Category Archives: Duty of the court

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000492

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing, the court must recalculate the credit for time served. The matter is remanded for the court to do so here. (The matter was complicated by the trial court awarding credit against this case for by credit earned in a separate case, making it difficult to determine how much the court credited in this particular case.)

Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000454

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though we find that a condition of probation that requires the defendant participate and complete any counseling, rehabilitation, or treatment program deemed appropriate by the probation officer was not an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine, it was improper to impose as a condition of probation that the defendant participate at his own expense.

The challenged probation condition should be modified to delete the portion of the condition requiring defendant to be responsible for the payment of the costs/fees of any counseling or rehabilitation/treatment program. The court is directed to issue a separate order for the payment of such costs and fees. Before the court may order defendant to pay any or all costs associated with his probation, it must make an inquiry and determination as to his ability to pay and determine the amount of payment.

First Holding:

A trial court may order a defendant to pay for reasonable costs of probation; however, such costs are collateral and their payment cannot be made a condition of probation. Instead, the court must issue a separate order for the payment of such costs. Moreover, before ordering a defendant to pay costs of probation, the court must make an inquiry and determination of the defendant’s ability to pay and the amount of payment.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1b(a)

Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321-322

Second Holding:

Though we find there was no improper delegation, the defendant’s claim that the condition of probation is an improper delegation of the court’s authority under the separation of powers doctrine has not been forfeited for lack of objection, because it raises a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888

People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172

Third Holding:

A trial court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation of the defendant and to protect the public. Further, the court has authority to empower the probation department with authority to supervise the probation conditions. We review a constitutional challenge to a probation condition de novo.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1(j)

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240

In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143

Fourth Holding:

A trial court is governed by the separation of powers doctrine. The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. Although the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit one branch from taking action that might affect another, the doctrine is violated when the actions of one branch defeat or materially impair the inherent functions of another. Separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. III, sec. 3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 212

Fifth Holding:

By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer. Under the separation of powers doctrine, judicial powers may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers. While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer. The court may leave to the discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation. However, the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358-1359

Sixth Holding:

A probation condition directing that a defendant participate in any treatment program when considering another condition requiring a defendant complete a drug and alcohol assessment and follow through with treatment as prescribed by the probation officer, passes constitutional muster. This is particularly true where the court’s oral comments reflect that the defendant needs treatment for a substance abuse problem. However, where the condition includes the possibility of participation in a residential treatment program, as directed by the probation officer, it is an improper delegation of judicial authority.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902-903

People v. Cruz (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310 [Invalidating probation condition that gave the probation officer sole discretion to decide whether the defendant should be subject to GPS monitoring.]

People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, 1359 [Invalidating condition that provided, “You shall not associate socially, nor be present at any time, at any place, public or private, with any person, as designated by your probation officer.”]

People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238,-1241 [Upholding probation condition that directed defendant to “follow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe”]

People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307 [Upholding condition that probation officer may unilaterally select a residential drug rehabilitation program and determine whether defendant successfully completed that program.]

Seventh Holding:

A probation condition should be given the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. Following that precept, we read the challenged provision here not as delegating adjudicatory powers to the probation officer but as indicating the court’s advance approval of an agreement that the probation officer might reach with defendant. If a probation officer does interpret the condition in an arbitrary manner, defendant may then file a petition for modification of his probation condition. Thus, the probation condition did not improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer.

Authority:

PEN 1203.2(b)(1)

PEN 1203.3

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 211

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382

People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation officer’s actions]

People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658 [If probation officer interprets probation condition in an arbitrary way, the defendant can file a petition for modification of his probation condition.]

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000452

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court imposed the fines and fees without conducting an ability to pay hearing over trial counsel’s objection. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court settled the question of imposition of fines and fees with regard to the ability to pay. We strike the $370 in fines and fees.

First Holding:

A defendant may challenge the imposition of a punitive fine under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions. Equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing court operations and facilities assessments fees as ancillary costs.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 29-30

Second Holding:

On this record, it would not serve the interests of justice or judicial economy to require remand. Appellant has been incarcerated for most of his adult life. Given his current sentence (55 years to life), he will presumably be incarcerated for the rest of his life. Additionally, the probation report does not indicate he has any assets or property. The court has the authority to strike the fines and fees rather than remand the matter for a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay.

Authority:

PC 1260 [The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.]

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000450

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2024, the defendant was identified as an inmate eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Without conducting a full resentencing hearing, the trial court struck the defendant’s prior prison term enhancements. No party was present, including counsel for the defendant. The sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a full resentencing hearing consistent with section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required a court to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each separate prior prison term served for a nonviolent felony, unless the defendant remained free from custody for at least five years. Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature retroactively invalidated prior prison term enhancements imposed under section 667.5(b) prior to January 1, 2020, unless the term was served for certain sexually violent offenses. The Legislature also created procedures, in what is now section 1172.75, for sentencing courts to recall and resentence defendants who were serving prison terms on judgments that included the now invalid enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 667.5

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Under section 1172.75, if a trial court determines a defendant is serving a sentence that includes a now invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. At the resentencing hearing, the court must eliminate the repealed prior prison term enhancement. But that is not the only thing the court is required to do. Section 1172.75 provides specific instructions for the resentencing. The court shall appoint counsel for the defendant and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Section 1172.75 also permits courts to consider postconviction factors in the resentencing inquiry, including evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966

Third Holding:

Here, the defendannt was eligible for relief under section 1172.75 as his prior convictions used for the prior prison term enhancements were not for a sexually violent offense. The trial court struck his prior prison term enhancements. The court, however, was required to conduct a full resentencing hearing, during which the defendant had the opportunity to be present and represented by appointed counsel. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 668, 673–674 [remanding for new hearing under sec. 1172.75 because defendant was not present at hearing and did not waive his presence]

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 346 [defendant’s absence from resentencing hearing constitutes federal constitutional error]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 968, 972 [defendant eligible for relief under sec. 1172.75 is entitled to full resentencing hearing to argue for further relief under other ameliorative changes]

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568 [same]

Fourth Holding:

Upon resentencing the defendant, the court shall recalculate his custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 40–41 [upon remand, trial court responsible for calculating all days defendant spent in custody prior to resentencing and presentence conduct credits prior to original sentencing]

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000448

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends that it was error to proceed to sentencing in the absence of the attorney she retained after counsel was appointed, and that the court abused its discretion when it found that her youth was not a contributing fact. Retained counsel did file a document titled “Limited Scope Substitution of Counsel.” Thereafter, appointed counsel filed a resentencing brief on the defendant’s behalf. The retained attorney did not. At the resentencing hearing, appointed counsel appeared with the defendant. The retained attorney did not appear. We affirm, but the trial court must recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

The trial court did not recalculate the defendant’s custody credits and ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to do the calculation. A trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits when resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]

Second Holding:

We review the defendants’s contentions regarding counsel of choice and selection of sentence term under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. A defendant who desires to retain his own counsel is required to act with diligence and may not demand a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if he arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of trial.

Authority:

People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1004 [trial court has discretion to deny substitution of counsel where it would prejudice the defendant or disrupt the orderly processes of justice]

People v. Blake (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 623-624

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [appellate review of asserted evidentiary error forfeited where defendant failed to make a timely, specific objection]

Third Holding:

Section 1170(b)(6) does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant was under age 26 at the time the crime was committed. Instead, the presumption applies only if the defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in his or her commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991-992

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 [trial court’s sentencing choices reviewed for abuse of discretion]

Fourth Holding:

At oral argument, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in conducting the resentencing hearing without her physical presence. But the defendant failed to raise this contention in her opening brief. Thus, it is forfeited. Forfeiture aside, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record before us.

Authority:

People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [Every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration]

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claims not raised in the opening brief are waived]

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 674

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348