Category Archives: Amelioration

Amelioration, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000264

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand from a grant of habeas corpus reversing the conviction of attempt murder, it was error for the court to simply strike the punishment attached to that reversed count and fail to conduct a full resentencing. The trial court did not explicitly state it was recalling the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1. However, the court’s actions at the 2023 hearing make clear that it did.

First Holding:

Courts generally lack jurisdiction to modify a defendant’s sentence once execution of the sentence has begun. Section 1172.1 provides an exception to that general rule. It states a trial court may, at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary of the CDCR or the district attorney, recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced. When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.1, the trial court must consider postconviction factors and apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PC 1172.1

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344 [Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced]

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 636–637

Second Holding:

After announcing the People were conceding the defendant’s motion for recall and resentencing, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the gang allegation under section 1385. Assuming the defendant’s judgment of conviction was final at the start of the hearing—as the trial court believed it to be—the court had authority to grant the People’s motion only if it first recalled the defendant’s sentence. In other words, the fact that the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss shows it first recalled the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

PEN 1385

People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114, 121, fn. 8

People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 123

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 666–667 [Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively only to cases that are not yet final]

Third Holding:

By recalling the defendant’s sentence, the trial court effectively vacated the entire judgment, not just the portion related to the gang allegation. Therefore, the court was required to resentence the defendant on each count and enhancement in the same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced. The court also was required to apply changes in the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219 [the recall of appellant’s sentence effectively vacated his original sentence and commitment]

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360 [recall of a defendant’s sentence nullifies the original sentence]

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163 [once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [the “full sentencing rule” applies when a court recalls a sentence under former section 1170(d), a predecessor to section 1172.1]

Fourth Holding:

The court dismissed the gang allegation, but it did not orally pronounce a sentence on the murder conviction or the firearm enhancement, even by reference to the original sentence. Nor is there any indication that the court applied the changes to the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement]

People v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 521, 532 [at sentencing, the court must orally pronounce the term of imprisonment]

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [trial court erred by failing to pronounce sentence on a count before staying its execution]

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his right to a full resentencing by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Generally, a defendant must raise an issue in the trial court to preserve it on appeal. However, that general rule does not apply to an unauthorized sentence, which a defendant may challenge on appeal despite not objecting below. Here, the trial court recalled the defendant’s sentence, which effectively vacated his entire sentence. However, it never pronounced a new sentence on the murder conviction and firearm enhancement. The court’s failure to do so resulted in an unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [court committed unauthorized sentencing error by failing to pronounce a sentence on a count before ordering it stayed]

Sixth Holding:

Even if the forfeiture rule applied, we would exercise our discretion to consider the issue on the merits in order to forestall an inevitable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate courts have discretion to consider issues not preserved for review]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399–400 [declining to apply forfeiture rule where defendant failed to object to the lack of full resentencing under section 1172.75]

Seventh Holding:

Where, as here, the defendant did not receive a full resentencing to which he was entitled, the proper disposition is to remand for a full resentencing. Accordingly, we remand the case for the trial court to resentence the defendant in accordance with section 1172.1. In doing so, the court must consider postconviction factors and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. When resentencing the defendant on remand, the court may not reinstate the gang allegation it dismissed under section 1385.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [remanding case for resentencing where the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under section 1172.75]

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1278–1279 [same]

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 [when the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing]

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000261

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing under section 1172.75, the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements as to each count. Pursuant to section 1465.9, we vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Section 1385 provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. It requires that a sentencing court give great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. One or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement. The statute provides an exception when the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. “Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

When a trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, it must not exclusively consider whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the public. Although the current dangerousness of the petitioner is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe not necessarily the same as a currently dangerous defendant who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly. A trial court would find the former to pose a greater danger than the latter.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Third Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1036

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentencing enhancements under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. We must not disturb an exercise of discretion on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fifth Holding:

During the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the superior court should not reduce the sentence beyond striking the prior prison term enhancement because the defendant posed a threat to public safety based on the underlying facts of the case. In response, defense counsel urged the court not to focus on his current risk to public safety. She reasoned that the defendant would still have to serve three consecutive life sentences even if the court struck the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

The court’s discussion of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s prior convictions does not suggest a forward-looking inquiry. Instead, the court relied on past conduct to determine the defendant’s present dangerousness. The court applied a legal standard that was not consistent with Gonzalez. The record does not demonstrate that the superior court considered whether the defendant would endanger public safety if the enhancements were stricken and he was still subject to the indeterminate term. We conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider his future dangerousness if the enhancements were stricken within the context of his indeterminate sentence.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Sixth Holding:

The Attorney General argues that we should presume that the superior court correctly applied the law and conducted a forward-thinking inquiry as to the defendant’s dangerousness. But the superior court did not have the benefit of Gonzalez on the date of resentencing. We cannot presume the trial court knew a standard that did not yet exist.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption does not apply when the sentencing law is not yet established]

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case: 000260

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing on his petition filed under section 1172.6 for recall of sentence in light of the changes in homicide law, the trial court denied the defendant’s resentencing petition on the ground the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt he aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The trial court did not conclude that the defendant was the direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor in an express malice murder. The trial court misidentified the relevant life-endangering act and thereby used an incorrect legal standard for determining the defendant’s mens rea for aiding and abetting implied malice murder.

We therefore reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing using the correct life-endangering act and consistent with this opinion. The trial court did not address the defendant’s convictions on counts 2 through 4 for attempted murder. Sentencing relief under section 1172.6 extends to attempted murder. In conducting a new evidentiary hearing following remand, the court shall make findings and rule on the defendant’s resentencing petition on the attempted murder convictions. The amended abstract of judgment indicates that the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. That is incorrect: He was convicted by a jury, not pursuant to a plea agreement. The abstract of judgment must be corrected accordingly.

First Holding:

The trial court denied the defendant’s resentencing petition on the ground the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt he aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The trial court did not conclude that the defendant was the direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor in an express malice murder.

Murder is committed with implied malice when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. A defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder. Notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990

Second Holding:

Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990-991

Third Holding:

A life-endangering act is the act that proximately causes death. To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. Here, the life-endangering act was the shooting by the co-defendant at the vehicle carrying the victim.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713, fn. 27

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 643

Fourth Holding:

Although a homicide might have more than one proximate cause, to suffice for implied malice murder, the perpetrator’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must involve a high degree of probability that it will result in death.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 963

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989

Fifth Holding:

The co-defendant perpetrator’s act of bringing the gun to the anticipated confrontation with the other gang did not in itself give rise to a high probability that death would result. Rather, that act merely created a dangerous situation in which death was possible depending on how circumstances unfolded. Deeming a life-endangering act to be the act of the co-defendant perpetrator bringing the gun to the fight comes precariously close to a natural and probable consequences theory of liability: Bringing the gun to a gang fight becomes life endangering only because a natural and probable consequence of doing so is the gun is fired and someone is killed. [GARY NOTE: Implicit in that example is that the change in the homicide law eliminated the natural and probable consequences rationale as supporting a murder conviction of the non-killer.]

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989

Sixth Holding:

By misidentifying the life-endangering act committed by the perpetrator, the trial court used the incorrect legal standard for determining mens rea for aiding and abetting implied malice murder.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991 [using incorrect life-endangering act constitutes legal error]

Seventh Holding:

We have the ability to order the correction of clerical errors in an abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–187

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000255

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in not applying the ameliorative provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.

First Holding:

PEN 1172.75

Authority:

Under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, a defendant with two or more strikes will be sentenced to a doubled term rather than to a life term (that carried a minimum of 25 years or longer, depending on the offense) that was required for a third strike (regardless of the nature of the new felony) under the original Three Strikes law, unless the new offense is a serious felony, as defined. [There are some exceptions to the Reform Act not applicable here, essentially related to large quantities of drugs, sex offenses, use of or armed with firearms or other deadly weapons, or the intent to cause great bodily injury, or if the prior convictions were of the sort enumerated as disqualifying.]

Second Holding:

PEN 1170.12

PEN 667(e)

PEN 1170.126

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Third Holding:

In Guevara, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. It remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court to determine whether sentencing that defendant (Guevara) under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If it so determined, the superior court was to reimpose the indeterminate term. If the superior court did not determine that resentencing Guevara would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and Guevara was otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence him pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: The Guevara court did not limit the determination of public safety risk to the definition subsequently enacted in conjunction with Proposition 47, which did define it in section 1170.18. The standard to be applied was the pre-Proposition 47 definition that had traditionally been applied under the Three Strikes Reform Act. That was necessary for the two sets of provisions to be constitutionally reconciled. This aspect was not mentioned in the unpublished opinion summarized here.]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878

Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000251

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though the trial court did not err in concluding that the defendant’s bare assertions of eligibility for relief in his petition to recall his sentence under section 1172.6 were belied by the record of conviction, the matter was remanded to the trial court to give the defendant the opportunity to file an amended petition.

First Holding:

Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the statutes defining malice (section 188) and felony murder (section 189, subd. (e)) to eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limit the scope of the felony-murder rule. It also added former section 1170.95, which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief. Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1170.95 to extend the resentencing procedures to a person convicted under any other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime. Former section 1170.95 has since been renumbered as section 1172.6, with no substantive changes.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957

Second Holding:

If a section 1172.6 petition contains all required information (e.g., declaration of eligibility, case information, any request for appointed counsel), the trial court must review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions of section 1172.6. If the petitioner has made this initial prima facie showing, he or she is entitled to appointed counsel, if requested, and the prosecutor must file a response, and the petitioner may file a reply. The court then reviews the petition a second time. If it concludes in light of this briefing that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts.

Authority:

People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1003

Third Holding:

When conducting the prima facie review, the trial court must assume the truth of the petition’s allegations unless they are refuted by the record of conviction. If a petition is supported only by conclusory, checkbox allegations and the preliminary hearing transcript contains unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts, then the trial court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage. This is because a section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite having access to counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition, offers only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to a record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner’s conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made a prima facie showing.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 564-566

Fourth Holding:

However, petitioners need not, at the prima facie stage, meet an evidentiary burden of proof to establish entitlement to relief, such as the burden of proof applicable to the People if trying to defeat relief at the later section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing. Rather, petitioners confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is unavailable have the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 566-567

Fifth Holding:

We review de novo whether the record of conviction establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing relief.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Sixth Holding:

The court properly considered the preliminary hearing transcript to make a prima facie determination that defendant was the actual killer and thus ineligible for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563

Seventh Holding:

Defendant requests that, if we affirm, we should remand with directions to afford him 30 days to amend his petition to plead additional facts. Because defendant did not have the benefit of Patton’s guidance during the prima facie stage before the trial court, we grant his request.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569-570

People v. Glass (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 922, 930

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000250

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred at sentencing when it relied on aggravating circumstances to increase the defendant’s punishment without obtaining a waiver of his right to a jury trial on those circumstances.

First Holding:

The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant to an upper term absent the defendant’s (a) stipulation to the aggravating facts the trial court relied on or (b) waiving a jury trial on those aggravating facts.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076 [criminal defendants are entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose them to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided middle term]

Second Holding:

We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true the facts underlying the aggravating circumstance that the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult are numerous. This aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague and subjective standard, which makes it difficult to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

For example, we cannot confidently say where the jury would have drawn the line for numerous, how the jury would have weighed felonies or misdemeanors, or how the jury might have considered the passage of time and discounted older convictions. We are also mindful that we cannot necessarily assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented had aggravating circumstances been submitted to the jury. For example, had the defense told the jury more details about the offenses, the jury could have been more likely to count convictions as minor and thus less likely to add up to the numerous standard. Having determined that the facts underlying one aggravating circumstance do not meet the standard for harmless error, we must vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1091

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000247

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant is not eligible to have a full resentencing under section 1172.75 because no now-invalid prior prison term enhancement had ever been imposed, a pre-condition for invocation of section 1172.75. The abstract of judgment must be corrected because it erroneously indicates that the enhancement for the prior prison term was stayed, when it is clear from the record that the court actually struck the enhancement rather than impose and stay it.

First Holding:

Appellate courts may exercise their authority to correct clerical errors, including correcting an abstract of judgment and may strike statements in the abstract to conform with the court’s oral pronouncement. Because the trial court explicitly stated, “The court is likewise going to strike the 667.5(b) prison prior,” the enhancement should not have been listed in the abstract of judgment, and we have the authority to order the abstract’s correction without requiring an accompanying resentencing. We order that correction accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts]

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 388

Second Holding:

The question in this case was left open by the Supreme Court in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1066, footnote 2 and, as is discussed below, is factually distinguishable from the issue to be decided in People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 (Espino), review granted October 23, 2024, S286987, which hinges on the “imposition” of a stricken prison prior enhancement’s punishment. Pending briefing before the Supreme Court is limited to the following issue: “Is a defendant entitled to resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 when the judgment in the defendant’s criminal case includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed but for which punishment was stricken?” (Espino, S286987, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 30, 2025.)

(Gary Note: Espino was decided by the Supreme Court on July 2, 2026. It did firmly hold that section 1172.75 applies when the punishment for a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement was stricken, not merely stayed as it was in Rhodius. Footnote 1 of the Supreme Court opinion in Espino seems to make it clear that it was not deciding the issue that arose in this Case 000247. Footnote 1: “Our decision in Rhodius also left open whether a prior prison term enhancement is “imposed” (sec. 1172.75(a)) “when an enhancement, not just its associated punishment, [is] stricken” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1066, fn. 2). As that question is not at issue in this case, we do not address it.”

(I can tell you that a petition for review in this case (the one for which this is the summary, 000247) was denied a few months ago, before Espino was decided. It seems it will take a different case to convince the Supreme Court to decide whether a person is eligible for relief under section 1172.75 in cases where the court struck the enhancement itself (and thus had nothing on which to impose and either stay or strike punishment.)

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1066, footnote 2

People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 (review granted 10/23/24, S286987

People v. Espino (2026) ___ Cal.5th ___ (S286987, decided July 2, 2026)

Amelioration, Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity

Case: 000243

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of legislation enacted since the disposition hearing, the $100 restitution fine is ordered stricken in this Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile proceeding.

Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now states that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Because the judgment is not final, the appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000242

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court failed to update the credits for time served, and awarded only the credits allowed at the original sentencing 12 years earlier. This was error, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to recalculate the proper credits as of the date of the resentencing hearing.

Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody up to that time, including his time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Ca1.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000239

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Here, where the petition was facially sufficient, it was error to deny the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage without appointing counsel and without a hearing. The trial court in this case appointed no counsel, conducted no hearing, and did not consider briefing, arguments of either party, or any other portion of the trial record, which necessarily informs the prima facie inquiry. On this record, with multiple participants in the shooting incident, as well as the jury’s instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a theory of implied malice, we cannot say it would be a waste of judicial resources to send the case back to the trial court to conduct its obligations under section 1172.6.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. It also added section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, to provide a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief. Thereafter, it expanded the path to resentencing under the law to allow relief for those with attempted murder convictions based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723-724

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Second Holding:

A petition under section 1172.6 that includes a declaration by petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for relief , based on all the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (a), the case number and year of the petitioner’s conviction, and whether the petitioner seeks counsel is facially sufficient and entitles the petitioner to counsel.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558-559

Third Holding:

The prima facie inquiry is limited A petitioner’s allegations should be accepted as true, and the court should not make credibility determinations or engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless. Indeed, in assessing petitions from individuals convicted after a jury trial, the jury instructions will be critical. The record of conviction also includes documents such as verdict forms. If the record [of conviction, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner. The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971, 974

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 720 [factfinding is prohibited at the prima facie stage]

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 731

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 563

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211

People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000232

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted provisions to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. Pretrial diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

If the defendant is eligible, the court also must determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Fourth Holding:

The trial court failed to apply the presumption that, given the timely diagnoses of mental health disorders, the mental condition contributed to his behavior. The burden then was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence tha there was no causal connection.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Fifth Holding:

However, while eligibility and suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they are met. Because of the existence of this residual discretion, the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in accordance with the current law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000231

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The jury’s true finding in 2023 that the defendant suffered a prior serious felony and strike offense based on a past gang related conviction was error. We vacate the prior serious felony and strike conviction and remand for retrial and resentencing. Further, the abstract of judgment must be corrected because it reflects a conviction for first degree robbery when it should be second degree robbery.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature amended the law prohibiting criminal gang activity law. In many respects, it changed the elements of a section 186.22 offense that the prosecution here did not prove. For a pre-AB 333 section 186.22 offense to qualify as a prior serious felony and strike offense, the prosecution was required to prove that the defendant’s past conduct met the post-AB 333 section 186.22 elements.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

AB 333

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582-583

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion listed no authority for its order directing the correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious. Other opinions have cited authority for the proposition that the appellate court itself has the power to correct the abstract of judgment. For convenience, and because my point in presenting unpublished cases in the first place is to provide education on principles that might not be obvious to find in published opinions that deal with new and nuanced problems, I have set forth some authority the appellate court could have cited]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2