Category Archives: Duty of the court

Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000446

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though affirming the lower court’s decision to not exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancement, there was an error in the calculation of credit for time served.

First Holding:

A trial court’s refusal to dismiss a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed on appeal under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985

Second Holding:

When a trial court declines to strike a five-year sentencing enhancement for a serious prior felony conviction, no error occurs if the trial court evaluates all relevant circumstances to ensure that punishment fits the offense and the offender.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 587

Third Holding:

A trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not aware of its discretion to dismiss or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss,’ or where the sentencing norms established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law, produce an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

But it is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more prior conviction allegations. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605

People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029

People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 [Section 1385(c) does not mean that, whenever a listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would endanger public safety]

Fifth Holding:

The trial court awarded the defendant the number of days of actual custody credit that reflected his credits from the date of his incarceration to the date of his original sentencing hearing, and ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to calculate credits for the time he has been incarcerated at CDCR. On resentencing, a trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits through the date of the resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000439

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Relief is granted on this petition for writ of habeas corpus. The defendant is entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75. In August 2022, pursuant to (now) section 1172.75, the trial court entered an order modifying petitioner’s judgment by dismissing the enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). It is undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the court’s intent to modify the judgment, was not appointed counsel, was not notified of any court proceedings related to modification of the judgment, and did not appear at any such proceedings. It is also undisputed that the court did not conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, what is now section 1172.75 declared invalid most sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identifies a defendant serving a term for a judgment including a qualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement, the trial court is required to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The court is also required to appoint counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. Section 1172.75 creates a presumption that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed. It expressly requires the court to consider postconviction factors, including evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing, and it guides the trial court in selecting among the lower, middle, and upper term on each count. In this case, the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, including the application of any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. It was proper for him to seek relief by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances in this case.

Authority:

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 359–361

In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 449–450 [Frequently used to challenge criminal convictions already affirmed on appeal, the writ of habeas corpus permits a person deprived of his or her freedom, such as a prisoner, to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record, and often represents a prisoner’s last chance to obtain judicial review. A writ of habeas corpus may thus provide an avenue of relief to those unjustly incarcerated when the normal method of relief—i.e., direct appeal—is inadequate]

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000435

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand for the trial court to modify the judgment to reflect an additional five days of presentence custody credit.

Holding:

The defendant is entitled to all days of custody, and there was an error in the trial court’s calculation.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000431

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The superior court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a midterm sentence in the absence of any indication that the superior court was aware of the requirements of section 1170(b)(6) regarding a lower-term presumption where the defendant makes a showing of childhood trauma sufficient to trigger the presumption. We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing

First Holding:

In relevant part, section 1170(b)(6), provides that, unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. Here, as the Attorney General concedes, the defendant made a sufficient showing in this respect, thus triggering the lower term presumption. The contested issue, then, is whether the superior court actually found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

Second Holding:

On the present record, we cannot conclude the court made that finding. First, the court did not expressly conduct the inquiry that would allow such a finding to be made: The court neither referred to section 1170(b)(6), nor invoked its language. Second, the record does not affirmatively show compliance with the statutory sentencing mandate, as is required when the court has not expressly complied. The court’s averment that “looking at the mitigating factors is where you start nowadays” is too vague to be an affirmative indication that the court was aware that the lower term was presumptive.

Similarly, the court’s decision to select the midterm after referring to aggravating factors is different from a finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, as is required to defeat the presumption in favor the lower-term sentence. Indeed, on the sentencing form signed by the sentencing judge, no marking has been made on the field that reads, “[25] Aggravation factors outweigh those in mitigation,” even though several other fields on the form are marked. In short, this record gives us no reason to believe the court complied with section 1170(b)(6).

Authority:

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991 [the record must affirmatively show compliance with a statutory sentencing mandate whenever the mandate has been triggered by an initial showing of the applicability of the statute]

Discretion, Duty of the court, Juveniles, Standard of review

Case: 000415

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court failed to show it recognized and exercised its discretion to designate second degree burglary as a felony or a misdemeanor, and the program condition of probation delegated impermissibly broad discretion to the probation officer

First Holding:

Second degree burglary is a “wobbler,” that is, an offense that may be punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor. This determination is important not only because felonies are subject to longer periods of confinement, but also because felony convictions have additional adverse consequences, including use without limitation for impeachment under Proposition 8 in subsequent criminal proceedings, enhancement of sentences, and the general blight upon the character of persons convicted of felonies. To ensure that juvenile courts are aware of their discretion to charge wobblers as misdemeanors and that they consciously choose to treat wobblers committed by juveniles as felonies, juvenile courts are required to expressly declare how they are treating such offenses. If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.

Authority:

WIC 707

People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 461, fn. 6

In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1207, 1209

In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 619, fn. 3

Second Holding:

Although remand is not automatically required when a juvenile court fails to expressly declare that a wobbler is a felony or misdemeanor, to establish prejudice a juvenile need not show a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. Also, challenges under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 are not forfeited by failure to object at trial. Instead, in this context, the key issue is whether the record as a whole establishes that the juvenile court was aware of its discretion to treat the offense as a misdemeanor and to state a misdemeanor-length confinement limit. The record in this case does not reflect that the court was aware of its discretion to properly exercise it. A minute order may not substitute for a declaration by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.

Authority:

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 704, 711-714, 717

In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1209

Third Holding:

We review juvenile placement decisions for abuse of discretion. It was not an abuse of discretion to order the minor to be placed in a secure facility.

Authority:

In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154

Fourth Holding:

In placing the minor in a secure facility, the juvenile court imposed a number of terms and conditions, including a requirement that he participate in and complete any appropriate programs as directed by [his] Probation Officer. We review orders of this nature de novo. This condition is an improper delegation of judicial authority. Probation conditions may be challenged for the first time on appeal if they are challenged as unconstitutional on their face and the challenge therefore presents a pure question of law.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888

Fifth Holding:

Although juvenile courts have greater discretion to formulate probation terms than adult criminal courts, their discretion to delegate authority is restricted by the separation-of-powers doctrine. Under the California Constitution, separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible. Thus, a court may delegate to a probation officer authority to specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions. However, the separation-of-powers doctrine limits the delegation of judicial authority to nonjudicial officers, especially in the absence of judicial supervision and review of the exercise of that authority. Consequently, a court may not delegate complete discretion over a significant aspect of the court’s legal control. To satisfy the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court delegating judicial authority to a probation officer must dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation.

Authority:

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910, 919

In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 208-209, 212

People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902, 903 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to choose between residential and outpatient substance abuse programs]

People v. O’Neal (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359 [the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended]

People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to authorize probationer to attend court proceedings and otherwise barring probationer from attending court proceedings unless a party or witness]