Tag Archives: Standard of review

Discretion, Jury trial, Sixth Amendment, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000407

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although the defendant initially decided not to testify at his trial, he changed his mind just before oral argument, after the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss one of the counts and denied the defense motion for acquittal. As the People concede, it was error for the court to deny his request.

First Holding:

It cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49

Second Holding:

After a litigant rests their case, the trial court has wide discretion to reopen a criminal matter to receive additional evidence. When this court reviews a trial court’s decision to preclude the defense from reopening the case to present additional evidence, we must consider four factors: (1) The stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence. The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to testify is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard enunciated in Chapman.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 66

People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1069

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 871–872

Third Holding:

With respect to the first factor, the state of the proceeding, when the defendant has recently rested his case, closing argument has not begun, and the jury has not been instructed, granting defendant’s request does not entail any great inconvenience. Only 25 minutes passed between when the defense rested and when the defendant expressed that he wished to testify.

Authority:

People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 757

Fourth Holding:

As to the defendant’s diligence, the trial court asserted it could not reopen the case because the defense had moved for acquittal, and the prosecution had dismissed count 2. This rationale is not supported by the law. Section 1118.1 provides, in relevant part, that if a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved that right. Here, the court took the defendant’s waiver and allowed the defense to rest before hearing its motion for acquittal. Thus, when the defendant decided to testify, the defense had to make a motion to reopen, which the court denied. Under section 1118.1, the court should have ruled on both the motion for acquittal and the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss before inquiring about the defendant’s decision to testify. Had this procedure been followed, the defendant would have had the opportunity to offer evidence after the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Authority:

PEN 1118.1

Fifth Holding:

The third factor is whether reopening the case will cause the jury to give undue emphasis to the new evidence. A jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations begin. Here, at the time the defendant changed his mind, the jury had not been told whether he intended to testify. Further, although the court had advised the jury that the presentation of evidence was complete, that advisement occurred only shortly before the defendant changed his mind. For these reasons, we have no reason to believe that the jury would have afforded undue weight to his testimony if the court had reopened the defense case and this factor also shows an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521

Sixth Holding:

The final factor, the significance of the evidence, also shows error by the trial court. The most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. This was not a lopsided case with overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence of guilt, as demonstrated by the jury’s acquittal on count 1. Courts must evaluate whether the interests served by restricting a defendant’s right to testify justify the limitation imposed on this most basic right of a defendant in a criminal case—to present his own version of events in his own words. Here, the trial was relatively short and involved a single defendant, and the jury instructions and closing arguments had not yet occurred at the time Mendoza made his request. The defendant’s testimony may have been highly significant and could have altered the outcome of the case. Under this four-factor test, the court’s decision constituted an abuse of its discretion.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 56

Seventh Holding:

Finally, as the parties agree, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury deliberated for over three hours and acquitted the defendant of count 1, suggesting it entertained doubts about at least certain aspects of the prosecution’s case. It cannot be said that the jury necessarily would have reached the same result if the court had permitted the defendant to testify.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Equal protection, Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000404

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

For criminal conduct committed when he was 17, the imposition of a sentence of a determinate term of nine years plus and indeterminate term of more than 150 years to life was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), and as a matter of equal protection, the defendant must be considered eligible to petition for recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).

First Holding:

Statutory interpretation and the application of undisputed facts to a statute are questions of law we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311

Second Holding:

A juvenile defendant who was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole is eligible to seek resentencing under section 1170(d). Although the defendant’s sentence does not fall within the statute’s plain language, the constitutional right of equal protection extends section 1170(d) eligibility to juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.

Authority:

PEN 1170(d)(1)(A)

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 633–634

Third Holding:

The defendant’s sentence exceeds the sentence in Heard, and the People concede it unquestionably exceeds the juvenile offender’s natural lifespan.

Authority:

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440, 450–451 [10 years plus 130 years to life constituted functional equivalent of LWOP]

People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 267–268 [40 years plus 70 years to life]

Fourth Holding:

The defendant’s youth offender parole eligibility under section 3051 does not affect his eligibility to seek section 1170(d) resentencing because section 3051 relief became available only after his sentence was imposed. As relevant here, under section 3051, a youth offender sentenced to a life term of 25 years to life or more is eligible for parole after 25 years of incarceration. (PC 3051(b)(3).) Because section 1170(d)(1) refers to what the defendant was sentenced to, what matters is the defendant’s original sentence. We acknowledge that other courts have parted ways with Heard, but we do not.

Authority:

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 629

Juveniles, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000402

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated section 1170 and the defendant’s right to a jury trial by relying on aggravating factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated to under to section 1170(b). And the court must conduct a Franklin hearing.

First Holding:

On January 1, 2022, SB 567 went into effect, amending section 1170. Section 1170 now authorizes a trial court to impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. However, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(3)

Second Holding:

While not directly addressing section 1170, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt or freely admitted in a guilty plea. An exception to this allows a trial court to find only the fact of a prior conviction. Under that exception, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834, 838

Third Holding:

In accordance with Erlinger, Wiley held that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. The court also addressed two specific aggravating factors specified in the Rules of Court–the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and a defendant’s unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole, and held that each must be found true by a jury before it can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

Rules of Court rules 4.421(b)(2) and (b)(5)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082-108

Fourth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Fifth Holding:

In selecting the upper term on count 5, the trial court relied on the defendant’s extensive serious record. While the court did not refer to any specific aggravating factor, it appears the court relied on, at the very least, the increasing seriousness of his prior convictions or sustained juvenile petitions. However, a jury determination is required before a court can rely on this aggravating factor to justify an upper term sentence. Here, there was no jury trial, stipulation, or jury trial waiver on this factor in aggravation. Accordingly, the court’s reliance on this factor to impose an upper term sentence was error.

Authority:

People v. Wiley [(2025)] 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Sixth Holding:

The determination of whether these prior convictions are of increasing seriousness is a comparative and qualitative one, which makes it difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court. A rational juror may not have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt. As we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found this aggravating factor true, the error was not harmless. As the trial court erred and the error was not harmless, we will vacate the sentence and remand the case for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Wiley [(2025)] 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087, 1090

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Seventh Holding:

The trial court also misunderstand its responsibility to conduct a Franklin hearing itself, believing that it was a parole matter to be handled by the Parole Board. A Franklin proceeding gives an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Parole] Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to give great weight to youth-related factors in determining whether the offender is fit to rejoin society. On remand, the court must conduct a Franklin hearing.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

Immigration, Standard of review

Case: 000398

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals the denial of his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his 1991 drug conviction. We conclude the trial court improperly denied his motion as successive. We will reverse and remand with instructions.

First Holding:

Section 1473.7(a)(1) authorizes a person no longer in criminal custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence that is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging person’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. A successful section 1473.7 motion requires a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, of a prejudicial error that affected the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand the actual or potential immigration consequences of a plea. Prejudicial error means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.

Authority:

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 517

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319

Second Holding:

We apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its immigration consequences. Under that standard, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. When the trial court’s findings derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, the trial court and the reviewing court are in the same position, and no deference is owed.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319-320

Third Holding:

Given intervening amendments to section 1473.7 between the defendant’s first and second motions, we agree with the parties that the section motion was not successive of his first. Effective January 1, 2019, Assembly Bill No. 2867 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) made it easier to retroactively challenge convictions based on an inadequate immigration advisement. Significantly, the new law eliminated the need to meet the requirements of Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (on ineffective assistance of counsel). Section 1473.7 states that a finding of legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the new law provides a different standard for challenging and prevailing based on immigration advisement errors, the earlier motion did not bar appellant’s later motion.

Authority:

People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1066

Fourth Holding:

Although the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion as successive, mere judicial error does not establish bias and normally is not a proper ground for disqualification. We find nothing in the record that demonstrates actual bias or the appearance of bias. Thus, we deny the request to appoint a different judicial officer on remand.

Authority:

In re Tuilaepa (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1283

People v. LaBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 108

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000396

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s petition for recall under section 1172.6 because it applied an incorrect definition of reckless indifference to human life.

First Holding:

The trial court erred in defining reckless indifference as meaning there is a foreseeable risk of death. Reckless indifference requires there be a grave or significant risk of death.

Authority:

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Second Holding:

In criminal cases an appellate court may take into consideration the judge’s statements as a whole when they disclose an incorrect rather than a correct concept of the relevant law, embodied not merely in secondary remarks but in the court’s basic ruling. In the instant case, the trial court’s understanding of the law is set forth in the trial court’s ruling, as opposed to stray remarks. Accordingly, we will review the trial court’s presentation and application of the law of reckless indifference. Because this is a purely legal issue, we will utilize the independent standard of review.

Authority:

People v. Tessman (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1303

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

Third Holding:

Reckless indifference means knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death. The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the analysis. There must be a significant risk of death. Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any violent felony is insufficient. Only knowingly creating a grave risk of death satisfies the statutory requirement. Participation in a garden-variety armed robbery, i.e., one in which the only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 883, 884

In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677

Fourth Holding:

In its ruling, the trial court asserted that recklessness is also determined by an objective standard, namely what a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation. The trial court’s presentation of the law of recklessness failed to include the requirement that there be a significant risk of death, which is a crucial part of the reckless indifference analysis. By omitting a critical part of the law, one can infer that the trial court did not have a full understanding of the meaning of reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 884