Error and/or relief
We reverse the denial of the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 and direct the trial court to consider the defendant’s youth at the time of the killing as a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant formed the requisite mental state to be convicted of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder.
First Holding:
The trial court found that the defendant directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. To satisfy the actus reus for that theory of liability, the aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The relevant act is the act that proximately causes death.
The required mens rea is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.
Authority:
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991
Second Holding:
Based on our review of the trial court’s written order denying resentencing, we conclude the trial court understood and applied the elements of directly aiding and abetting an implied malice murder. We therefore review its decision for substantial evidence.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We do not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility determinations. We presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. To overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.
Authority:
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331
People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118
People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755
Third Holding:
The defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider his youth when deciding the resentencing petition. He did not raise the issue in the trial court, arguably forfeiting the issue. But we agree that considering the issue on the merits is appropriate where this emerging area of the law was only developing at the time the trial court denied the petition.
In Pittman, for example, the defendant argued for the first time on appeal after the denial of resentencing that his youth (21 years old at the time of the offense) was relevant to whether he acted with implied malice and therefore could be found guilty of second degree murder. The appellate court observed that the policy interests underlying the felony-murder cases—that youth is relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences, and therefore to the level of culpability—apply equally in the context of implied malice murder.
The Pittman court further concluded that failure to consider Pittman’s youth was not harmless, given trial evidence of Pittman and his peers acting impulsively and under the influence of transient rashness.
Authority:
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416, 418 [Cases discussing the role of youth in relation to criminal culpability stress two areas: youthful offenders’ relative impulsivity and their vulnerability to peer pressure]
Fourth Holding:
The defendant was 20 years old at the time of the crime. Impulsivity and vulnerability to peer pressure may have contributed to his participation in the unplanned group attack of a rival gang member. We find it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached on the defendant’s petition had the trial court considered his youth.
Authority:
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417 (applying the Watson standard)
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818