AppellateAdvisor Law Library Background

Case Summaries

Welcome to the Appellate Advisor blog! Please feel free to scroll through the case summaries in chronological order, or search by keyword, category, or tags. It may be helpful to start with the Welcome Post.

Elements of crime, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000922

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor committed count 1 (conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm).

First Holding:

Conspiracy is an inchoate crime. A conviction of conspiracy requires proof that the defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act by one or more of the parties to such agreement in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Criminal conspiracy is an offense distinct from the actual commission of a criminal offense that is the object of the conspiracy. Other than the agreement, the only act required is an overt act by any of the conspirators, not necessarily the defendant, and that overt act need not itself be criminal. Conspiracy thus criminalizes preparatory conduct at an earlier stage than an attempt to commit a crime.

As an inchoate crime, conspiracy fixes the point of legal intervention at the time of agreement to commit a crime, and thus reaches further back into preparatory conduct than attempt. An overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy must occur after the agreement but before the completed offense.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616, superseded on other grounds in People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 142

People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 560, overruled in part on other grounds in Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 376

People v. Brown (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1361, 1368

Second Holding:

Conspiracy requires specific intent to commit the target offense. The mental state elements of conspiracy require the prosecution to demonstrate the defendant had the specific intent both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the object offense.

The two elements are distinct, but closely related. In some cases, it may be useful to distinguish between the two elements, especially when evidence of one is direct and the other is circumstantial. But in many cases, proof of the two specific intent elements will overlap.

Together, these two specific intent elements play a critical role in a conspiracy prosecution: Proof of these elements is what separates a coconspirator from a mere bystander to the crime.

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 164

People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 600

People v. Marsh (1962) 58 Cal.2d 732, 742–744 [focusing on intent to commit a crime where there was clear evidence of intent to agree]

People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 629 [focusing on intent to agree where there was clear evidence of intent to commit a crime]

Third Holding:

The First Amendment forbids punishing a person merely for associating with others—even as part of a group premised on a violent aim. Because the law will not recognize a rule of guilt by association, we insist on proof of a defendant’s knowledge of, and specific intent to further, the group’s unlawful ends.

Authority:

Scales v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 203

Elfbrandt v. Russell (1966) 384 U.S. 11, 19 [A law that applies to membership without the specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization rests on the doctrine of guilt by association, which has no place here]

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) 561 U.S. 1, 18 [noting that mere membership in, or association with, an organization that advocates terrorism cannot itself be criminalized]

Fourth Holding:

To prove conspiracy, the prosecution need not establish the intent to participate in every act necessary to complete the object offense. But ultimately, to connect any individual to the charged conspiracy, the prosecution must at least establish that the individual specifically intended to agree to commit the criminal offense and to play at least some role in achieving it.

Authority:

Salinas v. United States (1997) 522 U.S. 52, 63 [A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense]

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 166-167

Fifth Holding:

We must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, and then determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Sufficiency determinations necessarily take account of the standard of proof that applied before the trial court.

That is why in criminal cases we must ensure the record demonstrates substantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167

Sixth Holding:

We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

But we cannot, however, venture beyond the evidence presented at trial, and may consider only those inferences that are reasonably supported by the record.

A reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. It must logically flow from other facts established in the action, and it cannot be based entirely on the suspicions of the officers involved in the case and the conjecture of the prosecution.

In sum, after considering the record in its entirety, we conclude that the evidence presented at the contested jurisdiction hearing is insufficient to show that minor had the requisite specific intent to participate in a conspiracy to commit the target offense of assault with a firearm.

(Gary note: I omitted the recitation of facts the court relied on to reach its conclusion after applying the various principles set forth in the opinion and this summary.)

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167-168

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000921

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was 16 years old when he committed attempted murder on two people, and he was convicted by plea as an adult in 2015. He subsequently petitioned under section 1172.6 for recall of his sentence in light of changes to the law on liability for murder and attempted murder by those who were not the direct perpetrators. He was resentenced to five years in prison.

On appeal, he contends correctly that the court should have conducted a transfer hearing in light of changes in the statute enacted through Proposition 57.

Holding:

In 2016, voters passed “The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016” to obligate the People to criminally charge a minor in the juvenile court unless the juvenile court determines after a transfer hearing that the minor should be tried and sentenced as an adult.

This part of the act applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. When a court vacates a criminal sentence after a successful petition for resentencing, it reacquires jurisdiction to reimpose punishment and the judgment reverts to being nonfinal for that purpose.

The parties agree that the defendant is entitled to a juvenile court transfer hearing, and for these reasons so do we.

But we emphasize: Whatever potential that hearing may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of guilt.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, 304, 305–307

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158, 161-162, 167, 169-170

Fourth Amendment

Case 000920

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearm — which was obtained after a warrantless search of his car — because no exception to the warrant requirement justified the search.

(Gary note: As with most search and seizure opinions, the facts are incredibly important to the result of the motion to suppress evidence. Because unpublished cases cannot be cited, they are literally worthless as cases to which you can compare your own client’s situation to demonstrate that your client should have the same result (suppression). So I am not setting forth the extensive set of facts that resulted in the reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. I have concentrated simply on the applicable law governing how courts are to assess the facts.)

First Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within a specific judicially recognized exception. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally prohibited from being used in criminal trials.

Authority:

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1213

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359

People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 125

People v. Marquez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 402, 411

Second Holding:

Defendants may move to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a warrantless, unreasonable search or seizure. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing an exception applies.

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence — evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Having engaged in that review, we conclude none of the People’s proffered exceptions to the warrant requirement apply here.

Authority:

PEN 1538.5(a)(1)(A)

People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795

People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212

People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 937

Third Holding:

Searching the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden is permissible, but the officer must possess a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer’s belief that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.

The issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.

In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight is given to specific reasonable inferences the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Authority:

Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30–31

Fourth Holding:

The circumstances here, however, demonstrate the officer improperly acted on his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch to search the car. The officer’s belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous based primarily upon his carrying a crossbody bag was purely speculative.

Authority:

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27,

People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 490 [officer’s testimony that defendant was armed and dangerous because he wore baggy clothing that could conceal a weapon even though it naturally had bulges was speculative and lacking in specific, articulable facts]

Fifth Holding:

That the gas station was in a high crime area does not elevate the carrying of a crossbody bag into a reasonable suspicion of criminality, as the People contend. Many citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that have high crime rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit relatives or friends.

Courts are reluctant to conclude that a location’s crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual.

There was no testimony regarding any reason to believe the defendant was in a gang. The officer had never met the defendant and had no knowledge of his history.

The defendant’s presence in that area, standing alone, did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.

(Gary note: I have cited a few of the authorities relied on by the court, but there were other purported justifications presented by the prosecution, and the appellate court found simply that they did not justify the search. For a degree of brevity and readability, I have chosen to end the summary with the authorities shown below.)

Authority:

People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 645

In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 897 [high crime area justification is so easily subject to abuse that this fact alone should not be deemed sufficient to support the intrusion], superseded by constitutional amendment on another point in In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460, fn. 2.

King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 286

People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1052 [knowledge of person’s history of violence and possession of weapons provided reasonable suspicion suspect was armed and dangerous]

People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233

Amelioration, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 000919

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to consideration for resentencing under section 1172.75 even though she stipulated to the upper term in her original plea agreement. The matter is remanded.

Under Mitchell, the defendant is free to raise the issue of whether section 1171 precludes the setting aside of her plea if the court modifies the sentence to something less than the stipulated sentence.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s provisions notwithstanding her agreement to a specified term as part of a plea bargain.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729

Second Holding:

The proper remedy is to remand this case and permit the defendant to pursue relief under the new benefit that SB 567 confers. On remand, the defendant may either waive or invoke the requirements of section 1170(b). If she reaffirms her acceptance of the plea bargain and enters a new waiver of section 1170(b)’s requirements, the court shall reinstate the original sentence as negotiated by the parties.

If she declines to enter that waiver, in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify the existing plea agreement to specify a midterm sentence. If the court also accepts the modification it shall sentence the defendant accordingly. If no such agreement is reached and approved, the defendant’s remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain. In that case the court shall set aside the plea, the matter shall proceed as to the defendant as if no plea had been entered, and the case shall be set for trial.

In keeping with footnote 9 of Mitchell, however, on our remand to the trial court, the defendant may present her argument that section 1171, enacted effective 1/1/25, provides that any modification of her sentence under ameliorative provisions shall not result in setting aside her plea.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000918

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Following the invitation by the defendant to recall his sentence under section 1170.1, the trial court did recall his sentence and resentenced him to a considerably lesser number of years, but still more than 50 years to life. We affirm the trial court’s resentencing decision, with directions to make a correction to the record.

The trial court appropriately and correctly recalculated his credit for time served, but the abstract of judgment fails to reflect the recalculation. 

Holding:

We direct the trial court on remittitur to amend and forward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) the abstract of judgment to reflect more than 10,000 days of actual credit and conduct credit that the trial court determined defendant was entitled to as of the resentencing date.

[Gary note: The court does not list any authority for ordering correction of the abstract of judgment, most likely because the authority is so obvious. But for your convenience, I have listed some of the cases that the court could have cited.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2