Category Archives: Probation Parole PRCS

Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000862

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed an incorrect maximum term for the juvenile, and one of the probation conditions was overbroad.

First Holding:

The court declared that the maximum confinement time for the minor was 16 years, when it fact the maximum was 10 years.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 726(d)(1) provides that if the minor is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

Second Holding:

Section 726 defines the maximum term of imprisonment as the middle of the three time periods set forth in section 1170(a)(3) of the Penal Code, plus enhancements.

To the extent section 726 is ambiguous, we think it logical that the method for selecting the term for the underlying offense should apply in selecting the term for an enhancement.

Here, the middle term for the underlying offense is six years, and the middle term for the enhancement is four years, for a total of ten years.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(2)

In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 [interpreting prior version of section 726]

Third Holding:

The juvenile court ordered a total commitment of in terms of a number of days that exceed even the 16-year maximum confinement time in the court’s minute order. Rather than expressing the commitment in days, we will modify the disposition order such that appellant’s total commitment is for the maximum confinement period of 10 years.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 896, fn. 15 [remand unnecessary where maximum sentence had been imposed]

Fourth Holding:

Appellant’s probation conditions included the following: (1) “You shall not possess, nor shall you knowingly associate with anyone who possesses, any weapon, including, but not limited to firearms, pellet or BB guns, chemical weapons, a replica of any weapon, ammunition, or C02 canisters. You shall not remain in any vehicle where you know anyone has such a weapon or ammunition”; and (2) “You shall not associate with any person who is using or trafficking in any controlled substance, including marijuana.”

The juvenile court has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions, but a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. While we generally review the imposition of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo.

The two conditions at issue are overbroad because they encompass people who legally possess weapons and use controlled substances. We will modify these conditions to specify that they apply only to illegal possession or use. While the word “trafficking” seems to imply illegal conduct, to remove any doubt, we will also specify that the trafficking must be illegal. The condition prohibiting association with those using or trafficking in controlled substances lacks a knowledge requirement. Modification to impose an explicit knowledge requirement is necessary to render the condition constitutional.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892

People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-102

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000815

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a condition of probation that the defendant must submit to chemical testing for the use of alcohol at any time as directed by probation officer or other law enforcement officer.

First Holding:

As an initial matter, we address and reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant’s failure to object to the alcohol testing condition forfeited the issue on appeal. Neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic, and appellate courts have discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges. Here, we exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits, in order to eliminate the need to address the defendant’s alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We now turn to the reasonableness of condition

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 928

Second Holding:

The defendant challenges the imposition of probation condition 13, which required him to submit to alcohol testing, as unreasonable under Lent. He contends the condition does not make sense because the trial court struck condition 12 that prohibited him from consuming or possessing alcohol.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

Fourth Holding:

A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

The conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime as long as they are reasonably directed at curbing an offender’s future criminality. But there must be a strong connection between the burdens imposed by the challenged condition and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1120

Fifth Holding:

Notably, when asked to strike the condition requiring the defendant to abstain from drinking alcohol, the sentencing court freely did so without any apparent reservation. This striking shows the court was not concerned that the defendant’s alcohol consumption had the potential for abuse or was likely to lead to future criminality.

As such, because the defendant was allowed to possess and consume alcohol, there was no rational need to test the defendant for alcohol consumption as a condition of probation. Therefore, we conclude the testing condition here has no deterrent effect on the defendant’s future criminality and is unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922, 928, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236–237 [court struck a probation condition that appellant not possess or consume alcohol or frequent places where alcohol was sold because there was no factual indication in the record that the proscribed behavior is reasonably related to future criminal behavior]

Sixth Holding:

Because the court’s imposition of condition 13 was therefore an abuse of discretion, we order it stricken.

Authority:

In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901 [In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as modified]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case 000801

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in believing that the defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation. Remanded for resentencing.

First Holding:

All defendants are eligible for probation, in the discretion of the sentencing court, unless a statute provides otherwise. Some statutes bar probation absolutely, while others provide that a defendant is ineligible except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would be served. Here, the trial court apparently relied on the probation report and defense counsel to conclude section 1203(e)(3) rendered the defendant ineligible for probation.

Authority:

People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282

Second Holding:

Section 1203(e), provides in relevant part, that except in unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted probation, probation shall not be granted to any person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of the crime of which that person has been convicted. By its terms, section 1203(e)(3) renders a defendant conditionally ineligible for probation only when there has been a finding the injury was willful, i.e., intentional.

Here, there was no such finding, and the People concede that the defendant’s no contest plea does not establish that she admitted to willfully inflicting great bodily injury on the victim. Thus, absent any additional findings by the trial court, section 1203(e) did not render her presumptively ineligible for probation, and the trial court erred in applying that presumption.

Authority:

PEN 1203(e)(3)

People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 854

Third Holding:

Where the sentencing court bases its determination to deny probation in significant part upon an erroneous impression of the defendant’s legal status, fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be afforded a new hearing and an informed, intelligent and just decision on the basis of the facts. Here, the record demonstrates the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion and may have relied upon the error to deny probation. A new sentencing hearing is therefore necessary for the trial court to consider the defendant’s probation request under the appropriate legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 168

People v. Manriquez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1614, 1620

People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912 [where a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the matter must be remanded for an informed determination]

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000790

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by setting the length of probation at four years instead of two years.

Holding:

Effective January 1, 2021, AB 1950 amended Penal Code section 1203.1 to limit the maximum probation period for felony offenses. Under prior law, the length of felony probation could not exceed five years or the maximum possible sentence of imprisonment, whichever was longer. Now, the statute provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, felony probation may continue for a period of time not exceeding two years. Because the trial court imposed a term of probation in excess of section 1203.1’s normal two-year limit, we will reduce the term to comply with that limit.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(a)

People v. Kite (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986, 992

People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 185

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 979 [reducing probationary term to two years to comply with AB 1950, without remand to trial court]

AppellateAdvisor Updates, Duty of the court, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000762

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss his conviction under section 1203.4 following his fulfillment of conditions of probation. The trial court concluded that the defendant was not eligible for relief as long as he had to register as a sex offender. The trial court denied the defendant’s petition for an erroneous reason without determining whether he fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire probation period. Therefore, the order denying the petition is reversed, and the trial court is directed to make that determination.

First Holding:

When a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, the defendant is entitled to have his conviction set aside and the case dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4(a)(1)

Second Holding:

This statutory provision is clear. If the defendant fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, the trial court shall allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information. Dismissal in this circumstance is mandatory.

Authority:

People v. Daffeh (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 790, 796

People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 892, fn. 6 [under section 1203.4, if the petitioner establishes either of the necessary factual predicates, the trial court is required to grant the requested relief]

Third Holding:

A person who has suffered a conviction specified in section 290 is required to register as a sex offender, notwithstanding dismissal of such conviction pursuant to 1203.4. But the duty to register as a sex offender does not make the person ineligible for relief under section 1203.4

Authority:

Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 423

People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287

People v. Hamdon (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1071, fn. 3 [Section 290.007 expressly precludes relief from the sex offender registration requirement for persons whose convictions are dismissed pursuant to section 1203.4]

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 996 [same]

Fourth Holding:

If the defendant has not fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation or been discharged prior to the termination of the probation period, the court still has discretion to grant relief in the interests of justice.

Authority:

People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 991