Category Archives: Equal protection

Elements of crime, Equal protection, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000577

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The conviction of section 270 must be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.

First Holding:

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

We determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This determination presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. In considering a sufficiency challenge, we do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.

Authority:

People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

Second Holding:

Section 270 (failure to provide necessities to a minor child) states that violation is a misdemeanor unless a court of competent jurisdiction has made a final adjudication in either a civil or a criminal action that a person is the parent of a minor child and the person has notice of such adjudication. While felony punishment can be imposed constitutionally on persons previously found guilty of a violation of section 270, the statute violates equal protection to the extent felony punishment is grounded solely on an earlier legal determination of paternity.

Authority:

PEN 270

People v. Gregori (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 353, 356

Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000571

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing fees regardless of the defendant’s inability to pay. We strike the fees.

Holding:

In Kopp, our Supreme Court recently held that, if a defendant requests, a trial court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Here, defendant argued he had not been working and was therefore unable to pay any fines and fees, and the trial court agreed as to the court operations and court facilities assessments.

However, instead of waiving these fees as a court would do for an indigent civil litigant, the trial court imposed and stayed the ancillary costs. Given that the Legislature has provided fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a criminal defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment. No similar differences justify denying criminal defendants the right to seek a waiver of certain ancillary costs when civil litigants facing the same costs may receive such a waiver. While the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kopp at the time it imposed fines and fees, the order nonetheless violated defendant’s equal protection rights, and we must strike the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Equal protection, Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000552

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding that a sentence of 45 years to life is not the functional equivalent of a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), within the context of section 1170(d) for those who committed an offense as a juvenile and were convicted as an adult.

First Holding:

Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides that when a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing. Where the length of a sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP, it is a denial of equal protection to exclude the defendant from consideration under section 1170(d).

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 [50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP for a nonhomicide juvenile offender in the Eighth Amendment context]

Second Holding:

The People contend that defendant’s current eligibility for early youth offender parole under section 3051 and future eligibility at age 50 for elderly parole under section 3055 render him ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). However, that question is being considered by the Supreme Court in Munoz. Pending that decision, we agree with the reasoning in Heard that section 3051 eligibility does not defeat defendant’s section 1170(d) petition.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040

Abstracts and Minutes, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000427

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for limited resentencing proceedings concerning the imposition of mandatory ancillary costs under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, both of which were omitted from the trial court’s original oral sentencing pronouncements.

First Holding:

The sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court only imposed restitution and parole revocation fines, both in the amount of $500. The court purported to waive all fees and other fines without providing an explanation. Yet, the minute order and the indeterminate abstract of judgment indicate an imposed $200 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, as well as a $150 criminal conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373.

The court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment are properly characterized as ancillary costs. That is, they are funding mechanisms created by the Legislature to raise funds for court operations and facilities; they are not punitive in nature. Imposition of these ancillary costs is mandatory for every criminal conviction except parking offenses. However, due to a robust fee waiver system in civil cases for the same types of ancillary costs, the unavailability of a fee waiver in criminal cases violates equal protection guarantees. Upon request by a criminal defendant, a trial court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). This includes allowing the parties to present and contest any relevant evidence or argument on the question.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 14-15, 26-27, 30

Second Holding:

[Gary Note: The court sidestepped the issue because it remanded for a Kopp hearing, but oral pronouncements prevail over written orders. The court has the authority to order corrections where the abstract of judgment or minute order does not reflect exactly what the court ordered. Had the court decided to order the correction, there are many cases it could have chosen from as authority. I have set forth a few below. Again, the discrepancy was moot in this case.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Appellate Principles, Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000414

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erroneously applied the doctrine of the law of the case to deny the defendant’s section 1170(d) petition in which he sought resentencing under its provisions because 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).

First Holding:

In his original appeal from the 2010 conviction the Court of Appeal concluded that 50 years to life was not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. The trial court denied his petition under section 1170(d) in 2023 on the basis that, under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court had previously ruled that his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. However, years after the original appeal was decided, the Supreme Court determined that 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

Second Holding:

The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and this although in its subsequent consideration the court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.

Authority:

People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6

People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 442 [The law-of-the-case doctrine binds the trial court as to the law but controls the outcome only if the evidence on rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based.]

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 430 [The doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case bar a defendant from raising an issue that was raised and rejected in a prior appeal.]

Third Holding:

The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate review of the same issue more than once in a single action. It is well settled, however, that the doctrine may be disregarded where the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations.

Authority:

Truck Ins. Exchange v. Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 67, 87, fn. 6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716-717 [Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) does not apply when there has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.]

Fourth Holding:

Here, although defendant raised and this court previously rejected the issue of whether, as a juvenile offender, defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, the law on the issue has changed significantly and is currently split.

Authority:

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to sec. 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for sec. 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 441 [140 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061 [107 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 513, dis. opn. of Feuer, J. [ majority holds 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP, but the dissent would hold that it is], review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 999 [44 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540 [50 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [parole eligibility at 47 years of age was by no stretch of the imagination functional or de facto LWOP]

People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]