Error and/or relief
The trial court erred when it overruled defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective Hispanic juror who reported negative experiences with law enforcement and the criminal justice system, where the prosecutor did not overcome the presumptive invalidity of the challenge by clear and convincing evidence.
First Holding:
Intentional discrimination is not the correct standard for determining whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge was improper. The court did not first require the prosecutor to overcome the presumptive invalidity of the challenge under the more demanding standard set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7(e). We may not impute to the trial court findings it did not make, but in this case, the record is devoid of any evidence that the prospective juror’s negative experiences with law enforcement and the criminal justice system bore on his inability to be fair and impartial. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor did not overcome the presumptive invalidity of the peremptory challenge, the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objection, and section 231.7 compels reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Authority:
CCP 231.7(e) and (j)
People v. Guzman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 464, 475
People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534, 540
Second Holding:
Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race. Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.
Authority:
People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1210–1211
People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 612
Third Holding:
The Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that race discrimination be eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of the State is most compelling in the judicial system. This is so because it is not only litigants who are harmed when the right to trial by impartial jury is abridged. Taints of discriminatory bias in jury selection—actual or perceived—erode confidence in the adjudicative process, undermining the public’s trust in courts.
Authority:
Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 412, 415
People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1154
Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 238
Fourth Holding:
Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection engaged in ‘purposeful discrimination. Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted AB 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. The Legislature intended that the new law be broadly construed to further the purpose of eliminating the use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias, in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
Authority:
CCP 231.7
People v. Guzman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 464, 475
People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943
People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 791–792
Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258
Fifth Holding:
Section 231.7 prohibits the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups. If a party or the trial court objects to the use of a peremptory challenge, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.
If the reason for the exercise of the peremptory challenge is not presumptively invalid under section 231.7(e) or (g) (which set forth specific reasons that are presumptively invalid), the reason is to be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances to determine if there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person, who is aware that unconscious bias and purposeful discrimination have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in California, would view membership or perceived membership in any of the protected groups as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge. The court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection.
Authority:
CCP 231.7
People v. Barnes (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 560, 577–578
Sixth Holding:
The trial court’s denial of an objection under section 231.7 is reviewed de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any findings, including findings of a prospective juror’s demeanor, that the trial court did not expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain either the party’s use of the peremptory challenge or the party’s failure to challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a comparative analysis argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
Authority:
CCP 231.7(j)