Monthly Archives: September 2026

Case 000986

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the defendant’s petition for recall under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, and remand for further proceedings because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that defendant is ineligible for relief as required at the prima facie stage of section 1172.6.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

SB 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. This language eliminated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in second degree murder prosecutions.

SB 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) expanded the scope of those changes to encompass, among other things, murder convictions under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846

People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978

Second Holding:

Section 1172.6 creates a petition process for an eligible defendant to seek to be resentenced. Section 1172.6(b) and (c) create the process for evaluating the petition. First, the trial court must determine whether the petition is facially sufficient under section 1172.6(b). If the petition is facially sufficient, the court must appoint counsel (if requested) and follow the briefing schedule set forth in the statute. Following the completion of this briefing, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petition has made a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960-962, 966

Third Holding:

While the trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.

A court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, contains facts refuting the allegations made in the petition, then the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.

Stated another way, a petition for resentencing may be denied at the prima facie stage where the record of conviction, including items such as the jury instructions and associated findings, establishes a defendant’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 459-461

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s jury in 2013 was given the murder instruction under CALCRIM No. 520 and aider and abettor instructions under CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of second degree murder.

Under these instructions, the perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the victim; the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the perpetrator need not have had murderous intent, certainly the aider and abettor need not have had such an intent.

Although the definition of second degree murder in CALCRIM No. 520 states that the perpetrator must have acted with conscious disregard for human life, the definition of an aider and abettor in CALCRIM No. 401 does not include the same requirement. Thus, under the instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, the defendant need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, assaulting the victim—whether or not the defendant intended to aid or encourage the victim’s killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing.

This possible application of defendant’s instructions establishes a prima facie case for a section 1172.6 petition.

Authority:

People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 984

Fifth Holding:

In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. The prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972

Sixth Holding:

The record of conviction therefore does not establish defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. In order to conclude defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we would have to weigh the evidence and find defendant to have been the actual killer, which would be impermissible at this stage. The trial court consequently erred by denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 20

People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269

Case 000985

Error and/or relief

The sentencing minute order cites the statute for the firearm enhancement as section 12022.53(d), instead of section 12022.5(a). On remand, the trial court is therefore instructed to correct the sentencing minute order nunc pro tunc.

Holding:

The sentencing minute order from January 7, 2025 contains the same error contained in the original abstract of judgment, i.e., the statute for the firearm enhancement is cited as section 12022.53(d), instead of section 12022.5(a). While the abstract of judgment was subsequently corrected, there is nothing to indicate in the record that the sentencing minute order was also corrected. On remand, the trial court is therefore instructed to correct the sentencing minute order nunc pro tunc.

(Gary note: The court does not cite its authority to order correction of the minutes, likely because it’s so obvious, not to mention that it apparently had previously spotted the same error in the abstract of judgment and ordered its correction. For your convenience, I have listed a nonexclusive list of cases that the court could have chosen its authority from.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case 000984

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the firearm enhancement on count 2.

First Holding:

In affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the defendant’s request for dismissal of the firearm enhancement attached to count 1, we review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion, including a court’s determination of dangerousness. Section 1172.75(d) vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry.

Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

A court also abuses its discretion if the decision is made without the sentencing court’s informed discretion or if the court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers.

The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.

A defendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. We assume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725

People v. Calhoun (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 [a court’s sentencing decision implies requisite subsidiary findings]

Second Holding:

On count 2, the defendant had been convicted of section 246 (shooting at an occupied vehicle), enhanced under section 12022.53(d) for an additional 25 years to life. (In the prior appeal from the conviction, the appellate court struck the enhancements on count 2 under sections 12022.53(b) and (c), because section 246 is not one of the crimes listed in 12022.53(a) that subdivisions (b) and (c) can apply to.) At the 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the court imposed the lesser enhancement on count 2, under section 12022.53(c), for an enhancement of a determinate term of 20 years instead of the indeterminate 25 years to life he was serving under section 12022.53(d).

Because section 246 is not a crime listed under section 12022.53(a) to which subdivisions (b) and (c) can be applied, it was error to reduce the section 12022.53(d) enhancement to 12022.53(c).

While the trial court could dismiss the section 12022.53(d), firearm enhancement as to count 2, it could not impose a lesser enhancement under section 12022.53(c). We vacate the sentence as to count 2 and remand for resentencing as to that count only.

(Gary note: The court did not mention it as an option, but the trial court can dismiss the section 12022.53 (as the appellate court stated) and impose an enhancement on a lesser included enhancement, such as section 12022.5.

(Under People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, the Supreme Court extended its holding of Tirado (which held that a court could exercise its discretion to impose a lesser section 12022.53 enhancement to the one that was found true) to expressly permit striking section 12022.53 and imposing a lesser included, uncharged enhancement authorized elsewhere in the Penal Code, outside section 12022.53. Under McDavid, the court in this case could strike the 12022.53(d) enhancement and impose an enhancement under section 12022.5, for example. In other words, the court is not faced with a choice of it’s either all or nothing.)

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(a)

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 699, fn. 12

(People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015)

Case 000983

Error and/or relief

The convictions on counts 1 and 2 (domestic violence and assault with a deadly weapon) are based on the same act of striking the victim with his vehicle and therefore he cannot be punished for both.

First Holding:

Under section 654(a), an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. That the purpose of section 654 is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with the defendant’s culpability.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211

Second Holding:

A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the trial court’s determination of the applicability of section 654. We review the trial court’s factual findings, express or implicit, in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Kurtenbach (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1289

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730

People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312–1313

People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603

Third Holding:

When confronted with offenses within the purview of section 654, the proper procedure is to stay execution of sentence on all but one of the offenses subject to this section. A concurrent sentence simply does not satisfy the prohibition against double punishment. We will therefore modify the judgment ourselves to stay the sentence on count 2 in accordance with section 654.

Authority:

People v. Pena (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1312

People v. Bey (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 144, 167–168

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [exercising authority under sec. 1260 to modify judgment rather than remand as remedy for trial court’s failure to impose and stay sentence]

Case 000982

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of both carjacking and kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking for the same incident. He argues that the carjacking conviction must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense. We agree and reverse the carjacking conviction.

First Holding:

Carjacking is a necessarily lesser included offense of kidnapping during a carjacking.

Authority:

People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898

In re B.J. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 646, 652

Second Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of a greater and a lesser included offense, reversal of the conviction for the lesser included offense is required.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1416