Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000304

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant filed a petition for dismissal citing three different Penal Code sections—sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and 1203.41. The trial court denied the petition based on section 1203.41, under which the defendant was not entitled to relief. We reverse and remand to allow the court to consider the defendant’s claim for relief under section 1203.4.

First Holding:

The trial court’s denial of relief under any of these statutes (1203.4, 1203.41, 1203.4a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 572

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 authorizes the trial court to expunge a criminal record if the defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period, the defendant was discharged before the probation period ended, or if the court believes relief should be granted in the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

Third Holding:

Section 1203.4a authorizes dismissal of charges against defendants who are convicted of misdemeanors but were not granted probation.
Authority:

Authority:

PEN 1203.4a

Fourth Holding:

Section 1203.41 allows an individual convicted of a felony, under certain circumstances, to withdraw a guilty or nolo contendere plea, or set aside a guilty verdict in the interests of justice, in the court’s discretion. The crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty is a wobbler. In this case, because the defendant was sentenced to probation with 364 days in county jail, it is a misdemeanor offense.

Authority:

PEN 1203.41

People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874, 880

Fifth Holding:

it appears the trial court may have been confused by the defendant’s petition, which sought relief under all three statutes. Relief was not authorized to the defendant under sections 1203.4a and 1203.41, and the court did not err in denying relief under section 1203.41. When a trial court evaluates a petition under the incorrect statute or misunderstands the scope of its discretion, this is an abuse of discretion and the case must be reversed and remanded for an exercise of informed discretion, unless the record clearly indicates the same result would follow.

Authority:

People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required]

People v. Parker (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 498, 501–502 [case remanded because trial court mistakenly believed an imposed but suspended sentence is a bar to section 1203.4 relief]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000298

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although a trial court has broad discretion in imposing terms and conditions when sentencing a criminal defendant to probation instead of imprisonment, any conditions imposed must have some relationship to the crime and be designed to prevent future criminality. In this case, one of the probation conditions imposed required defendant to participate in mental health and substance abuse testing and treatment. Not only was this unconnected to the underlying crime, any suggestion in the probation and sentencing report that defendant suffered from mental health or substance abuse issues was wholly unsupported. Therefore, that probation condition must be stricken.

Holding:

A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. But such discretion is not unlimited: A condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. A probation condition will be upheld unless all of the following are true: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. We review a challenge to the conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000289

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude that section 654 did not apply here because the trial court granted defendant probation without imposing sentence, so we affirm the judgment. But we direct the trial court to correct the clerk’s minute order to reflect the oral pronouncement as to the jail probation condition and restitution fine and corresponding stayed probation revocation fine as $300 each.

First Holding:

There is an apparent discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement imposing a probation condition of 300 days in county jail and the clerk’s minute order splitting the 300 days between the two counts, showing 150 days under each count. The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order. The court’s oral pronouncement was clear. It imposed a probation condition of 300 days in county jail. We order the clerk’s minute order corrected to reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of a probation condition of 300 days in county jail.

Authority:

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 187-188

Second Holding:

Generally, section 654, which precludes multiple punishment for a single act, does not apply when a court grants a defendant probation. A grant of probation is neither punishment nor a criminal judgment. It is an act of grace and clemency designed to allow rehabilitation. No punishment is imposed. Section 654 does not apply where no punishment is imposed. This is so even if probation is conditioned on jail time. Here, because the trial court granted defendant probation without imposing a sentence, section 654 does not apply.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Stender (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 413, 425, overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 240

People v. Wittig (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 124, 126-127 137

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 965

Third Holding:

The minute order conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement, the latter which ordered only the mandatory minimum fines (here, $300), not the $1,000 fine included in the minutes. When there is a discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement and the clerk’s minute order or the abstract of judgment, the record of the oral pronouncement controls. We order the clerk’s minute order corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of the mandatory minimum restitution fine of $300 and the corresponding stayed $300 probation revocation fine.

Authority:

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case: 000269

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the electronics search condition as currently framed is invalid under Lent and In re Ricardo P. We therefore strike the condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider the imposition of a modified electronics search condition in conformance with Ricardo P. and this opinion.

First Holding:

A juvenile court is authorized to impose any reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Notably, the permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults, given that juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and that the state stands in the shoes of the parents in caring for the minor’s well being when it asserts jurisdiction over the minor.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 909–910

Second Holding:

This broad discretion, however, is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. As the Supreme Court has explained, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first question is whether the minor’s use of an electronic device bore a relationship to his assault of the victim with force likely to produce great bodily injury. In the context of electronics search probation conditions, some Courts of Appeal have found that use of an electronic device is related to an offense when the device was used to commit, plan, or facilitate that offense. In this case there was no indication that the minor used an electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his assault of the victim.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720, 724 [electronic device was involved in the offense where defendant met his victim through social media]

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [electronic devices involved in transportation of controlled substances where defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

Fourth Holding:

Other Courts of Appeal have found that electronic devices were not related to an offense when the connection between electronic device usage and an offense was more tangential. For example, in Alonzo M., the mere fact that electronic devices were stolen during the minor’s commission of automobile burglaries and purse snatch robberies did not compel the conclusion that electronic devices related to these offenses. Similarly, in Amber K., the minor’s use of social media before and after a school fight was found to be insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Lent.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 158-164 [observing the condition could not be upheld under either of first two Lent prongs]

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 564–566

Fifth Holding:

As indicated, there appears no dispute the second prong of the Lent test has been met. And for good reason: it is well-established that there is nothing inherently illegal about using electronic devices.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Sixth Holding:

The third prong of Lent requires that we assess whether the electronics search condition requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. The third prong of Lent contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. An abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality is insufficient. A condition can survive only when there is information in the record establishing a connection between the search condition and the probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history and when the burden imposed by the condition is proportionate to the legitimate interests served by that condition.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1121-1122

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166

Seventh Holding:

Following Ricardo P. and Alonzo M., we conclude the broad-ranging electronics search condition burdens the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the probation department’s legitimate interest in monitoring” his compliance with his probation terms, including the order to stay away from the victim.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000244

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by imposing a probation condition that required the defendant to submit to searches of her computers, recordable media, and electronic devices. The electronic search condition is not reasonably related to criminality. Because we conclude the electronic search condition is unreasonable under the Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand with instructions to strike the electronic search condition and consider whether a more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable.

First Holding:

In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily valid. Generally, a condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Second Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review a probation condition for an indication that the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000238

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We strike the domestic violence probation fee. The defendant was sentenced to prison.

Holding:

The domestic violation probation fee is imposed only when a defendant is granted probation. It is not applicable when the defendant is sentenced to prison. the unauthorized fee must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1203.97(a)(5)

People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1520

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000228

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant pleaded no contest to felony reckless evasion of a peace officer in a motor vehicle and misdemeanor driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. The trial court granted probation for a period of three years. More than two years later, the defendant violated his probation, and the court imposed a felony prison term. The court lacked authority to impose a felony sentence because his violation of probation occurred after the first two years of the probationary term. We reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

Holding:

AB 1950 amended Penal Code sections 1203a and 1203.1 to restrict the length of most probation terms. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, secs. 1, 2.) Effective January 1, 2021, misdemeanor probation terms are generally limited to one year and felony probation terms are generally limited to two years (sec.1203.1(a)). Exempt from these limits are offenses that ‘include specific probation lengths within their provisions.

Authority:

PEN 1203a

PEN 1203.1

AB 1950

People v. Saxton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 428, 431

Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000203

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in denying his expungement request under Penal Code section 1203.4 and in failing to consider his request to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b). Because the court did not address his request under section 17(b), on remand it must do so.

First Holding:

An order denying relief under section 1203.4 is appealable.

Authority:

People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 114

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 provides in pertinent part that a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation is entitled as a matter of right to have the plea or verdict changed to not guilty, to have the proceedings expunged from the record, and to have the accusations dismissed. If the petitioner meets the criteria for relief under section 1203.4, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 249-250

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991

People v. Lewis (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 294, 297-298

Third Holding:

As of 2023, section 1203.4 provides that a petition for relief under this section shall not be denied due to an unfulfilled order of restitution, and an unfulfilled order of restitution shall not be grounds for finding that a defendant did not fulfill the condition of probation for the entire period of probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(c)(3)(A) & (B)

Fourth Holding:

When a crime is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor it is commonly referred to as a “wobbler,” and the trial court may reduce the offense to a misdemeanor at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter. The court has broad discretion in deciding whether to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor. In exercising its discretion, the court considers several factors, including “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.

Authority:

PEN 17(b)(3)

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877,

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,

People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 790-791

Fifth Holding:

Grand theft by embezzlement of property valued at more than $950, the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is a wobbler. The trial court should have addressed the defendant’s request to reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor.

Authority:

People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 75

Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000199

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was sentenced to state prison after pleading no contest to robbery and injury a girlfriend. The trial court improperly imposed a domestic violence fee. We strike the fee.

Holding:

A domestic violence fee is only authorized when a defendant is granted probation.

Authority:

PEN 1203.097

Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000194

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant appeals the trial court’s written order vacating its prior order appointing counsel and scheduling a Franklin hearing to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful offender parole hearing. Defendant asks this court to remand the matter so he may present additional argument to the trial court. The People do not oppose giving defendant an opportunity to establish his eligibility for a Franklin hearing. We accept the People’s concession and will reverse and remand the matter.

First Holding:

As of January 1, 2020, defendants who committed crimes when they were 25 years old or younger are generally eligible for a youth offender parole hearing after specified periods, depending on their sentence. However, the statute excludes those defendants who, like defendant here, were sentenced to LWOP for crimes they committed when they were 18 to 25 years old.

[GARY NOTE: A defendant who is eligible for future consideration of parole as a youthful offender may make a record in the superior court to preserve facts that may be persuasive in a future hearing on whether to grant parole.]

Authority:

PEN 3051

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

Although Hardin rejected an equal protection challenge to section 3051 by an offender sentenced to LWOP for special circumstance murder, it did not foreclose other as-applied challenges to the statute based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 484-495 [the defendant successfully raised an as-applied challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder under section 190.2(d)]

Third Holding:

There are cases with possibly similar crimes by possibly equally culpable offenders who would now be eligible for parole while the defendant is not. Although these authorities do not conclusively establish any violation of defendant’s right to equal protection, they do allow for the possibility that he might be able to develop such an argument under Harden.

Authority:

People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831

People v. Mulqueen (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 532

People v. Fortman (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 45

Fourth Holding:

Some states have constitutions that prohibit imposing an LWOP sentence on youthful offenders. While these authorities do not conclusively establish that section 3051’s exclusion of young adult offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution, they allow for the possibility that defendant might be able to develop such an argument.

Authority:

Commonwealth v. Mattis (2024) 493 Mass. 216, 234-235

Equal protection, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000187

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends on this appeal that the trial court erroneously found he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and erred in denying his Franklin motion as successive. In 2018, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a Franklin hearing.

(The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing.)

That court (in 2018) denied that petition on the basis that he was not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he would already be released before reaching the 15 years’ threshold for youth offender parole. In 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that it was a successive motion. The People agree with defendant that the court erred when it denied his motion as successive. We conclude the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing as successive. We reverse the court’s order and remand for the court to consider defendant’s motion under Penal Code section 1203.01.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2014, SB 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) enacted sections 3051, 3046(c), and 4801(c) to provide a parole eligibility mechanism for youthful offenders. Defendants who were 25 years old or younger at the time they committed the offense and were convicted of a determinate term are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 15th year of incarceration. The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. For defendants whose judgments were final, the proper procedure to obtain a Franklin hearing is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and the Cook decision.

Authority:

PEN 1203.01

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261,283-284

People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

There is no express bar to successive motions or requests for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The defendant’s section 1203.01 motion should not have been denied as successive.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Third Holding:

The trial court’s order denying a defendant’s Franklin motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. In deciding whether the court abused its discretion we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Critical to the resolution of this case, we note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459

People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749

People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746

Fourth Holding:

Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. As such, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the sole basis he had already sought a Franklin hearing by filing a habeas petition. Therefore, the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion as successive.

Authority:

ADIn re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 457-458

Abstracts and Minutes, Eighth Amendment, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000176

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The $150 restitution fine and the parole revocation fine imposed on count three are unauthorized and must be vacated or stayed. The fine had been imposed on a count that was stayed under Penal Code section 654. Aside from that problem, a separate parole revocation fine cannot be imposed on a misdemeanor offense. Also, the abstract of judgment must be corrected because it incorrectly states that he has a prior strike and was sentenced under Penal Code section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12.

First Holding:

When a court imposes multiple punishments in violation of section 654, it acts in excess of its jurisdiction and imposes an unauthorized sentence that can be challenged for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1234

Second Holding:

Defendant is not subject to parole separately for the misdemeanor and is thus not subject to a parole revocation restitution fine on it.

Authority:

People v. Holmes (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 539, 547

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected because it erroneously states that he has a prior strike and that he was sentenced under section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12. There is no indication in the record defendant has sustained a prior strike conviction. We will order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect that he does not have a strike prior, and he was not sentenced pursuant to section 667(b) through (i), or section 1170.12.

[Gary note: The court cited no authority for the obvious proposition that the abstract of judgment needs to be corrected. I have listed below some of many cases that the court could have relied on.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2