Monthly Archives: August 2026

Duty of counsel, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000740

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

First Holding:

A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a right to counsel but also allows him to waive this right and to represent himself without counsel.

Authority:

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

Second Holding:

In any case in which a Faretta request for self-representation has been made, the court must evaluate two countervailing considerations: on one hand, the defendant’s absolute right to counsel, which must be assiduously protected; on the other hand, the defendant’s unqualified constitutional right to discharge counsel if he pleases and represent himself.

The right to representation by counsel persists until a defendant affirmatively waives it, and courts indulge every reasonable inference against such waiver.

The waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary—that is, the defendant must actually understand the significance and consequences of the decision, and the decision must be uncoerced. The purpose of the knowing and voluntary inquiry is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.

Authority:

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 [Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel]

Third Holding:

When confronted with a request for self-representation, a trial court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

Nevertheless, no particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217–218

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,. 835

People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140

Fourth Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently invoked his right to self-representation. The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the waiver was invalid.

Authority:

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549

Fifth Holding:

In Jackio, the court held that trial courts are required to advise a defendant desiring to represent himself at trial of the maximum punishment that could be imposed if the defendant is found guilty of the crimes, with enhancements, alleged at the time the defendant moves to represent himself.

In Bush, the court distinguished Jackio and held that, while the better practice would be to inform the accused, on the record, of the maximum sentence, including any maximum monetary fine that could be imposed on a conviction, we have not found any case specifically concluding that an advisement on this point is a constitutional minimum in every case.

Authority:

People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445, 454

People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 473

Sixth Holding:

It is not entirely clear whether the invalid waiver is structural error that is reversible per se or whether the error should be reviewed for prejudice under the standard of Chapman, under which error is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We need not resolve that question because, even if the error was not structural, respondent has not shown the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. There is certainly a reasonable possibility that, faced with a sentence three times longer than he initially had in mind and with no plausible defense to the charges, appellant would have opted to forgo self-representation. And there is also a reasonable possibility appointed counsel could have negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecution that would have resulted in a sentence less than that appellant received.

Authority:

People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 244 [acknowledging but not resolving split of authority]

People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 549

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees

Case 000739

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution fine under section 1202.4, but because defendant is serving terms of LWOP, the court did not impose a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. The minute order and abstract of judgment, however, reflect a parole revocation restitution fine was imposed and suspended. They must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls, and we may correct a clerical error in recording the judgment at any time. Consequently, we will direct the trial court to correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to omit reference to imposition of a parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Fourth Amendment

Case 000738

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence. A security guard noticed that car in the parking lot had shooting targets and loose ammunition–both legal–in the car, and the car’s trunk was open. No one was inside or near the car, which was locked. The guard called the police. The officer saw what appeared to be a tactical vest in the partly opened trunk. The officer then fully opened the trunk and could then see the butt of a pistol in the vest.

Because the officer could not see the gun and magazines until after he had seized the tactical vest, he had no probable cause to open the trunk further to conduct the search the trunk or of the vest he removed from the trunk.

First Holding:

In reviewing an order on a suppression motion, we rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, provided they are supported by substantial evidence, to independently determine whether the search was constitutional.

Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the context of historical facts determined by the trial court construed in the light most favorable to the court’s order. It is the trial court’s role to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences.

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

Second Holding:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of private property. A defendant challenging the lawfulness of a warrantless search must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched or the things seized. A successful showing requires the government to respond by identifying an applicable exception to the warrant requirement.

If the government fails to do so, the court must apply an exclusionary rule that forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial and must also preclude the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of the illegal search.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1469

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 115

People v. Golden (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905, 911

Third Holding:

A defendant’s expectation of privacy must be both subjective and objectively reasonable. To meet this second prong of the test, the expectation must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

Authority:

People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 960

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fourth Holding:

The court’s determination that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk of his car is supported by substantial evidence. At the time of the search, the doors to his car were locked and the key was in his pocket. These facts are highly relevant to our inquiry because one of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.

Accordingly, one who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. The facts indicate that the defendant took precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.

Authority:

Byrd v. United States (2018) 584 U.S. 395, 405

Fifth Holding:

It does not violate the Fourth Amendment for an officer to make a warrantless seizure of an incriminating object in plain view if (1) the officer was lawfully in a place where the object could be viewed; (2) the officer had a lawful right of access to the seized item; and (3) the item’s evidentiary value was immediately apparent. This third element requires that there be probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or contraband before it was seized.

Authority:

People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 489

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

Sixth Holding:

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we defer to a trial court’s credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. Generally, this is evidence that, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.

Under this standard, we may reject testimony accepted as credible by the trial court only if it is wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds or unbelievable per se such that no reasonable person could believe the testimony Credibility findings that fail to survive this scrutiny are rare indeed. There must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or the statements falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.

This case presents one of these rare occurrences. (The opinion then details the problems it perceived with trial courts conclusions drawn from the officer’s testimony.)

Authority:

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 860-861

People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149

In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1149

DiQuisto v. County of Santa Clara (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 236, 261

Seventh Holding:

Under the plain view doctrine, probable cause that an item of interest to law enforcement is incriminating must exist before the object is seized. The trial court’s logic, by contrast, suggests that this standard can be met by a mere hunch that happens to pan out. That is not how the Fourth Amendment works.

Authority:

People v. Stokes (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 715, 719

People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 889 [A hunch may provide the basis for solid police work. A hunch, however, is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a Fourth Amendment intrusion]

Eighth Holding:

A law enforcement officer often performs functions that are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. As these so-called community caretaking functions relate to vehicles, they include impounding them if they pose threats to public safety—for example, because they are disabled, parked illegally, or blocking traffic or a sidewalk—or stand at risk of theft or vandalism.

When vehicles are impounded, that is, seized, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. These inventory searches are “a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

Accordingly, under what is sometimes referred to as the vehicle community caretaking exception, the government may introduce evidence obtained from an inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.

But controlling precedent recognizes the vehicle community caretaking exception applies only in the context of impound procedures, which undisputedly were not used here. No published California case has applied the concept of community caretaking outside the context of a vehicle inventory.

Even assuming that the community caretaking function might in some circumstances permit a warrantless search for suspected firearms in the unsecured trunk of an unoccupied car in a public place, the search here was unreasonable because sheriff’s deputies made no attempt to first locate the driver of the vehicle before opening the trunk

Authority:

Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 441

People v. Vodak (1980) 105 Cal.App.3rd 1014

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 52

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 867

People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1048, 1053

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000737

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the $200 restitution fine imposed by the trial court on resentencing must be vacated, as section 1465.9(d) requires such a fine that is more than 10 years old to be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4 states a court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

Second Holding:

Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. This section not only authorizes, but mandates, vacation of a portion of a judgment for the purpose of striking the now-unauthorized assessments.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626

Elements of crime, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000736

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There is insufficient evidence proving the defendant burned forest land as that term is defined by section 450(b).

First Holding:

Section 451 provides that a person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned any structure, forest land, or property. Section 451 identifies four types of felonious arson: (1) arson causing great bodily injury; (2) arson causing an inhabited structure or property to burn; (3) arson of a structure or forest land; and (4) arson of property. Section 450(b) defines forest land as any brush covered land, cut-over land, forest, grasslands, or woods.

By contrast, property means real property or personal property, other than a structure or forest land. The maximum sentence for arson of a structure or forest land is double that of the maximum sentence for arson of uninhabited property.

Authority:

PEN 451

PEN 450

Second Holding:

At the heart of this case lies a question of statutory interpretation—the meaning of forest land—which we consider de novo. Our primary task in interpreting the statute is to determine the lawmakers’ intent. We begin with the words of the statute and their usual and ordinary meaning, which would typically be their dictionary definition. Their plain meaning controls, unless the words are ambiguous. If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 5-6

People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71

Third Holding:

To the extent we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence of forest land, we consider whether the record discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and we do not reweigh evidence. In the end, the only evidentiary question before us is whether the prosecution—consistent with the theory it advanced regarding what constituted forest land—presented sufficient proof in this case.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 5

People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71

People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 820

Fourth Holding:

It appears undisputed that the site here does not fall within the statutory definition of forest land as cut-over land, forest, or woods. The People argue it constitutes forest land as grasslands or brush covered land. We disagree. Merriam-Webster defines grassland as farmland occupied chiefly by forage plants and especially grasses, or land on which the natural dominant plant forms are grasses and forbs, or an ecological community in which the characteristic plants are grasses. Based on these definitions and the language of sections 450 and 451, we agree with the defendant that the mere presence of grass is insufficient to make an area a grassland.

The statutes distinguish between arson of forest land, including grasslands, and arson of other types of uninhabited property, suggesting that the Legislature intended forest land to mean something other than any land on which grass grows. The definitions suggest a grassland is an open land or prairie, occupied largely by grasses, rather than just any land with grass on it, such as a lawn or park. The 1979 amendment to the statute from “any grass” to “grasslands” suggests the Legislature intended to narrow the types of grassy areas giving rise to heightened punishment for arson.

Authority:

PEN 450

Fifth Holding:

Based on the definitions and the discussion in Costella, we believe the definition of “brush covered land” requires that at least some portion of the land in question be densely populated with brush, even if it is not continuously covered with brush. Here, there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the area affected was forest land or grassland or brush covered land. In sum, there is insufficient evidence that the land at issue constituted forest land under sections 450, subdivision (b), and 451, subdivision (c). Therefore, the arson conviction must be reversed.

Authority:

PEN 450

PEN 451

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 7