Monthly Archives: August 2026

Appellate Principles, Equal protection, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000414

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erroneously applied the doctrine of the law of the case to deny the defendant’s section 1170(d) petition in which he sought resentencing under its provisions because 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).

First Holding:

In his original appeal from the 2010 conviction the Court of Appeal concluded that 50 years to life was not the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence. The trial court denied his petition under section 1170(d) in 2023 on the basis that, under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court had previously ruled that his sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. However, years after the original appeal was decided, the Supreme Court determined that 50 years to life was the functional equivalent of LWOP.

Authority:

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

Second Holding:

The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal, and this although in its subsequent consideration the court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.

Authority:

People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6

People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 442 [The law-of-the-case doctrine binds the trial court as to the law but controls the outcome only if the evidence on rehearing of an issue is substantially the same as that upon which the appellate ruling was based.]

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253

People v. Vizcarra (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 430 [The doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case bar a defendant from raising an issue that was raised and rejected in a prior appeal.]

Third Holding:

The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate review of the same issue more than once in a single action. It is well settled, however, that the doctrine may be disregarded where the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations.

Authority:

Truck Ins. Exchange v. Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 67, 87, fn. 6

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716-717 [Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) does not apply when there has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.]

Fourth Holding:

Here, although defendant raised and this court previously rejected the issue of whether, as a juvenile offender, defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, the law on the issue has changed significantly and is currently split.

Authority:

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 268 [eligibility for parole pursuant to sec. 3051 mooted any assertion that defendant’s 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 359 [50 years to life for juvenile offender ineligible for sec. 3051 relief is the functional equivalent of LWOP]People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 624 [103 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 441 [140 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054-1061 [107 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 513, dis. opn. of Feuer, J. [ majority holds 50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of LWOP, but the dissent would hold that it is], review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, 999 [44 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Thompson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1081, review granted Sept. 24, 2025, S292540 [50 years to life not functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Perez (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 49, 58 [parole eligibility at 47 years of age was by no stretch of the imagination functional or de facto LWOP]

People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292070 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, review granted Nov. 12, 2025, S292860 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Lara (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 484, review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S294095 [The requirement of a youth offender parole hearing moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP]

Abstracts and Minutes

Case: 000413

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Errors in the abstract of judgment must be corrected. Among other things, the abstract does not reflect that in the defendant’s prior appeal, this court ordered the section 12022.5 enhancement stricken, not stayed.

First Holding:

Clerical errors in abstracts of judgment are subject to correction.

Authority:

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000412

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The electronics search condition is invalid under Lent and must be stricken.

First Holding:

In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. The court may impose and require such reasonable conditions as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer. The trial court’s discretion, although broad, nevertheless is not without limits.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120–1121

Second Holding:

A three-prong test determines whether a probation condition is unreasonable. A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. All three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first Lent prong is satisfied because the record does not show a relationship between the defendant’s use of electronic devices and the offending conduct sufficient to justify the search condition. There is no information in the record that he used any kind of electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his offenses of molesting a child or dissuading a witness. Nor is there any mention whatsoever of his use of a mobile phone, computer, or social media account in connection with the victim or any other conduct that might be said to relate to the offenses in this case.

Authority:

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720 [defendant met victim through social media]

Fourth Holding:

As for the second Lent prong, it goes without saying that the use of electronic devices is not criminal in and of itself.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Fifth Holding:

The third Lent prong contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. It requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality. Nothing in the testimony at the preliminary hearing, the probation report, or the record of the defendant’s personal history revealed anything about his electronics use that might be connected to his past crimes or potential future criminality. The defendant had no prior history of arrests, convictions, or probation, and his risk of recidivism was assessed as below average. Thus, as in Ricardo P., the burden imposed by the electronics search condition on the defendant’s privacy is substantially disproportionate to the condition’s goal” of deterring future criminality.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122

In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 663–664

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000411

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court orally sentenced appellant to “life, with the minimum parole date of 7 years” for the attempted murders in counts 7, 8, and 9. It remarked that the sentences on counts 8 and 9 were, “effectively, 7-years-to-life,” and that the sentence on each count when the firearm enhancements were included was “effectively 8-years-to-life.” The minute order reflects terms of “life plus 7 years” on these three counts, and the abstract of judgment indicates the sentence on each of these counts is “7 years to life.” The abstract of judgment and minute order must be corrected to reflect sentences of life on each of the attempted murder counts (counts 7, 8, and 9), plus one year and four months for each related firearm enhancement.

First Holding:

Section 664(a) prescribes a punishment of imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole for the crime of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. The minimum term a person sentenced to life must serve before parole is seven years; that minimum applies to each consecutively imposed life term.

Authority:

PEN 664(a)

Second Holding:

Although seven years to life is a common shorthand for such a sentence, it is incorrect because it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility. There is a minimum parole eligibility of seven years, but that is not part of the sentence that is pronounced. Thus, a more accurate statement of the sentence for attempted murder is simply life, plus any determinate enhancements. The trial court accurately stated that the sentences on counts 7, 8, and 9 were life, with the minimum parole date of 7 years, but the minute order and abstract recording the trial court’s oral pronouncement incorrectly impose a minimum term on the attempted murder sentences.

Authority:

People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4

People v. Robbins (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 660, 678

Third Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment or minute order, the oral pronouncement controls, and we may order correction of any such errors.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Juveniles

Case: 000410

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the juvenile court to correctly determine the maximum period of confinement the minor may be subjected to under the commitment order. The correct term appears to be five years, less than the term announced by the juvenile court.

Holding:

When a minor is named a ward of the court and removed from the custody of his parent, the juvenile court must set a maximum term of confinement that does not exceed the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. A court is prohibited from committing a juvenile to any juvenile facility for a period that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense. The court may aggregate terms for multiple counts or previously sustained petitions in the manner set out in Penal Code section 1170.1 for adults, requiring subordinate felony terms be imposed at one-third the middle term. The same rule applies to misdemeanors.

Authority:

WIC 726

In re David H. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1131