Tag Archives: Abstract of judgment or minute order

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000158

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant appeals the trial court’s resentencing order, arguing prejudicial error occurred because he was not present at the resentencing hearing in the 1172.6 proceedings and did not waive his constitutional right to be present. We reverse and remand the matter with directions to hold a new hearing with defendant present or to obtain a valid waiver. The abstract of judgment currently reflects that he waived his presence, but this is incorrect, and it must be corrected if the defendant does not waive his presence on remand.

First Holding:

Penal Code section 1172.6 permits resentencing for a person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. if a prima facie case for relief is made, the statute requires an evidentiary hearing where the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty under the revised law. At this hearing, the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing,” and the “prosecutor and the petitioner may offer new or additional evidence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

A defendant has the constitutional right to be personally present in court where necessary to protect the defendant’s opportunity for effective cross-examination, or to allow the defendant to participate at a critical stage and enhance the fairness of the proceeding. This right is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution. Because a section 1172.6 hearing allows the court to potentially vacate a murder sentence through the admission of new evidence or by reweighing prior evidence, it is a critical stage and, as such, requires either a defendant’s presence or a valid waiver.

Authority:

People v. Quan (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 532

People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 57

People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, 150-151

Third Holding:

The minute order asserts defendant waived his presence, but this conflicts with the transcript of the hearing and we presume the reporter’s transcript is more accurate.

Authority:

Garner v. BNSF Railway Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660, 668

Fourth Holding:

Because a defendant’s absence from a critical stage in criminal proceedings is constitutional error, to be harmless it must be found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s absence did not affect the outcome of the proceeding.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 461

People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 902

Abstracts and Minutes, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000147

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) believed the abstract of judgment was ambiguous because the felony complaint had specifically alleged defendant’s offense was committed under circumstances that would have rendered it a violent felony pursuant to section 667.5(c)(21), but it is not clear from the Minute Order or the Abstract whether the allegation was found true.

The trial court responded by amending the abstract of judgment to check the box indicating that the offense for which petitioner was convicted constituted a violent felony and by forwarding a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to CDCR. We conclude the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the abstract of judgment in the manner that it did after execution had commenced, requiring vacatur of the amended abstract of judgment and reinstatement of the original abstract.

First Holding:

Where a trial court fails to make a necessary finding on a special allegation and imposes a sentence as if the finding were not true, we presume the omission was deliberate and the trial court’s silence operates as a not true finding. In Candelario, the defendant admitted the truth of a special allegation that he suffered a prior conviction at the time he entered his plea, but the trial court omitted any reference to the allegation in its minute order and abstract of judgment, although the printed form contained a box specifically for such entries.

In evaluating the effect of the omission, our high court explained that admission of the prior offense did not thereby relieve the court of its responsibility to pronounce judgment finding petitioner guilty of the substantive offense with a prior conviction, and to have such judgment entered in the official records of the court. If the record is silent in that regard, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be inferred that the omission was an act of leniency by the trial court. In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true. Even when the defendant admits the prior conviction, the court is not compelled to make a finding on the charge.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702

Second Holding:

The failure to check the box in the abstract of judgment form indicating that defendant’s conviction constituted a violent felony may have been erroneous, but under Candelario and other cases, any such error would have been upon judicial error and not an error in the abstract of judgment. Instead, the abstract of judgment appears fully consistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment omitting a true finding on the special allegation and imposing a sentence consistent with a conviction for a nonviolent felony.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702

People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14-15 [failure to mention prior conviction at the time judgment is pronounced must be interpreted as deliberate act of leniency]

People v. Gutierrez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1440 [When no words are used and the trier of fact fails to make a finding the effect is the same as a finding of not true]

People v. Burnett (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 257, 260-261 [On a silent record, the Court of Appeal will presume that the trial court’s failure to impose a statutorily mandated fine was a result of making factual findings in support of a statutory exception to imposition of the fine]

People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619, 635-636 [In the absence of any mention of necessary findings under the three strikes law at the time of sentencing or in the abstract of judgment, we treat defendants as if the trial court concluded the strike allegations were not true]

Third Holding:

Given our conclusion that the trial court’s original judgment in 2017 should be interpreted as a conviction for a nonviolent felony, the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the judgment to add a true finding. As the California Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced. And a judgment for imprisonment ordinarily is deemed executed when a certified copy of the minute order or abstract of judgment is furnished to the officer whose duty it is to execute the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089

Fourth Holding:

The exceptions to the rule are limited and do not apply here. This was not a clerical error that could be corrected at any time. This was not a request by CDCR for resentencing under section 1172.1 (which would prohibit a sentence greater than the initial sentence). Because the failure to make any finding on the special allegations pursuant to section 667.5 operates as a finding of not true on the allegation, the sentence was not unauthorized, so there is no need to enter the debate on the authority of a court to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, even when the matter has not vested jurisdiction.

Authority:

People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619, 635-636

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 1120 [holding a trial court that imposes an unauthorized sentence retains jurisdiction to correct the sentence at any time the error comes to its attention]

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, at pp. 67-68 [disagreeing with Codinha, stating that no cases hold that trial courts can act to correct unauthorized (or unlawful or invalid) sentences outside of some other posture where they independently have jurisdiction to do so]

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, at pp. 634-642 [The unauthorized sentence doctrine does not itself create jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated defendant’s motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence]

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 797

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000129

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody credits.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court waived the imposition of a restitution fine and the parole revocation fine and other fines and fees.  [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has the authority to do so, and I have listed some authorities below.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

As the People did not object in the court below, the People have forfeited the issue of the propriety of the trial court order waiving the restitution and other fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Third Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing. [GARY NOTE: the court did not cite authority for remanding for the court to determine custody credits, but the law is clear, per the authorities I have set forth below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000121

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court failed to recalculate the actual time defendant had served pursuant to the sentence for which he was being resentenced and reflect those credits in the amended abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Second Holding:

Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical error can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000120

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant submitted both a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion for recall and resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court erroneously treated both as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which it denied without prejudice to allow the defendant to separately file a petition under section 1172.6. Though contained in the same envelope and assigned a single case number by the court clerk, there were two separate matters presented to the trial court. The matter is remanded for the trial court to give due consideration to the petition/motion filed for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. There is also an error in the abstract of judgment that should be corrected, depending on the outcome of the hearing on the petition.

First Holding:

The record indicates that defendant submitted not only a petition for writ of habeas corpus, but also a separate motion for resentencing. The title page of the habeas petition states it was being filed concurrently with a motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant included a separate section 1172.6 “motion” with its own title page and caption designating it as such. That defendant, a prisoner, mailed the documents in one envelope as opposed to two, and placed his “motion” for resentencing before the exhibits to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, does not change the fact he submitted a separate “motion” to the court. As for the assignment of only one case number—for the habeas proceeding—this was a clerical matter over which defendant had no control. The trial court was required to consider the motion/petition filed under section 1172.6.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960 [where resentencing petition complies with the three facial sufficiency requirements of sec. 1172.6(b), the court proceeds to consider whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under subd. (c)]

Second Holding:

The abstract contains an error on whether the two counts were ordered served concurrently or consecutively. Should the trial court determine defendant is ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6, we direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment that corrects this error.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical error in their records at any time and appellate courts that have assumed jurisdiction over a case may order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes

Case: 000115

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We did find an error in the abstract of judgment, which we will direct the trial court to correct. Whether the trial court clerk intended to record the date of the verdict or the date defendant was sentenced, the clerk failed to correctly record either. We shall direct the trial court to correct the abstract accordingly.

Holding:

The abstract of judgment was incorrect. It reflected the day of the year that the verdict was entered, except in 2021 rather than 2024. The judgment itself was entered later in 2024. We shall direct the trial court to correct the abstract accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate court may order correction of clerical errors in the abstract of judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000114

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the defendant’s presentence custody credits and his sentence on the attempted murder count. We accordingly modify the judgment to correct these sentencing errors and affirm the judgment as modified.

First Holding:

While a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole becomes eligible for parole after serving seven years, the correct sentence to be imposed remains life with the possibility of parole, plus any determinate enhancements. The abstract of judgment, which currently describes the sentence on the attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation as “seven years to life,” must be corrected accordingly. [Gary note: The court did not provide its authority for ordering that the abstract of judgment be corrected, but there are many cases it could have cited. I have listed some below, which were not in the opinion but support the correction.]

Authority:

PEN 3046(a)(1)

PEN 664(a)

People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4 [shorthand pronouncement of seven years to life where statutory term is life with the possibility of parole is incorrect because it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

The trial court miscalculated the credit for time served. The defendant is entitled to three additional days, and the abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly. [GARY NOTE: The court did not provide any authority for this correction, most likely because it is so obvious that it must be corrected. Authorities supporting the court’s order (but not cited by the court) could include those I set forth below, among others.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527

Abstracts and Minutes, Jury trial, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case: 000111

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We affirm the judgment of conviction as to defendant A. We reverse defendant B’s count 1 felony murder conviction, and otherwise affirm his judgment. The People concede both abstracts of judgment must be amended; we agree and remand with directions. The People concede and we agree the abstracts of judgment erroneously state that the convictions in counts 2, 4, and 6 are for first degree robbery. Both defendants were charged with second degree robbery, and the juries were instructed only on that theory. There are several other errors in the abstracts of judgment that must be corrected.

First Holding:

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the sufficiency of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record independently for substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302

People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60

Second Holding:

Defendant A [the actual killer] contends there was no evidence he aided and abetted Defendant B in the count 6 robbery and count 7 assault. A person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that crime even if someone else committed some or all of the criminal acts. A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. Mere presence at the scene of a crime or knowledge of, but failure to prevent the crime, are not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting its commission. However, factors which may be considered to determine aiding and abetting include presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.

Authority:

People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 851

People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409

Third Holding:

Section 189(e) provides that a participant in a specified felony is liable for murder for a death during the commission of the offense only if one of the following is proven: (1) The person was the actual killer. (2) The person, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer. (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

PEN 189(e)

Fourth Holding:

There are several factors courts should consider in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life: What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used? Reckless indifference and the element of major participant significantly overlap, for the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615

Fifth Holding:

Defendant B was not the actual killer, but was convicted on the basis of felony murder (item (3)). We need not decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, defendant was a major participant because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support that he exhibited reckless indifference to human life. The actus reus for the felony-murder aider and abettor special circumstance requires more than simply being an aider and abettor of the underlying felony under section 31. The special circumstance requires that the defendant be a major participant in the underlying felony.

Likewise, the mens rea requirement for the felony-murder aider and abettor special circumstance is different from that required for first degree felony murder. The special circumstance requires that the defendant have reckless indifference to human life. A defendant’s knowing participation in a robbery with others who are armed is insufficient, without more, to prove the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any armed crime is insufficient, because a defendant must knowingly create a grave risk of death through the defendant’s own actions. Reckless indifference encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of the defendant’s actions. Reckless indifference to human life has both a subjective and an objective element.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 615-617

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 794, 807-810

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Sixth Holding:

In committing the count 1 felony robbery, Defendant A entered the convenience store alone, and therefore Defendant B had no opportunity to restrain him, or to aid the victim. The evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant B was aware, when they left the third convenience store, that Defendant A had killed the victim. This factor weighs against a finding of reckless indifference. Defendant B had no meaningful opportunity to aid the victim before the shooting.

However contemptible the court may find a defendant’s conduct following a killing, the governing standard is not satisfied by evidence that the defendant was generally indifferent to the fact that someone has been killed. It requires evidence that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant acted with indifference toward the grave risk that someone could be killed. Though the former may be evidence of the latter, it is insufficient, standing alone, to support murder liability. While it is true a defendant’s willingness to engage in an armed robbery with individuals known to him to use lethal force may give rise to the inference that the defendant disregarded a grave risk of death, no evidence was presented at trial that Defendant A was known to have a propensity for violence, let alone evidence indicating that Defendant B was aware of such a propensity.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 894-895

Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157

Seventh Holding:

The abstracts of judgment contain several errors that must be corrected. The abstracts of judgment erroneously state that the convictions in three counts are for first degree robbery. The verdict forms do not specify the degree of the robberies. But under California law, upon the failure of the jury or the court to determine the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty, it shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree. Therefore, we conclude that the robberies in the three counts are in the second degree.

The jury convicted both defendants of being a felon in possession of a firearm and not a “convicted felon and narcotic” as stated in the abstracts of judgment. As to Defendant A, the abstract of judgment shows the court imposed a consecutive full term of three years for one of the counts. However, the court orally stated, “Under [that count], the court is going to use one-third the midterm for that charge of one year, and that will run consecutive to the determinate terms under [two other counts].” Given this discrepancy, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls.

Authority:

PEN 1157

People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1222, fn. 14.

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000106

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court modified the defendant’s sentence only to the extent required under sections 1172.75 and 1170.18, but otherwise left the balance intact, finding that the defendant remained a danger to the public. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate the days of actual custody and to correct the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Because the sentence was modified under PC 1172.75, the trial court erred in not calculating the actual days in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s finding that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(1)

Third Holding:

The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that it is highly probable the facts which he asserts are true.

Authority:

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998

Fourth Holding:

The narrow definition of danger to public safety under PC 1170.18 does not apply to the undefined term of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. [GARY NOTE: after the opinion in this case 000106 was filed, the Supreme Court ruled in Guevara that it was constitutionally necessary to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act’s understanding of the term “unreasonable risk to public safety” within the meaning of section 1170.126 (enacted by initiative) in order to reconcile the application of section 1172.75 (enacted by the Legislature) to those who would otherwise qualify but are serving a sentence under the Three Strikes Law (an initiative provision).]

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 374, 374-375

[People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838]

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a determinate term of 14 years instead of 10 years, and it must be corrected. [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority, most likely because the error and solution are obvious. There are many relevant cases supporting this holding, some of which I have set out below.]

Authority:

People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938

People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Abstracts and Minutes, Plea bargains

Case: 000102

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Our independent review of the record discloses that the trial court inadvertently failed to dismiss one of the charged counts after accepting the defendant’s no contest plea to the remaining counts. We shall modify the judgment to reflect dismissal of that count. The abstract of judgment contained several errors that must be corrected.

First Holding:

Because the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the approved plea, the court’s silence at the sentencing hearing regarding dismissal of a count was not an exercise of judicial discretion but rather a clerical error in the record of judgment.

Authority:

PEN 1192.5

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [parties must abide by the terms of the plea agreement, including the dismissal of other counts]

Second Holding:

The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order, which may not modify the judgment it purports to digest.

Authority:

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Abstracts and Minutes

Case: 000100

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. The abstract of judgment as it relates to the sentence should be corrected to reflect that counts 2 and 4 were stayed.

Holding:

When an abstract of judgment does not reflect the actual sentence imposed in the trial judge’s verbal pronouncement, this court has the inherent power to correct such clerical error on appeal, whether on our own motion or upon application of the parties.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case: 000092

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The clerk of the superior court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court did not impose any prior-prison-term enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The clerk of the superior court is directed to forward copies of the corrected abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

First Holding:

As the judge did not orally impose any prior-prison-term enhancements, section 1172.5 does not come into play, despite a reference to the priors in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2020, SB 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, sec. 1) amended section 667.5 to limit the enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses (sec. 667.5(b)).

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, SB 483 made the change retroactive to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1062

Fourth Holding:

Penal Code 1172.75 affords relief when the sentence enhancement was imposed but the punishment on the enhancement was stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

Fifth Holding:

An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and will affirm on any correct ground.

Authority:

People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 800

Sixth Holding:

An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Seventh Holding:

The abstract may be corrected at any time when it does not reflect the oral pronouncements.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185