Error and/or relief
We will reverse the conviction and remand for the trial court to reconsider defendant’s suitability for mental health diversion according to the factors in section 1001.36(c) and defendant’s current circumstances. To the extent the court exercises its residual discretion under section 1001.36(a), it must take into account the Legislature’s intent and the statute’s underlying purposes.
Although we express no opinion as to how the court should decide the matter on remand, we note that the suitability inquiry must be informed not only by defendant’s past performance but also by his present circumstances and prospects for diversion compliance.
First Holding:
Since 2018, section 1001.36 has afforded trial courts discretion to grant criminal defendants suffering from certain recognized mental disorders pretrial diversion to receive mental health treatment. Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The express purpose of the legislation was to increase diversion of eligible individuals, and legislative amendments have only confirmed the Legislature’s desire to expand mental health treatment through diversion.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36
People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 119
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891
Second Holding:
As currently enacted, a defendant accused of a qualifying offense is eligible for mental health diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental health disorder which was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If a defendant is found eligible for mental health diversion, a trial court must also consider whether the defendant is suitable for diversion.
According to the statute, a defendant is suitable for diversion if, in the opinion of a mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms would respond to treatment; the defendant consents to diversion and waives his right to a speedy trial; the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and the defendant will not pose an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as defined in section 1170.18.
Section 1170.18 defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit one of certain enumerated violent felonies, known colloquially as “super strikes.”
Authority:
PEN 1001.36
PEN 1170.18
Third Holding:
Even if a defendant meets the enumerated suitability criteria, a trial court retains discretion to deny diversion. But that residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law. We review a decision to deny diversion for abuse of discretion.
Authority:
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887, 888, 891
Fourth Holding:
We see no substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an unsuitability finding as defined under the statute. Section 1001.36(c) prescribes specific suitability factors and does not expressly contemplate a finding of unsuitability based on other factors not identified in the statute. We acknowledge it is possible to construe the court’s finding of unsuitability as an exercise of its residual discretion under section 1001.36(a).
But the only reasoning articulated by the court involved defendant’s criminal history and past failures to appear (which could themselves have been connected to a mental health disorder), his past difficulties complying with treatment (notwithstanding the evaluators’ conclusions about his prospects for future treatment), and the circumstances of the charged offense. The trial court’s statement of the reasons for its decision thus did not reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.
Authority:
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 893