Tag Archives: Standard of review

Effective assistance of counsel, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000464

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law in closing arguments and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object. We therefore reverse the judgment as to the murder conviction and accompanying sentence. The prosecutor prejudicially misstated the law during closing arguments, andt defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because we additionally conclude that substantial evidence supported the conviction, the defendant may be retried.

First Holding:

The defendant forfeited any objection to the jury instructions by failing to object in the trial court. Generally, failure to object to a jury instruction forfeits a claim of error on appeal. Generally, a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived impropriety. The defendant’s failure to object will be excused if an objection would have been futile or if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct. The defendant’s claims are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 471

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674

Second Holding:

The defendant also asserts that his trial attorney’s failure to object to the instruction or the prosecutor’s argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore address the underlying claims of error in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its result.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 [a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent and conscientious advocate]

In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 721

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687

People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215

In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773

Third Holding:

To prevail on his claim, the defendant must show that defense counsel’s omission fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place. The defendant must also show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. It is enough to show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

The standard for judging counsel’s representation is a most deferential one. We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight. Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge. Accordingly, we must reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 689, 693-694

In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773-774

Fourth Holding:

Where the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury, this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper or erroneous manner. We objectively examine how a reasonable juror would likely interpret the prosecutor’s remarks, bearing in mind that we do not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340

Fifth Holding:

Where the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury, this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the prosecutor’s remarks in an improper or erroneous manner. We objectively examine how a reasonable juror would likely interpret the prosecutor’s remarks, bearing in mind that we do not lightly infer that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.

Authority:

People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340

Sixth Holding:

Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law. In general, if the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected.

Moreover, because, in general, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to speculate as to the existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for a defense attorney’s course of conduct when the record on appeal does not illuminate the basis for the attorney’s challenged acts or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately made in a habeas corpus proceeding, in which the attorney has the opportunity to explain the reasons for his or her conduct. Additionally, the decision facing counsel in the midst of trial over whether to object to comments made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical one and a mere failure to object to evidence or argument seldom establishes counsel’s incompetence.

Here, however, we are constrained to conclude that there could be no satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law during closing arguments. The defendant has established that defense counsel’s failure to object fell short of prevailing professional standards of reasonableness. We also conclude that he has demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675

People v. Stratton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 87, 93

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000462

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially violated the Confrontation Clause (U.S. const., amend. VI) by overly restricting defendant’s cross-examination of two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only prosecution evidence presented on counts 2 and 4. And although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots defendant’s Pitchess request, we exercise our discretion to address the issue and find that the trial court should have ordered the production of two civilian complaints.

Given this disposition, we need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is incorrect, since the trial court must enter a new judgment on remand. Defendant’s sentence is therefore vacated. On remand, if the People do not timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court shall resentence him on counts 1, 3, and 5 accordingly. If the People timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court is directed to disclose the Pitchess records consistent with this opinion and afford defendant a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial.

First Holding:

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. But they have a right only to reasonable cross-examination. Trial courts therefore have wide discretion in determining the appropriate scope of cross-examination.

Authority:

People v. Royal (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 121, 149

Olden v. Kentucky (1988) 488 U.S. 227, 231

People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 406

Second Holding:

Although trial courts may reasonably limit a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness’s bias, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause restricts the court’s discretion. A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.

The trial court’s restrictions on a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness for bias does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant shows that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness had the defendant been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination. However, excluding evidence of marginal impeachment value generally does not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Authority:

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455-456

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680

People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s order restricting defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies for an abuse of discretion. We likewise review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 765

People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 957

Fourth Holding:

The tactical decision (which was defendant’s to make) has no bearing on whether the trial court properly limited defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies. The issue is whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deputies’ potential bias, not whether that cross-examination might benefit the prosecution.

Authority:

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679

Fifth Holding:

That defendant could have asked other witnesses about the 2015 incident to attack the deputies’ credibility is beside the point. Defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to reasonably probe the deputies’ credibility by cross-examining the deputies. The issue here is, again, whether the trial court’s limitation on defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies violated the Confrontation Clause, not whether defendant had other available means to explore the deputies’ bias beyond cross-examining them.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 513 [Confrontation Clause allows appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness]

People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 [The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility]

Sixth Holding:

The testimony of the deputies was effectively the only evidence presented on the assault on an officer and felony evading charges, since they were the only witnesses to those offenses. Evidence about the deputies’ knowledge of the earlier incident was thus not of marginal impeachment value, nor was it not relevant, as the trial court incorrectly concluded. This was the only evidence that showed the deputies might have been biased against defendant, despite their denials, and could have influenced the jury’s view of their testimony.

Given that defendant’s guilt on the two counts hinged on the deputies’ testimony, their credibility was a critical issue on those counts. The trial court’s ruling allowed defendant to ask the deputies only whether they knew defendant and whether they were biased against him. When both deputies said they were not biased against him, defendant could not then probe any potential bias stemming from the 2015 incident, even though the jury might have reasonably found that the incident gave the deputies a motive for favoring the prosecution. In our view, the trial court’s ruling made defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies an exercise in futility.

Authority:

United States v. Abel (1984) 469 U.S. 45, 52 [Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony]

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1280-1282[Bias has traditionally been viewed as especially powerful.]

Abatti v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 52 [Impeachment of a witness can make the difference between acquittal and conviction, especially where credibility is the major issue in a case and evidence at trial will consist of opposing stories presented by the defense and the prosecution witnesses.]

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [“blanket” ruling prohibiting all inquiry into a witness’s potential bias violated Confrontation Clause]

Seventh Holding:

The second step of the analysis asks whether a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the challenged witness’s credibility if the proposed line of cross-examination had been permitted. This requires us to focus on the witness’s cross-examination rather than the outcome of the trial as a whole, examining whether the defense had other means of impeachment of the witness during cross-examination. We review the issue de novo.

Authority:

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282

Eighth Holding:

In Davis, the United States Supreme Court reasoned: “While counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness.”

So too here. Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine the deputies, we must reverse the convictions on counts 2 and 4 unless the People show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The People have not done so.

Authority:

Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 317-318

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 684

Ninth Holding:

A review of the Pitchess materials reveals that complaints had previously been filed against the deputies. Those materials should have been released to the defendant. The fact that the complaints were found by the internal police investigation to be unfounded is immaterial because unsustained complaints are discoverable. This is because “the burden for preparing a criminal defendant’s case rests with his counsel, not with the police department. That burden cannot be properly discharged unless counsel has direct access to potential witnesses, for it is counsel who must decide if they can aid his client, not the police department’s internal affairs division, however sincere and well motivated the latter may be.

Authority:

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 182

People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 93 fn. 1, 101

Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000461

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We direct the trial court to modify the judgment to correct a sentencing error on the defendant’s sentence for attempted kidnapping.

First Holding:

We review unauthorized sentences de novo. A computational error that leads to an unauthorized sentence can be corrected at any time.

Authority:

People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1140

People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205

Second Holding:

Kidnapping is punishable by three, five, or eight years in state prison. The sentence for an attempted offense is one-half of the sentence for the completed offense. Thus, attempted kidnapping would be punishable by 18 months, 30 months, or four years. However, any subordinate counts to be served consecutively are only given one-third of the middle term. Here, the trial court used count 2 (assault with a deadly weapon) as the principal count for the determinate term.

This made count 3, the attempted kidnapping, a subordinate term. Since the court imposed a consecutive sentence for this count, the court was only authorized to impose one-third of the middle term, which is 10 months. However, the court stated one-third the middle term was two years and six months. The court clearly intended to pronounce the correct sentence but miscalculated or misspoke as to the actual length of the term. The abstract of judgment reflects the incorrect calculation and should be amended to reflect 10 months for count 3.

Authority:

PEN 208

PEN 664

PEN 1170.1(a)

People v. Felix (2000) 22 Cal.4th 651, 655

People v. Wilson (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 500, 518 [reviewing court has authority to correct unauthorized sentence]

Third Holding:

As to his convictions and punishment for murder and robbery, section 654 prohibits punishment for both murder and the target offense when the prosecution relies only on a theory of first degree felony murder. However, if the prosecution offers an alternate theory such as premeditation, and there is evidence to support the alternate theory, then the court may properly impose separate sentences for the murder and the underlying felony.

Authority:

People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 841

Fourth Holding:

We use the substantial-evidence standard to assess the trial court’s factual findings, implicit or explicit, of whether there was a course of conduct with a single criminal objective. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. We look at the entire record in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Moseley (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1603

People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1524

Fifth Holding:

Section 654(a) prohibits multiple punishments for actions that fall within the same course of conduct in which the perpetrator had a single intent and objective. A defendant may be punished only once if all the crimes were merely incidental to or were the means of accomplishing a single objective. If a defendant had multiple, independent criminal objectives, he or she may be punished for each crime, even if the crimes had common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. The applicability of section 654 turns on whether the defendant had multiple criminal objectives, not whether an act occurred during the commission of a crime.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311

People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525

People v. Rodriguez (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007

Sixth Holding:

We review instructional error de novo. We view the challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction impermissibly. We assume jurors are intelligent and capable of understanding and correlating instructions.

Authority:

People v. Ocegueda (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 548, 557

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000458

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The evidence showed the defendant possessed the firearm on each of the dates alleged in the information, but there was no evidence his possession of the firearm was anything but continuous over this period of time. One of the two counts must be stayed.

First Holding:

Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one. Intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court, which must find evidence to support the existence of a separate intent and objective for each sentenced offense.

Authority:

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 290, 294

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354

Second Holding:

A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654(a) applies in a given case. Under this standard, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and presume the existence of every fact the court could reasonably deduce from the record.

Authority:

People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618

People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737

People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113

Third Holding:

Though the trial court did not provide specific reasoning for its decision not to stay the sentence for felon in possession of a firearm, we review the record to determine whether there exists substantial evidence in support of the court’s finding of multiple criminal intents.

Authority:

People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312–1313

Fourth Holding:

We conclude the sentence for one of the counts for being a felon in possession of a firearm should be stayed pursuant to section 654. That is, we find no substantial evidence to support a conclusion defendant harbored multiple criminal intents in possessing the firearm on the two charged dates. To the contrary, the evidence only supported a conclusion that the gun possessed on July 11 was the same gun used in the charged shooting on July 7. However, there was no evidence defendant’s firearm possession was anything but continuous and pursuant to a single criminal objective. The prosecution did not present evidence, for example, showing defendant relinquished possession of the gun for a period between the specified dates.

Authority:

People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119, 129–131 [Where no evidence was presented that the defendant did not maintain constructive possession of the gun the entire time, it could be inferred he had continuous constructive possession of the gun with a singular intent to possess the weapon as a felon, and thus was a single act with a single objective]

People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 366

Fifth Holding:

One of the sentences on the two counts should be stayed pursuant to section 654. Remand is necessary for the trial court to exercise its discretion in modifying defendant’s sentence.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

Fourth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000455

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The motion to suppress evidence under should have been granted. The juvenile court’s denial of the minor’s motion to suppress is reversed. His admission to the offense is vacated. The juvenile court is directed to enter an order granting the minor’s motion to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle, and we remand the matter for further proceedings.

[GARY NOTE: This was a very fact-intensive ruling on who knew what what and why. Essentially, an officer followed the minor’s vehicle after noticing the registration tag had expired. Through a series of events, the minor left his vehicle legally parked on the street, walked a few blocks away, was found by the officer, was asked questions that he answered truthfully, and in response to a request for the detaining officer, other officers searched the locked car that was a few blocks away (ostensibly to look for registration and identification–after identification had been already been confirmed), revealing contraband.]

First Holding:

In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences. The appellate court will uphold the court’s express and/or implied findings on such matters if they are supported by substantial evidence, but it independently review the application of the relevant law to the facts.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761

Second Holding:

Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside. Probable cause means that, under the known facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside the vehicle.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359, 372

Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696

Third Holding:

The accepted practice of modern law enforcement is that an officer often conducts searches at the direction of another law enforcement officer even though the searching officer himself lacks actual, personal knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. When that occurs, the collective knowledge doctrine applies and the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the searching officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to search is based on facts known only to his superior or associates. The focus is on knowledge of the person who was the source of the information the searching officers relied on.

Authority:

U.S. v. Jensen (2005 9th Cir.) 425 F.3d 698, 704

Fourth Holding:

Once the officer confirmed the identity of the minor, there was no cause to believe the minor was lying and therefore no probably cause to search. Because officers should not have been inside the vehicle to see the firearm magazine, they could not rely on the magazine to supply probable cause for continuing to search the vehicle.

Authority:

United States v. Ngumezi (2020 9th Cir.) 980 F.3d 1285, 1290 [Because the opening of the car door and leaning into the car constituted an unlawful search, we must consider what remedy is appropriate. The exclusionary rule generally applied in Fourth Amendment cases requires courts to suppress any evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, as well as evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree]

Fifth Holding:

Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things that might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.

But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. When the officer searched the vehicle, the minor was over a block away from the vehicle, in handcuffs. Additionally, the minor had locked the vehicle, and one officer had taken the key away from the minor. Given the foregoing facts, the vehicle was not under the minor’s control at the time of his arrest. Therefore, there was no basis to search the vehicle incident to minor’s arrest.

Authority:

Preston v. U.S. (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367

Sixth Holding:

When examining the propriety of an inventory search, we focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory. An inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. Under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local police department. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786-787

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Seventh Holding:

The reasonableness of the impoundment depended on whether the impoundment fits within the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. In other words, a valid caretaking purpose is required. The minor left the vehicle locked and parallel parked on a quiet residential street where other vehicles were parked. The vehicle was not blocking a driveway or impeding traffic. The People failed to introduce evidence as to why the vehicle could not remain parked on the street until retrieved by Mother.

A vehicle with a registration that has been expired for less than six months can remain parked on a public street. The People failed to introduce evidence of when the vehicle’s registration expired. Thus, the People did not demonstrate that the vehicle could be seized due to the registration being expired for more than six months. Given the evidence, there was no reason the police could not have locked the vehicle and left it parked on the street. There is no evidence of a community caretaking function to impounding the vehicle.

Authority:

VEH 22651(o)(1)(A)(i)

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141

Eighth Holding:

We are not examining whether the seizure of the vehicle was authorized by state law. Rather, we are examining whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The statutory authorization to impound a vehicle does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure. It is evidence of a community caretaking need to impound the vehicle that causes the seizure of a vehicle to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., where the impound process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.

Thus, we are not persuaded by the People’s assertion that the seizure of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable because it was authorized by the Vehicle Code.

Authority:

Miranda v. City of Cornelius (2005 9th Cir.) 429 F.3d 858, 864-865

South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373

People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246

People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762

People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869

U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1142