Category Archives: Equal protection

Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000708

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Once the court found that the defendant had the inability to pay the court operations assessment fee or the court facilities assessment, it was error for the court to impose the fees but stay them until the defendant had the ability to pay.

First Holding:

If a defendant requests, a trial court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Because the Legislature has provided fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a criminal defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30, 31

Second Holding:

Here, the trial court found that the defendant was unable to pay the court operations and court facilities assessments, but instead of waiving these fees as a court would do for an indigent civil litigant, the court imposed and stayed the ancillary costs. Because the court in this case should have waived these fees upon its finding of an inability to pay, rather than stay their execution, we will strike the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30 [noting lack of justification for denying criminal defendants the right to seek a waiver of certain ancillary costs when civil litigants facing the same costs may receive such a waiver]

Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000703

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing two $30 criminal conviction assessment fees and two $40 court operations assessment fees without first determining whether the defendant had the ability to pay those fees.

First Holding:

The imposition of ancillary payments raises equal protection issues. Upon request, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code, sec. 1465.8(a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373(a)(1)).

In making this determination, a court must allow the parties to present any relevant evidence or argument on the matter. For these reasons, we vacate the $80 court operations assessment fees and $60 criminal conviction assessment fees and remand the matter to afford the trial court an opportunity to determine in the first instance whether the defendant has the ability to pay those costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

To avoid passing upon whether the defendant’s trial attorney failed to provide constitutionally adequate assistance, we exercise our discretion to excuse the defendant’s forfeiture of his challenge to the imposition of the ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [noting that a reviewing court may reach the merits of a forfeited claim t forestall a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel]

Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case 000622

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Defendant, age 23 at the time of the offense, was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He sought a Franklin hearing to be able to present evidence that could be considered as mitigating factors related to his youth at the time of the crime in the event there is ever a parole hearing. The trial court denied the motion to conduct the hearing, on the basis that LWOP inmates will never be considered for parole. Reversed. We cannot determine whether the basis of his conviction would render him eligible even if the reasoning in Briscoe regarding a violated of equal protection is sound. We remand the matter to allow defendant to establish he is entitled to a Franklin hearing.

First Holding:

A Franklin hearing permits parties to preserve evidence relevant to a future youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051. Certain persons are, however, categorically ineligible for youth offender parole hearings, including cases in which an individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 458-459

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843

Second Holding:

California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age. To this end, section 3051 requires the Board of Parole Hearings to hold a parole hearing for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of the controlling offense. The minimum number of years of incarceration before eligibility was 15, 20, or 25 years, depending on the length and nature of the sentence imposed.

Authority:

PEN 3051

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 843

Third Holding:

The court in Briscoe concluded, notwithstanding Hardin, section 3051 violates equal protection as applied to youth offenders who were convicted as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Defendant may have been so convicted and therefore might be entitled to relief under section 3051. The trial court consequently erred in summarily denying defendant’s motion. Without taking a position on the correctness of Briscoe, we remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility for a Franklin hearing.

Authority:

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 485, 494

Fourth Holding:

As a result of changes in the law regarding the liability of persons who were not the actual killer, a person may now be found guilty of murder if the person was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life as described in section 190.2(d). Section 190.2(d) is the section describing a special circumstance under which a person may be punished by death or LWOP.

Thus, a person may be convicted simply of first degree murder as a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life and be sentenced to either 25 years to life (the sentence for first degree murder without special circumstances) or LWOP (the sentence for the same act but in which the special circumstance was alleged that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life).

Briscoe concluded that section 3051 purports to include the defendants convicted of the same behavior and received a sentence of 25 years to life, but to exclude those for whom the special circumstance describing the same behavior was alleged and found true and an LWOP sentence was imposed.

Briscoe concluded that section 3051 improperly denied equal protection under those circumstances, and that such individual should be eligible for consideration under section 3051 even if the sentence was LWOP.

Authority:

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 494

Fifth Holding:

The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification.

The degree of justification required to satisfy equal protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue. For the classification at stake here, based on a person’s criminal sentence, the general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

A court applying this standard finds a denial of equal protection only if there is no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government purpose.

We analyze equal protection claims de novo

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 487

Sixth Holding:

Hardin considered that it does not violate equal protection for section 3051 to apply to those sentenced to LWOP who committed the offense before they were 18 years old but not apply to those sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed as an adult.

The defendant Hardin did not demonstrate that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.

But the court made this conclusion without foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute.

Authority:

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838-839

Equal protection, Sentencing

Case 000597

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

For a crime committed when he was under age 18 and for which he was tried as an adult and sentenced to 46 years to life, the defendant filed a petition under section 1170(d) to recall his sentence and be resentenced, claiming he was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Reversed.

First Holding:

The issue regarding what sentences constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP is one the Supreme Court is set to resolve in Munoz.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

Second Holding:

Defendant maintained he was eligible for resentencing even though he was not given an LWOP sentence because he was serving a sentence that was the functional equivalent of LWOP and treating him as if he were ineligible for resentencing would accordingly violate equal protection principles. We agree with Heard and other precedent that holds defendants who are serving the functional equivalent of LWOP, not just those serving an actual LWOP sentence, must be eligible for section 1170(d) relief pursuant to equal protection guarantees—and the availability of a youthful offender parole hearing does not undercut this conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 628-629

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440

Due process, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000580

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Judgment is reversed and remanded for the court to consider the fines and fees imposed with regard to ability to pay and under the excessive fines doctrine.

First Holding:

In Kopp, the Supreme Court addressed how court-ordered payments should be analyzed when a defendant claims inability to pay. There are three categories: fines, ancillary costs, and victim restitution. “Fines” refers to penalties inflicted by the sovereign for commission of offenses. I.e., “fine” refers to a legislatively provided punishment following a criminal conviction.

By contrast, “ancillary costs” refers to payments that are generally not intended to punish for the commission of a crime but instead are funding mechanisms, created by the Legislature to reimburse a government agencies for expenditures or to otherwise fund a broad assortment of services. “Restitution” refers to payments made to compensate crime victims for economic loss caused by an offense.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11-12

Second Holding:

Restitution fines under section 1202.4 constitute punishment and therefore fines rather than true restitution and that parole revocation restitution fines under section 1202.45—which are in the same amount as restitution fines—are likewise punitive and therefore fines. Such fines do not need to be structured to reflect each person’s ability and avoid disproportionate burdens. Accordingly, due process does not require courts to consider the ability of defendants to pay fines before imposing them. Instead, excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13-14, 22-23

Bearden v. Georgia (1983) 461 U.S. 660, 666, fn. 8

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 22

Third Holding:

Ancillary costs or assessments should be imposed on criminal defendants only if they have the ability to pay the costs, on equal protection grounds. Kopp noted that the Legislature has enacted a robust fee waiver system in civil cases. In addition, because both the civil operations and facilities assessments imposed on the defendant in Kopp were enacted to raise money for the courts and were ultimately deposited into the same fund, the Supreme Court concluded that there appears no rational basis to deny only indigent criminal defendants the ability to avoid those costs.

Accordingly, the court in Kopp directed the trial court on remand to consider the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8 or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 24-30