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Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case 000622

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant, age 23 at the time of the offense, was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He sought a Franklin hearing to be able to present evidence that could be considered as mitigating factors related to his youth at the time of the crime in the event there is ever a parole hearing. The trial court denied the motion to conduct the hearing, on the basis that LWOP inmates will never be considered for parole. Reversed. We cannot determine whether the basis of his conviction would render him eligible even if the reasoning in Briscoe regarding a violated of equal protection is sound. We remand the matter to allow defendant to establish he is entitled to a Franklin hearing.

First Holding:

A Franklin hearing permits parties to preserve evidence relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051. Certain persons are, however, categorically ineligible for youth offender parole hearings, including cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458-459

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843

Second Holding:

California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. To this end, section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to hold a parole hearing for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of the controlling offense. The minimum number of years of incarceration before eligibility was 15, 20, or 25 years, depending on the length and nature of the sentence imposed.

Authority:

PEN 3051

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843

Third Holding:

The court in Briscoe concluded, notwithstanding Hardin, section 3051 violates equal protection as applied to youth offenders who were convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant may have been so convicted and therefore might be entitled to relief under section 3051. The trial court consequently erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion. Without taking a position on the correctness of Briscoe, we remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility for a Franklin hearing.

Authority:

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 485, 494

Fourth Holding:

As a result of changes in the law regarding the liability of persons who were not the actual killer, a person may now be found guilty of murder if the person was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life as described in section 190.2(d). Section 190.2(d) is the section describing a special circumstance under which a person may be punished by death or LWOP.

Thus, a person may be convicted simply of first degree murder as a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life and be sentenced to either 25 years to life (the sentence for first degree murder without special circumstances) or LWOP (the sentence for the same act but in which the special circumstance was alleged that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life).

Briscoe concluded that section 3051 purports to include the defendants convicted of the same behavior and received a sentence of 25 years to life, but to exclude those for whom the special circumstance describing the same behavior was alleged and found true and an LWOP sentence was imposed.

Briscoe concluded that section 3051 improperly denied equal protection under those circumstances, and that such individual should be eligible for consideration under section 3051 even if the sentence was LWOP.

Authority:

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 494

Fifth Holding:

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.

The degree of justification required to satisfy equal protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue. For the classification at stake here, based on a person’s criminal sentence, the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

A court applying this standard finds a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose.

We analyze equal protection claims de novo

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 487

Sixth Holding:

Hardin considered that it does not violate equal protection for section 3051 to apply to those sentenced to LWOP who committed the offense before they were 18 years old but not apply to those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed as an adult.

The defendant Hardin did not demonstrate that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.

But the court made this conclusion without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute.

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838-839

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000621

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The credit for time served was miscalculated and is corrected.

Holding:

The juvenile court must subtract days that a juvenile spends in custody before disposition from their maximum period of physical confinement. The court subtracts the full period of precommitment custody starting with the day of arrest and including the day of the dispositional hearing. When, as in this case, there is no dispute about a calculation error, we need not remand the matter for recalculation. Instead, we may modify the dispositional order.

Authority:

WIC 875

PEN 2900.5

In re Antwon R. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 348, 352, 353 [minors are entitled to same reduction that adults receive under Penal Code section 2900.5]

People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735 [custody credit includes days of arrest and sentencing]

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000620

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a full resentencing conducted while vacating the defendant’s one-year prior prison sentence enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court declined to consider whether two of defendant’s prior “strike” convictions were still valid under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, denied his request to dismiss those strikes under section 1385, imposed a new 10-year criminal protective order, and re-imposed a $5,000 restitution fine.

The matter is reversed for the court to hold a full resentencing hearing and exercise its discretion on whether or not to strike the prior convictions. Further, the court had no jurisdiction to reimpose a restitution fine because it had been ordered more than 10 years earlier and was rendered expired.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.75, a defendant who is eligible to have a prior prison sentence enhancement stricken is entitled to a full resentencing, at which time the trial court is to apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 193, 195, review granted* Oct. 23, 2024, S286987

[*Gary note: The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Espino on July 2, 2026, and affirmed the result in the Court of Appeal Espino decision–that a person is entitled to relief under section 1172.75 even if the punishment for the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement was stricken–resolving a question that was left unanswered in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050)]

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 373

Second Holding:

In Guevara, our Supreme Court held that a trial court engaged in a full resentencing under section 1172.75 of a person serving a life sentence under the Three Strikes Law must apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, including its provision according trial courts a discretionary override—as to defendants who would otherwise be eligible for relief—not to grant relief if the court determines that resentencing the defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 849-850

Third Holding:

Reversal and remand are necessary so that the trial court may consider whether the Reform Act would apply to the third-strike sentences imposed in this case and, if so, whether exercise of the court’s discretionary override is warranted. On remand, the court may also entertain any further requests to dismiss the prior strike convictions under section 1385(a)—but not under section 1385(c).

Authority:

People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243-244

Fourth Holding:

However, the court may not impose a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4(b) because the 2025 amendment to section 1465.9 provides that a restitution fine expires 10 years after the date of imposition. Because the restitution fine in this case was imposed over 25 years ago, it expired and may not be reimposed.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038, on another point)

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000619

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect a four-year arson enhancement under section 451.1, subdivision (a)(5)—instead of subdivision (a)(1).

Holding:

The abstract reflects that the four-year arson enhancement was imposed under section 451.1(a)(1). The record demonstrates, however, that this enhancement was charged and proven based on appellant’s use of a device designed to accelerate the fire. That enhancement falls within subdivision (a)(5) of that statute. As such, we agree with appellant’s counsel that it is appropriate to order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect the proper subdivision.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time]

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000618

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We will reverse the conviction and remand for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s suitability for mental health diversion according to the factors in section 1001.36(c) and defendant’s current circumstances. To the extent the court exercises its residual discretion under section 1001.36(a), it must take into account the Legislature’s intent and the statute’s underlying purposes.

Although we express no opinion as to how the court should decide the matter on remand, we note that the suitability inquiry must be informed not only by defendant’s past performance but also by his present circumstances and prospects for diversion compliance.

First Holding:

Since 2018, section 1001.36 has afforded trial courts discretion to grant criminal defendants suffering from certain recognized mental disorders pretrial diversion to receive mental health treatment. Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The express purpose of the legislation was to increase diversion of eligible individuals, and legislative amendments have only confirmed the Legislature’s desire to expand mental health treatment through diversion.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 119

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891

Second Holding:

As currently enacted, a defendant accused of a qualifying offense is eligible for mental health diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental health disorder which was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If a defendant is found eligible for mental health diversion, a trial court must also consider whether the defendant is suitable for diversion.

According to the statute, a defendant is suitable for diversion if, in the opinion of a mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms would respond to treatment; the defendant consents to diversion and waives his right to a speedy trial; the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in section 1170.18.

Section 1170.18 defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit one of certain enumerated violent felonies, known colloquially as “super strikes.”

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

PEN 1170.18

Third Holding:

Even if a defendant meets the enumerated suitability criteria, a trial court retains discretion to deny diversion. But that residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law. We review a decision to deny diversion for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887, 888, 891

Fourth Holding:

We see no substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an unsuitability finding as defined under the statute. Section 1001.36(c) prescribes specific suitability factors and does not expressly contemplate a finding of unsuitability based on other factors not identified in the statute. We acknowledge it is possible to construe the court’s finding of unsuitability as an exercise of its residual discretion under section 1001.36(a).

But the only reasoning articulated by the court involved defendant’s criminal history and past failures to appear (which could themselves have been connected to a mental health disorder), his past difficulties complying with treatment (notwithstanding the evaluators’ conclusions about his prospects for future treatment), and the circumstances of the charged offense. The trial court’s statement of the reasons for its decision thus did not reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 893