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Case Summaries

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Elements of crime, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000516

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

For section 136.1 (dissuasion of witness) to apply [prior to its amendment effective 1/1/26], the attempt at dissuading must be performed prior to the commencement of the parole revocation proceedings. There was insufficient evidence to prove that parole revocation proceedings had commenced after the alleged attempt to dissuage.

(GARY NOTE: Effective 1/1/2026, section 136.1 was amended to eliminate the ambiguity under which Reynoza concluded that section 136.1 applies only if the alleging document has not yet been filed. The original language (by the use of the word “and”) ambiguously implied that, to constitute a violation, the defendant had to attempt to dissuade not only the filing of the charges, but also assistance in the prosecution once filed.

(Under that interpretation, if the only attempt at dissuasion took place after charges were filed, then the evidence was not sufficient to show that there was an attempt to dissuade from the filing of the charges. In direct response to Reynoza, section 136.1 now has changed the “and” to an “or,” the effect of which makes section 136.1 applicable to attempted dissuasion occurring on or after 1/1/2026, whether the attempt at dissuasion took place before or after charges were filed. I have included this summary because there may still be some defendants whose alleged misconduct occurred prior to 1/1/26 and must be prosecuted under the law in effect at the time of the crime.)

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A reviewing court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Reversal is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 944

People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

Second Holding:

Under Reynoza, where criminal charges have already been filed, postcharging dissuasion alone does not constitute an offense under section 136.1(b)(2). In Reynoza, all evidence of the defendant’s dissuasive conduct occurred after the underlying charging document had been filed. Therefore, since there was no substantial evidence that the dissuasive conduct occurred before charges were filed, the court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the conviction.

Authority:

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 1013

Third Holding:

There is no substantial evidence that satisfies the required element that defendant’s dissuading conduct occurred before proceedings were initiated in order to support defendant’s section 136.1(b)(2) convictions. Absent substantial evidence to support the convictions, the judgment must be reversed. A reversal based on insufficient evidence shields defendant from retrial because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to convict the defendant. As such, defendant cannot be retried on counts 2 and 3

Authority:

People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 959

Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 41

[Gary Reminder:

[Reread what I wrote as a Gary note  in the Error and/or relief secrion above about the law having changed effective 1/1/26 for those whose crimes occurred on or after that date.  It demonstrates how critical it is for you to always check on exactly WHAT the language was for the crime on the date your client was alleged to have committed it.]
Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000515

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in sentencing him to the upper term when no aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information, he did not admit any aggravating circumstances, and no factfinder found any true beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

Under section 1170(b)(2), the court may impose the upper term only when aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge. That procedure was not followed here. A defendant, by entering into a plea agreement that includes the upper term as the maximum sentence, does not implicitly admit that his conduct could support that term. Specifically, while a plea agreement constitutes an admission to all the elements of the admitted offenses, it does not constitute an admission to any aggravating circumstance.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 48

People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1177

Second Holding:

Accordingly, the court here erred in sentencing the defendant to the upper term. Given the total absence of any admitted or proven aggravating circumstances, we cannot conclude this error was harmless. A remand for resentencing is thus required.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000514

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to consider whether the defendant, serving a Three Strikes life sentence, is entitled to reduction under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 and other ameliorative provisions at a new hearing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

SB 483, effective on January 1, 2022, added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, subsequently renumbered as section 1172.75. This section declares that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid. The Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each county are directed to identify individuals in custody and “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in section 1172.75(a) and provide the information to the court who sentenced the individuals identified. The court is directed to review the judgment, and if it included a sentencing enhancement described in section 1172.75(a), recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 modified the original Three Strikes law of 1994. Under Three Strikes, a third felony of any nature would draw a term of a minimum of 25 years to life if the defendant had previously suffered convictions for two serious felonies (as defined). Under the Reform Act, with certain exceptions, if the current felony is NOT one of the specified serious felony, the sentence would be treated as a two-strike case, in which the sentence would be a doubled determinate sentence rather than a life term.

When a defendant serving a Three Strikes term is resentenced under section 1172.75, the court must modify the Three Strikes term if the triggering third strike was not a serious or violent felony as defined, unless the resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public as that term has been construed in the context of the Reform Act. Pursuant to the full resentencing rule, the court may also exercise its sentencing discretion in light of any changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850, 878

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Third Holding:

With respect to sentencing error in particular, the statutory power of appellate courts to disqualify sentencing judges should be used sparingly and only where the interests of justice require it. The interests of justice require it, for example, where a reasonable person might doubt whether the trial judge was impartial, or where the court’s rulings suggest the ‘whimsical disregard’ of a statutory scheme. Erroneous rulings, without more, are not enough to justify the removal of a trial judge from further proceedings in a case.

Authority:

Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1256

Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 303

Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59–60

Abstracts and Minutes, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000513

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It is improper for a trial court to delegate to a probation officer whether to require a probationer to undergo residential substance abuse treatment.

First Holding:

In resolving whether a clerk’s transcript or the reporter’s transcript controls in the event of a conflict, we do not apply a mechanical rule in favor of the reporter’s transcript but instead consider the circumstances of each particular case to determine which portion of the record because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence. F

or reasons we explain below, in this case, we conclude that the clerk’s transcript best reflects the trial court’s intention to delegate to a probation officer whether to require the defendant to attend residential treatment. In this case the clerk’s minutes note that some of the probation conditions are set out in the probation order. Provision number nine of that order provides, “Complete a program of residential treatment and aftercare if directed by the probation officer.” The reporter’s transcript, however, with respect to this condition, states only, “Plead [sic] to any kind of treatment or aftercare if directed by probation.” We must determine which of the two versions reflects the court’s true intention.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599

Second Holding:

As a general rule, courts will attempt to harmonize the record if a conflict exists. Historically, when a conflict between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written record could not be resolved, the oral pronouncement was given preference However, the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599

People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346

Third Holding:

With respect to the type of record at issue here, when evaluating a court’s oral pronouncement of probation conditions, a thorough explanation of the conditions is not necessary if the defendant knows what the proposed conditions are. Therefore, the oral pronouncement may be less detailed than the probation order. In this instance, it is clear that the court summarized the conditions of the probation as outlined in the probation order proposed by the probation officer. We conclude that the court intended to adopt the language proposed, to the extent that it did not modify the language (as it did with some proposed conditions. We therefore conclude that the minute order and the probation order are to be given “greater credence” than the oral pronouncement in determining the applicable probation condition under review.

Authority:

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 [recital of probation conditions in court is unnecessary because conditions are spelled out in detail in the probation order]

People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599

Fourth Holding:

The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by the Constitution. Trial courts have the authority to determine if a defendant is eligible for probation and if so, which conditions would be appropriate under the circumstances. By ordering probation, a court may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.

Accordingly, a court may require a defendant to complete a residential treatment program, even though it would place a significant burden on a defendant’s liberty interests. A probation officer, on the other hand, has discretion to oversee and enforce the trial court’s orders. The probation officer may not create conditions not expressly authorized by the court.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

PEN 1203

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 903

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358

Fifth Holding:

It is an unconstitutional delegation to the probation officer to decide whether the defendant needed to complete residential treatment, as opposed to an outpatient program. Unlike outpatients, participants in residential programs may be confined to the treatment facility for the duration of the program, separated from family and friends, and unable to maintain a job. Given the significant liberty interests at stake, a court—not a probation officer—must make the decision to require a defendant to attend residential treatment.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 905

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Elements of crime, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000512

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find the evidence was sufficient and we affirm the jury trial convictions, there are errors in the indeterminate abstract of judgment insofar as it incorrectly reflects that two section 12022.53(b) personal use enhancements were found true. The jury found only one to be true. Also, the determinate abstract of judgment reflects the incorrect number of custody credits. There were other errors as well, but the matter must be remanded for further clarity on what should be included in the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

This court’s role in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is limited. When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the entire record to assess whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Additionally, when undertaking such review, our opinion that the evidence could reasonably be reconciled with a finding of innocence or a lesser degree of crime does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 800, 849

Second Holding:

Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. The taking element of robbery itself has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or carrying away the loot. A thing is in the immediate presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.

Authority:

PEN 211

People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165

People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 626-627

Third Holding:

An act may be robbery even if the property had been taken after the victim died. While it may be true that one cannot rob a person who is already dead when one first arrives on the scene, one can certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then taking his or her property.

Authority:

People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is forfeited for failure to support his argument with analysis and citation to evidence in the appellate record.

Authority:

Rules of Court rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)(C)

People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4 [an argument is forfeited if it is raised in a perfunctory fashion without any supporting analysis and authority]

Fifth Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because the need for correction of material errors is simply obvious. But the court could have cited a number of cases, a few of which I have laid out.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2