Error and/or relief
It was error to deny defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6, because substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
First Holding:
Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) overhauled the state’s murder statutes to more equitably sentence offenders according to their involvement in homicide offenses. It amended section 188 to require that a principal act with express or implied malice and amended section 189 to state that a person can be liable for felony murder only if: (1) the person was the actual killer; (2) the person, with an intent to kill, was an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the first degree; or (3) the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
These ameliorative changes eliminated murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other imputed malice theories based solely on a person’s participation in a crime and narrowed the first degree felony murder rule. The Legislature has since expanded eligibility for relief to those convicted of manslaughter. Individuals convicted under the former law may seek retroactive relief under the law as amended pursuant to section 1172.6 Where the trial court issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder under California law as amended by the changes to section 188 or 189.
Authority:
SB 1437
PEN 1172.6
PEN 188(a)(3) [Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime]
People v. Strong (2002) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707 [SB 1437 significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule]
Second Holding:
We review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.
We examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reweigh the evidence or revisit credibility issues, but rather presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Where the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant the judgment’s reversal.
Authority:
People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885
People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298
People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658
People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 919, 924-925
People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 358
Third Holding:
When SB 1437 amended Penal Code section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark. Banks and Clark, in turn, utilized Tison and Enmund as guideposts to delineate the contours of the major participant and reckless indifference standards for felony murder.
Banks and Clark laid out nonexclusive lists of factors that a court may consider when determining whether a defendant is a major participant in felony murder, or acted with reckless indifference to human life. No one of the Banks or Clark factors is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient to establish a defendant was a major participant or acted recklessly indifferent to a grave risk of death during an offense.
Authority:
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616, 618
Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782
People v. Strong (2002) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710
Fourth Holding:
Reckless indifference to human life is implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death. It encompasses a willingness to kill or to assist another in killing to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.
Recklessness has both a subjective and an objective component. Subjectively, the defendant must consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively, recklessness is determined by what a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation, that is, whether defendant’s conduct involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would observe. Participation in a garden-variety armed robbery, i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.
Authority:
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 616-617
People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 884
In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [the fact a participant or planner of an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life]