It was error to impose a $41 fine under section 1202.5. It is ordered stricken.
Under section 1202.5(a), courts are required to impose a fine on a defendant who is convicted of a theft-related offense listed in the statute. Here, the $41 crime prevention fine was unauthorized because defendant’s convictions are not among the offenses listed in section 1202.5(a). Thus, we strike the $41 crime prevention fine from defendant’s sentence.
PEN 1202.5(a)
The trial court failed to orally dismiss counts that were to be dismissed under the plea agreement. We modify the judgment to reflect the dismissal of the two counts.
The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the remaining counts as required by the plea agreement. While the minutes indicate the counts were dismissed, the court did not orally dismiss them at the hearing. To avoid unnecessarily wasting limited resources, we modify the judgment to reflect the plea agreement.
PEN 1260
People v. Superior Court (Gifford) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337 [A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound]
It was error to impose a $10 crime prevention fine under section 1202.5. It is ordered stricken. The minute order must be corrected to reflect that the resentencing proceedings were under section 1172.75, not under section 1172.6 as the minute order indicated.
The original imposition of the section 1202.5 crime prevention fine was unauthorized.
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [claims of unauthorized sentencing error may be raised at any time]
Under section 1202.5(a), courts are required to impose a $10 crime prevention fine on a defendant who is convicted of a theft-related offense listed in the statute. Here, the $10 crime prevention fine was unauthorized because defendant’s convictions are not among the offenses listed in section 1202.5(a). Thus, we strike the $10 crime prevention fine from defendant’s sentence.
PEN 1202.5(a)
People v. Jefferson (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 660, 663
The minute orders refer to the proceedings as taking place pursuant to section 1172.6. As the record is clear these were resentencing proceedings pursuant to section 1172.75, this appears to be a clerical error.
[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for the order or observation regarding the correction of the minute order, but there is authority aplenty. The court could have cited one or more of the cases I have set out below.]People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855
In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890
People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385
People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2
A trial court may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in determining whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. We affirm the denial but remand to give the defendant the opportunity file an amended petition.
A trial court may properly rely on uncontroverted evidence in a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in determining whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie entitlement to relief under section 1172.6.
PEN 1172.6
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
Hearsay testimony by a police officer at a preliminary hearing could support a trial court’s finding that the petitioner did not make a prima facie case under section 1172.6.
People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1179
The court failed to show it recognized and exercised its discretion to designate second degree burglary as a felony or a misdemeanor, and the program condition of probation delegated impermissibly broad discretion to the probation officer
Second degree burglary is a “wobbler,” that is, an offense that may be punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor. This determination is important not only because felonies are subject to longer periods of confinement, but also because felony convictions have additional adverse consequences, including use without limitation for impeachment under Proposition 8 in subsequent criminal proceedings, enhancement of sentences, and the general blight upon the character of persons convicted of felonies. To ensure that juvenile courts are aware of their discretion to charge wobblers as misdemeanors and that they consciously choose to treat wobblers committed by juveniles as felonies, juvenile courts are required to expressly declare how they are treating such offenses. If the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.
WIC 707
People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 461, fn. 6
In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1207, 1209
In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 619, fn. 3
Although remand is not automatically required when a juvenile court fails to expressly declare that a wobbler is a felony or misdemeanor, to establish prejudice a juvenile need not show a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. Also, challenges under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 are not forfeited by failure to object at trial. Instead, in this context, the key issue is whether the record as a whole establishes that the juvenile court was aware of its discretion to treat the offense as a misdemeanor and to state a misdemeanor-length confinement limit. The record in this case does not reflect that the court was aware of its discretion to properly exercise it. A minute order may not substitute for a declaration by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.
In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 704, 711-714, 717
In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1209
We review juvenile placement decisions for abuse of discretion. It was not an abuse of discretion to order the minor to be placed in a secure facility.
In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154
In placing the minor in a secure facility, the juvenile court imposed a number of terms and conditions, including a requirement that he participate in and complete any appropriate programs as directed by [his] Probation Officer. We review orders of this nature de novo. This condition is an improper delegation of judicial authority. Probation conditions may be challenged for the first time on appeal if they are challenged as unconstitutional on their face and the challenge therefore presents a pure question of law.
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888
Although juvenile courts have greater discretion to formulate probation terms than adult criminal courts, their discretion to delegate authority is restricted by the separation-of-powers doctrine. Under the California Constitution, separation of powers does not mean an entire or complete separation of powers or functions, which would be impracticable, if not impossible. Thus, a court may delegate to a probation officer authority to specify the details necessary to effectuate the court’s probation conditions. However, the separation-of-powers doctrine limits the delegation of judicial authority to nonjudicial officers, especially in the absence of judicial supervision and review of the exercise of that authority. Consequently, a court may not delegate complete discretion over a significant aspect of the court’s legal control. To satisfy the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court delegating judicial authority to a probation officer must dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation.
In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910, 919
In re D.N. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 202, 208-209, 212
People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902, 903 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to choose between residential and outpatient substance abuse programs]
People v. O’Neal (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1359 [the court’s order cannot be entirely open-ended]
People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to authorize probationer to attend court proceedings and otherwise barring probationer from attending court proceedings unless a party or witness]