At the conclusion of the hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court miscalculated the credit for time served, and the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct credits.
The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct days of custody credit.
People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628
People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428, fn. 8
The court erred by sentencing appellant to a consecutive mid-term of eight years on count 6, because he was convicted of only a single relevant offense. The mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme in section 667(d) can apply only when a defendant stands convicted of multiple enumerated sex offenses
The trial court sentenced appellant to a consecutive mid-term of eight years on count 6 under section 667.6(d)(1). But as the parties correctly note, the mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme in subdivision (d) can apply only when a defendant stands convicted of multiple” enumerated sex offenses under this statute. Here appellant was convicted of only one offense under section 667.6(e) and therefore the sentence on count 6 must be reconsidered.
People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 594, fn. 5
We reverse count 5 because section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one weapon at the same time and place in prison.
Section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one unlawful weapon at the same time and place in prison.
People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 64-67
(GARY NOTE: The opinion in Rowland relied on People v. Kirk (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 58, which held that possession of more than one sawed-off shotgun at the same time could result in only one count of conviction under what was then section 12020.
(What was then section 12020 has since been broken down into numerous sections by the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010. Its provisions were spread among many new code sections. Best to look at the charging document for the charge, but also look for separate sections that may define the terms.
(Subsequent to Kirk, the Legislature amended what was then section 12001 (now section 17800) to clarify that possession of more than one prohibited weapon simultaneously constituted separate offenses, each of which could be charged. The legislation specified the code section affected by the amendment, and Rowland relied on the absence of mention of section 4502 to conclude that possession of more than one weapon simultaneously under section 4502 still was limited to a single count, at least in part on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). The holding in this Case 000332 applied to section 4502. Rowland and its progeny should be used very carefully, and be cited only if its rationale has not been legislated away with respect to your given facts.)
On this appeal from denial of the defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, where the petition consisted of a check-box form, we remand with instructions for the trial court to consider any amended allegations filed by the defendant within 30 days of remand.
In 2019, the Legislature enacted SB 1437, which altered the rules of murder liability to ensure culpability more closely matched punishment. As part of this reform, the Legislature amended section 188 to prohibit imputing malice based solely on a defendant’s participation in a crime. In effect, a defendant can no longer be convicted of murder under an aiding and abetting theory merely because a killing was a natural and probable consequence of another intended offense.
PEN 188
People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 472
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839
To provide retroactive relief, SB 1437 also established a resentencing process, now codified in section 1172.6. This statute permits individuals convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory of imputed malice to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and seek resentencing.
PEN 1172.6(a)
Once the court receives such a petition, the section 1172.6 process unfolds in three distinct stages. At the first stage, a petitioner need only submit a facially sufficient petition that alleges the statutory prerequisites for relief. If the petition is facially valid, the petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel, if requested, and the matter proceeds to the second stage. At the second stage, the trial court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. If the court finds the petitioners have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case, the court must then issue an order to show cause and proceed to the third stage: an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioners remain guilty under current law.
PEN 1172.6
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562
Patton makes clear that at the second stage a trial court may consider uncontroverted facts from the record of conviction. This includes an evaluation of preliminary hearing evidence to determine whether a still-valid theory of liability supported the conviction. However, Patton also teaches that at the second stage petitioners have the opportunity to show why they are not ineligible, despite what might appear in preliminary hearing transcripts. To meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case for relief, the petitioner must provide nonconclusory allegations that alert the court and prosecution to the issues to be decided at the evidentiary hearing.
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567
The trial court prejudicially erred when it sentenced the defendant to an upper term sentence without affording him a jury trial on aggravating factors. Remanded for retrial on the factors in aggravation.
Section 1170(b)(2) provides that, in selecting a term of imprisonment, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Notwithstanding this rule, a court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.
PEN 1170
With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837
The California Supreme Court applied Erlinger to California’s determinate sentencing scheme. In Wiley, it overruled its prior decisions Black and Towne that had found it constitutionally permissible for a trial court to determine whether a defendant’s crimes were of increasing seriousness or whether the defendant’s performance on probation was unsatisfactory. A trial court’s determination of those aggravating factors without the defendant’s consent violated section 1170(b)(2).
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1084-1086 [expressly overruling People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 and People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799]
A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with the jury trial requirement is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069,1090
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
Here, the trial court relied on its own files to find that the defendant had two prior felony convictions for which he served prison sentences, and found that his performance on supervision had been unsatisfactory. The California Supreme Court has cautioned against attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances that require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts. The reviewing court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance. To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776
On remand, the parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant evidence to support or contest the factual support for the aggravating circumstances set out in the California Rules of Court. The court may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances justify such a sentence. If it cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term.
PEN 1170
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 777-778
The trial court should have stayed the sentence on one of the defendant’s convictions under section 654. Therefore, we modify his sentence to stay the sentence on that count. We also order the trial court to correct errors in the defendant’s abstract of judgment.
Section 654 provides that a defendant may be punished only once for an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. The statute itself literally applies only where such punishment arises out of multiple statutory violations produced by the same act or omission. However, because the statute is intended to ensure that a defendant is punished commensurate with his culpability, its protection has been extended to cases in which there are several offenses committed during a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time. Where the defendant committed more than one offense during a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time, the court looks to the defendant’s intent and objective to determine whether any of the offenses are subject to section 654. Whether section 654 applies to a given case is a question of fact for the trial court. In this case, based on statements made by the court on more than one occasion, the only reasonable conclusion is that the court determined the assault with a semiautomatic firearm in count 12 involved the same act or criminal objective as the robbery against the same victim in count 10.
PEN 654
People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 193
People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354
The abstract contains several errors. It stated that the court imposed, but stayed under section 654, several firearm and bodily injury enhancements on nine of the counts. In fact, however, the court dismissed those enhancements under section 1385. The abstract states that the sentences on three of the counts were full consecutive terms. In fact, the court imposed a consecutive term of one-third the midterm on each, as required under section 1170.1(a). And the abstract states that the total time on attached pages was four years and four months, whereas the actual total on the attached pages is fourteen years. On remand, the trial court shall ensure the amended abstract of judgment does not contain these errors.
[Gary note: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because it recognized there will be a new abstract of judgment issued to reflect the effect of section 654 on one of two counts. Had the Court of Appeal chosen to specifically order correction of the existing abstract, it would have found authority under one or more of the cases I have set forth below.]People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
Remanded for retrial of the strike prior allegation. The amended version of section 186.22 must be applied in determining whether prior convictions with a gang enhancement qualify as serious felonies under the Three Strikes law.
In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333, which amended section 186.22. This legislation narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207
In Fletcher, relying in part on the present conditional phrasing of section 1192.7(c)(28)—which applies to any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22–the Supreme Court held that current law (i.e., AB 333) applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28). The Supreme Court also concluded that there was insufficient evidence in that case that the defendants’ convictions were obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements because the only evidence presented were the abstracts of judgment, which merely showed the offenses and gang enhancements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the strike prior findings and directed the Court of Appeal to remand with instructions to retry the gang allegations under AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22.
PEN 1192.7(c)(28)
People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 603-604
The trial court erred by imposing sentence on the robberies which served as the predicate offenses for his murder conviction under the felony murder theory. We remand for full resentencing so the trial court may determine whether section 654 applies to all of the underlying robberies or to only one, and to correct other errors (if any) that the parties asserted in this appeal.
Section 654 provides that the same act or omission shall not be punished under more than one provision of law. Thus, where felony murder is the sole theory of murder under which the case was prosecuted, section 654 precludes imposition of separate terms for the predicate felonies for the theory of felony murder, for which defendant received his first degree murder sentence.
PEN 654
People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898
An appellate court normally reviews the trial court’s factual determinations in applying section 654 for substantial evidence.
People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618
People v. Jacobo (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 53-54
This is not exactly a win for the defendant, but it reinforces the proper application of section 654. In this instance, the trial court simply did not impose any sentence on a count that the court determined section 654 applied to. It resulted in reversal of the sentence, with a direction that the court impose a sentence on all counts, including the one to which section 654 applied, and stay execution as to that count. Interestingly, the abstract of judgment actually reflected that the court had imposed and stayed sentence under section 654. Reaffirming my supplication that we should always examine abstracts of judgment, as it truly is not uncommon for them to contain errors.
The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the trial court imposed the upper term for count 2 and stayed the sentence under section 654. However, the court did not impose sentence for count 2 during the sentencing hearing. Where, as here, a discrepancy exists between the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 893
People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967
An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Stated differently, section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission. When section 654 is applicable, the accepted procedure is to sentence defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on certain of the convictions to which section 654 is applicable.
PEN 654
People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 337
People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353
People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796 [when a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence]
People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380 [when section 654 applies, it is improper to impose no sentence or to stay imposition of the sentence]
People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [when section 654 applies, the trial court imposes an unauthorized sentence by failing to sentence defendant on all counts]
Because the sentence is unlawful, we remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing purposes. On remand a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.
People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 381
In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067
Summary denial of of the defendant’s 1172.6 petition without an evidentiary hearing was error where the jury had been given instructions that permitted it to find defendant guilty of murder under the felony murder rule or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and allowed it to find him guilty of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
In 2018, the Legislature passed SB 1437 that amended sections 188 and 189 to significantly limit the reach of the felony-murder rule and to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine in cases of first and second degree murder as it applies to aiding and abetting. The bill also added section 1172.6 to provide a procedural mechanism for defendants who could no longer be convicted of murder because of the amendments to petition for retroactive relief. The Legislature later amended section 1172.6 effective January 1, 2022, to provide resentencing relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
SB 1437
PEN 188
PEN 189
PEN 1172.6
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959
People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457
Section 189 as amended effective January 1, 2019, provides that a participant in the perpetration of a robbery or kidnapping (or attempted perpetration of those crimes) in which a death occurs is liable for first degree murder only if it is proven that the participant was the either (i) the actual killer; (ii) was not the actual killer but with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the first degree murder; or, (iii) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
PEN 189
Upon receipt of a petition that sets forth the required allegations, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis and hearing to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. Although the court should not reject the petition’s factual allegations without first conducting an evidentiary hearing, it may make a credibility determination adverse to the defendant if the court’s own documents refute those allegations.
PEN 1172.6(b)(3) and (c)
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545
It appears the trial court found that giving instructions that allowed the jury to find defendant guilty of murder based on theories of liability that had been abrogated by SB 1437 was harmless because the jury also received instructions on the still valid theories of being a major participant who aided and abetted with an intent to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. The difficulty here, however, is defendant was convicted in 2012, well before Banks clarified the law concerning major participant findings by identifying a series of considerations to assist in the inquiry whether a defendant is a major participant. Clark reiterated the Banks elements and substantially clarified the considerations relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 798-804
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 611-623
Unless a felony murder defendant was tried after Banks, a major participant finding will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case for section 1172.6 resentencing relief and, unless a defendant was tried after Clark, a reckless indifference to human life finding will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case for such relief. Because defendant was convicted before Banks and Clark, the special circumstance findings that he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life do not preclude him from establishing a prima facie case for resentencing relief.
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 721
The defendant was sentenced to prison terms of 60-to-life plus 13 years under both the Three Strikes law (section 667) and the Habitual Offender provisions of section 667.7. The sentence included 13 years for enhancements. The judgment is modified to strike the great bodily injury enhancement imposed under section 12022.7(a) and the two prior serious felony enhancements imposed under section 667(a). On the amended abstract of judgment form, the court should indicate in section No. 8 that the defendant was sentenced pursuant to both section 667.7 and the Three Strikes law.
As relevant here, section 667.7 defines a habitual offender as any person convicted of a felony in which the person inflicted great bodily injury as provided in section 12022.53 or 12022.7, or personally used force which was likely to produce great bodily injury, who has served two or more prior separate prison terms as defined in section 667.5 for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. A habitual offender with two prior separate prison terms shall be sentenced to life in prison and shall be ineligible for parole for a period of time calculated as the longest of three options: (1) 20 years; (2) the determinate term that would be imposed under section 1170, including any enhancements; or (3) any period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046. In other words, a habitual offender is not eligible for parole for a minimum of 20 years and for at least the duration of the sentence that would otherwise be imposed for the crime, including applicable enhancements.
[Gary note: The minimum term was set at 60 years, which was arrived at by tripling the minimum 20 years to life set by section 667.7 in keeping with section 667(e)(2)(A)(i), which sets the minimum term for Three Strikes sentences at “three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction” if that produces the greatest Three Strikes sentence. The third option listed above–the reference to section 3046–is what makes that the applicable minimum term under section 667.7.]PEN 667.7
PEN 3046(a)(2) [(a) An inmate imprisoned under a life sentence shall not be paroled until he or she has served the greater of the following: … (2) A term as established pursuant to any other law that establishes a minimum term or minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole.]
Section 667.7 is a self-contained sentencing scheme for habitual violent offenders. Because section 667.7 ensures that a habitual offender’s parole ineligibility lasts at least as long as the corresponding determinate sentence would, including enhancements, a sentencing court may not impose determinate sentence enhancements to further lengthen this period of parole ineligibility.
People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 241
People v. Victor (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 518, 524-526
People v. Tuggle (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 147, 157-158, disapproved on another ground in Jenkins, at p. 252
Permitting determinate enhancements to be imposed on top of a habitual offender life sentence would lead to absurd, anomalous, results. Section 667.7 expressly authorizes courts to use applicable enhancements to calculate the offender’s hypothetical determinate sentence. If the total exceeds 20 years, the determinate sentence defines the offender’s minimum parole eligibility. Thus, if the determinate sentence, including enhancements, for habitual offender A equaled 21 years, this would become his minimum term. Since the enhancements were used to calculate this actual minimum term, the court could not recycle the enhancements to add another five or ten years. If the determinate sentence, including enhancements, for habitual offender B, a less serious offender, did not exceed 20 years, then B would be hit twice. First, as the Legislature intended, his minimum term would be the statutory floor, 20 years. Second, the same enhancements, which were not enough to put his determinate term over 20 years, would then be added on top of the statutory floor. This is not what the Legislature intended.
People v. Victor (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 518, 524-525
People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 253 [noting that engrafting a term of enhancement onto the life term would lead to a result inconsistent with the statute’s methodology for setting the minimum period of required imprisonment, and nothing in the statute suggests that the Legislature intended that those same enhancements be used again to add an additional term of imprisonment onto the life term]
An appellate court may correct a sentence that is not authorized by law. Accordingly, we will strike the unauthorized enhancements from the defendant’s sentence.
In re Ricky H. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 176, 191
In re Sandel (1966) 64 Cal.2d 412, 417-419
People v. Skeirik (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 444, 468-469
On the amended abstract of judgment form, the court should indicate in section No. 8 that the defendant was sentenced pursuant to both section 667.7 and the Three Strikes law.
[Gary note: The court cited no authority for its directive for the correction of the abstract of judgment. It isn’t entirely clear that the abstract was incorrect, but a fair reading led me to that conclusion. In any event, there is much authority supporting the court’s ability to order correction of abstracts of judgment and minute orders, and I have set out some below.]People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
We affirm the order denying resentencing under section 1172.6, but direct the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment, because the credit for time served was miscalculated.
Both the date of arrest and the sentencing should be included in credit calculations
People v. Bravo (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735
The failure to properly calculate custody and conduct credits is a jurisdictional error that may be corrected at any time.
People v. Chilleli (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 581, 591