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Case Summaries

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Sentencing

Case: 000440

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in imposing concurrent sentences on counts 3 and 4. The sentences on counts 3 and 4 must be stayed under section 654.

First Holding:

The sentences on counts 3 and 4 must be stayed under section 654 because these counts were based on the same acts for which sentence was imposed on counts 1 and 2. Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act or omission, or an indivisible course of conduct. Under section 654(a), an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. If a defendant has two convictions, punishment for one of which is precluded by section 654, that section requires the sentence for one conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed. Section 654 does not allow any multiple punishment, including either concurrent or consecutive sentences. Section 654 does not, however, preclude multiple punishment when the defendant’s violent act injures different victims.

Authority:

PC 654

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591-592

Second Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000439

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Relief is granted on this petition for writ of habeas corpus. The defendant is entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75. In August 2022, pursuant to (now) section 1172.75, the trial court entered an order modifying petitioner’s judgment by dismissing the enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). It is undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the court’s intent to modify the judgment, was not appointed counsel, was not notified of any court proceedings related to modification of the judgment, and did not appear at any such proceedings. It is also undisputed that the court did not conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, what is now section 1172.75 declared invalid most sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identifies a defendant serving a term for a judgment including a qualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement, the trial court is required to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The court is also required to appoint counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. Section 1172.75 creates a presumption that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed. It expressly requires the court to consider postconviction factors, including evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing, and it guides the trial court in selecting among the lower, middle, and upper term on each count. In this case, the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, including the application of any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. It was proper for him to seek relief by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances in this case.

Authority:

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 359–361

In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 449–450 [Frequently used to challenge criminal convictions already affirmed on appeal, the writ of habeas corpus permits a person deprived of his or her freedom, such as a prisoner, to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record, and often represents a prisoner’s last chance to obtain judicial review. A writ of habeas corpus may thus provide an avenue of relief to those unjustly incarcerated when the normal method of relief—i.e., direct appeal—is inadequate]

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000438

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in calculating his sentence, and we therefore remand for a full resentencing. At that resentencing, the trial court may revisit the aggravating factors, so we decline to decide today the defendant’s challenge to one aggravating factor. We likewise decline to decide whether the victim’s mother and sister were properly named as protected persons on the criminal protective order, as the trial court must also determine the scope of the protective order in fully resentencing the defendant.

There were also errors in the minute order and the abstract of judgment because they reflected imposition of multiple fines that were not imposed in the court’s oral pronouncement.

First Holding:

It was error for the court to sentence the defendant under section 667.71 and also sentence him to a determine term. Section 667.71, also known as the “Two Strikes” law, provides that a habitual sexual offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. A habitual sexual offender is defined as a person who has been previously convicted of one or more of certain specified offenses and who is convicted in the present proceeding of one of those offenses. Among the specified offenses is lewd or lascivious act in violation of section 288(a).

The Two Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme for specified sexual offenses. Unlike a sentence enhancement, which imposes an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term, the Two Strikes law sets forth an alternate penalty for the underlying felony itself when the defendant has satisfied specified conditions. In other words, the trial court may either sentence the defendant under the penalty specified in the underlying statute or based on the Two Strikes law, but not both.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 360

People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 155

People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 118 [discussing One Strike law]

Second Holding:

Because we find the trial court’s sentence as to count 2 is unauthorized, we remand for a full resentencing as to all counts to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Third Holding:

As there were errors in the minute order and abstract of judgment listing multiple fines that were not imposed in the oral pronouncement of judgment, we trust the court’s minutes and abstract of judgment will track the court’s oral pronouncement on remand.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [Rendition of the judgment is normally an oral pronouncement, and the abstract of judgment cannot add to, or modify, the judgment, but only purports to digest and summarize it]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000437

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates a restitution fine of $3,400 to be paid, rather than the $2,400 imposed by the trial court. It must be corrected.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment–likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious–but there is plenty of authority, which I cite below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109 [court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in abstract of judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000436

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in that it indicates that the trial court imposed a restitution fund fine of $330 pursuant to section 1202.4 but at sentencing the trial court stated that the amount of that fine was $300. It must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000435

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand for the trial court to modify the judgment to reflect an additional five days of presentence custody credit.

Holding:

The defendant is entitled to all days of custody, and there was an error in the trial court’s calculation.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000434

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a continuance to obtain documents from the California Department of Corrections (CDCR). We conclude that the error prejudiced defendant because the trial court lacked potential information relevant to exercising its discretion. Additionally, the record does not show that when it denied the requested continuance, the court understood the full scope of its discretion. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b)is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(d)(3) provides that the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. Where defendant’s original sentence included a now-invalid sentencing enhancement the resentencing court must provide a full resentencing hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, one factor to consider is whether a continuance would be useful. Here, a continuance was merited because it would have allowed defense counsel to obtain potential evidence relevant to resentencing from the CDCR. The People did not oppose the requested continuance. The burden of a continuance was minimal because there would have been no need to reschedule witnesses or consider juror inconvenience.

We do not agree that the denial of a continuance was harmless. The record does not indicate the court understood the extent of its discretion when it denied the continuance. The court incorrectly stated that its only discretion was whether to strike the additional 25-to-life gun allegation, when in fact the court had discretion to reduce the 25-year-term to impose a lesser included enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118

People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829, 839–840

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020–1021, 1030 [trial court has discretion to strike enhancement and impose lesser included sec. 12022.53 enhancement or other lesser included enhancement]

Third Holding:

Section 1050(b) generally requires a written motion to request a continuance, but section 1050(c) states that, notwithstanding subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision, albeit absent a showing good cause, sanctions may be imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1050

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000433

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6, because substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) overhauled the state’s murder statutes to more equitably sentence offenders according to their involvement in homicide offenses. It amended section 188 to require that a principal act with express or implied malice and amended section 189 to state that a person can be liable for felony murder only if: (1) the person was the actual killer; (2) the person, with an intent to kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.

These ameliorative changes eliminated murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other imputed malice theories based solely on a person’s participation in a crime and narrowed the first degree felony murder rule. The Legislature has since expanded eligibility for relief to those convicted of manslaughter. Individuals convicted under the former law may seek retroactive relief under the law as amended pursuant to section 1172.6 Where the trial court issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the changes to section 188 or 189.

Authority:

SB 1437

PEN 1172.6

PEN 188(a)(3) [Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime]

People v. Strong (2002) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707 [SB 1437 significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule]

Second Holding:

We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.

We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658

People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 358

Third Holding:

When SB 1437 amended Penal Code section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark. Banks and Clark, in turn, utilized Tison and Enmund as guideposts to delineate the contours of the major participant and reckless indifference standards for felony murder.

Banks and Clark laid out nonexclusive lists of factors that a court may consider when determining whether a defendant is a major participant in felony murder, or acted with reckless indifference to human life. No one of the Banks or Clark factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient to establish a defendant was a major participant or acted recklessly indifferent to a grave risk of death during an offense.

Authority:

People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616, 618

Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137

Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782

People v. Strong (2002) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710

Fourth Holding:

Reckless indifference to human life is implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death. It encompasses a willingness to kill or to assist another in killing to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.

Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively, recklessness is determined by what a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation, that is, whether defendant’s conduct involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would observe. Participation in a garden-variety armed robbery, i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616-617

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 884

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [the fact a participant or planner of an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life]

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case: 000432

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the petition for recall of sentence for attempted murder under section 1172.6 because there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill. We reverse the order denying the petition and remand the matter with directions for the trial court to grant the resentencing petition, vacate the attempted murder conviction, and resentence on the remaining charges.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of the felony murder rule. Except in cases of felony murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. A defendant convicted of murder or attempted murder under a now-invalid theory may petition the sentencing court to have his or her conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts under section 1172.6.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Second Holding:

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted murder under a currently valid theory. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(d)(3)

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings following a section 1172.6(d) hearing for substantial evidence. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

Fourth Holding:

To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. A defendant cannot be convicted of attempting to kill someone if the defendant is not aware that person is present. Because direct evidence of a defendant’s intent is rare, intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.

Authority:

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 191

People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1079

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741

Fifth Holding:

A defendant may be convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor. To be convicted under such a theory, the defendant must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054

Sixth Holding:

Without any evidence that someone inside the co-defendant’s car targeted or otherwise shot at another person when they fired the underlying shots, we can only speculate as to whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill. Speculation is not substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 735

Seventh Holding:

The trial court also improperly relied on its own experience as a former gang prosecutor when it denied the petition, noting that it had prosecuted several cases against members of a gang in the 1990’s in explaining why it found that the defendant acted with the intent to kill. The court’s personal experience is not evidence.

Authority:

Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 236, 286

Eighth Holding:

When admitting a sentencing enhancement, the defendant admits only the facts necessary to establish the enhancement’s elements.

Authority:

People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000431

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The superior court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a midterm sentence in the absence of any indication that the superior court was aware of the requirements of section 1170(b)(6) regarding a lower-term presumption where the defendant makes a showing of childhood trauma sufficient to trigger the presumption. We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing

First Holding:

In relevant part, section 1170(b)(6), provides that, unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. Here, as the Attorney General concedes, the defendant made a sufficient showing in this respect, thus triggering the lower term presumption. The contested issue, then, is whether the superior court actually found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

Second Holding:

On the present record, we cannot conclude the court made that finding. First, the court did not expressly conduct the inquiry that would allow such a finding to be made: The court neither referred to section 1170(b)(6), nor invoked its language. Second, the record does not affirmatively show compliance with the statutory sentencing mandate, as is required when the court has not expressly complied. The court’s averment that “looking at the mitigating factors is where you start nowadays” is too vague to be an affirmative indication that the court was aware that the lower term was presumptive.

Similarly, the court’s decision to select the midterm after referring to aggravating factors is different from a finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, as is required to defeat the presumption in favor the lower-term sentence. Indeed, on the sentencing form signed by the sentencing judge, no marking has been made on the field that reads, “[25] Aggravation factors outweigh those in mitigation,” even though several other fields on the form are marked. In short, this record gives us no reason to believe the court complied with section 1170(b)(6).

Authority:

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991 [the record must affirmatively show compliance with a statutory sentencing mandate whenever the mandate has been triggered by an initial showing of the applicability of the statute]

AppellateAdvisor Updates

Case: 000430

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to impose the full term for an enhancement attached to the offense that was designated as a subordinate term.

First Holding:

A sentencing court has a duty to impose the punishment prescribed by law, and has no discretion to deviate from the statutorily specified penalty. When the trial court has imposed a sentence that could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case, it has imposed an unauthorized sentence that must be corrected even if raised for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 12

People v. Martinez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012

People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962

Second Holding:

Defendant was convicted of two or more felonies. Section 1170.1(a) required the trial court to select a principal term and designate the terms for his other convictions as subordinate terms. The conviction carrying the greatest term of imprisonment is designated the principal term. For the conviction designated as the principal term, the court must impose the full term. Subordinate terms and their applicable enhancements receive one-third of the middle term. The count to which the enhancement was designated as a subordinate term, so the court should have imposed only one-third of its middle term rather than its full term.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 202

Third Holding:

Counts that are subject to full-term sentencing under PC 667.6 are not to be including in any determination under section 1170.1. Thus, it was not error for the court to designate count 7 (which was not subject to section 667.6) as the principal term (to be served as a full term) under section 1170.1 even though the court had imposed sentence on two other counts as full term under section 667.6.

Authority:

People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115

[GARY NOTE: though the purpose for which Pelayo was cited continues to be true, Pelayo’s recitation of section 1170.1’s treatment of enhancements on subordinate terms is outdated, as section 1170.1 has since been amended to include enhancements on subordinate terms whether or not the subordinate term was for a violent felony.]
Discretion, Sentencing

Case: 000429

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

An insurer is not a “direct victim” eligible for restitution under section 1202.4

First Holding:

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164, 179

Second Holding:

In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. Victim includes a corporation or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime. Thus, only the direct victim of a crime is entitled to restitution from the perpetrator of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f)

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1537

Third Holding:

Direct victims include only the real and immediate objects of the defendant’s offenses Insurance companies that suffered the consequences of crime only by reimbursing the crime-related losses of their policyholders do not reasonably fit within this definition. As a result, restitution may not be awarded to insurers that partially reimbursed the direct victims for their losses, and trial courts may not divide the full amount of restitution between the victims and their insurers.

Authority:

People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 233

Fourth Holding:

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded restitution to the insurer. Instead, the court should have awarded the full restitution amount, including any amount awarded to the insurer, to the water district, which was the direct victim of the defendant’s crime, notwithstanding any reimbursement it already received from the insurer.

Authority:

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1537[a restitution order resting upon a demonstrable error of law constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion]

People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1272 [insurance payments to the victim do not allow the defendant to escape responsibility for the losses he caused]

Fifth Holding:

Because the defendant does not contest the amount of restitution or the water district’s entitlement to that amount on appeal, we vacate the insurer restitution order and remand the matter so the court can order full restitution to the correct victim under section 1202.4.

Authority:

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 [remanding so the trial court can order restitution to the victim for the amount that the hospital will accept as full payment for the medical services the victim received at the hospital]