Error and/or relief
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion under section 1172.6 to recall his sentence on his 1999 murder convictions (he had hired someone to kill his father, and that person also killed the defendant’s mother in the process, all while the defendant was away from the home in which they were killed). We conclude the defendant’s acquittal on first degree murder of his mother precluded a finding that he had intended to kill her. We remand for the court to consider whether he remains guilty of his mother’s murder under a theory of implied malice. In doing so, the court should consider his youth at the time of the offense.
First Holding:
The defendant hired a person to kill the defendant’s father. The hiree did so, but also killed the defendant’s mother. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder of the father, but of only second degree murder of his mother. In our view, the defendant’s acquittal of first degree murder as to the mother precluded a finding that he intended to kill her. First degree murder generally requires a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill. Second degree murder requires either an intent to kill without premeditation and deliberation or implied malice—conscious disregard for human life.
Authority:
People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 201
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151–152
Second Holding:
After the defendant’s trial, the Legislature amended the law of murder to eliminate liability based on imputed malice, including the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Section 1172.6 provides retroactive relief to defendants convicted under those now-invalid theories. Under principles of collateral estoppel, a jury’s finding at trial precludes a contrary finding in a section 1172.6 hearing.
Authority:
People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723–724
People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 385-386 [discussing collateral estoppel]
Third Holding:
We review the trial court’s factual findings in denying a section 1172.6 petition for substantial evidence. But the preclusive effect of a defendant’s partial acquittal is a legal issue we review de novo.
Authority:
People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383
Fourth Holding:
We presume the jury meticulously followed the trial court’s instructions. We thus conclude the jury found that that the defendant lacked an intent to kill the mother, precluding the trial court’s contrary finding.
Authority:
People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 69, 73
Fifth Holding:
The erroneous finding was not harmless. Although the record could have supported liability under a theory of implied malice, the trial court did not evaluate that theory and we cannot conclude it would have reached the same result if it had. The defendant was 19 years old at the time of the crimes—still on the lower end of the young adult age range. Recent decisions have emphasized that youths may be less able to appreciate risks and consequences and thus that courts must consider defendants’ youth in deciding if they acted with implied malice or reckless indifference.
Authority:
People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004, 1007
People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416–418