Tag Archives: Sentencing

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000339

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of insufficient evidence of the predicate offense, we reverse the juvenile court’s true finding on the gang enhancement as to count 1 pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1)(A) and remand the matter for resentencing. The prosecution did not present any evidence of predicate offenses showing the alleged gang members individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. Thus, it did not prove that the robbery was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.

First Holding:

Pursuant to section 186.22(b)(1)(A), the juvenile court may impose a sentencing enhancement for a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(b)(1)(A)

Second Holding:

A gang is an ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more enumerated offenses, having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(f)

Third Holding:

A pattern of criminal gang activity is the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of, two or more enumerated offenses, provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of [the criminal gang activity chapter], and the last of those offenses occurred within three years of the prior offense and within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to have been committed, the offenses were committed on separate occasions or by two or more members, the offense commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the offenses is more than reputational.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(e)(1)

Fourth Holding:

The offenses comprising a pattern of criminal gang activity are referred to as predicate offenses. The term ‘commission’ includes the broader statutory inclusion of the ‘attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction’ of a predicate offense.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 82

Fifth Holding:

Section 186.22(e) does not state that a predicate offense must be committed by a gang member. However, that requirement derives from the definition of a criminal street gang, which includes proof that the gang’s members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity. It follows, then, that the proof of a predicate offense must establish that a member of a defendant’s alleged gang was involved in its commission. Taken together the statutory scheme requires proof that gang members committed at least two predicate offenses within the statutory timeframe. Such proof will generally require evidence of who committed the crime and when they did so, as well as evidence of their gang membership and the nature of the crimes.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 829–830

Sixth Holding:

When assessing a claim of sufficiency of evidence of a gang enhancement under section 186.22, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the evidence’; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding.

Authority:

People v. Shively (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 460, 468

Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633

Eighth Amendment, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000338

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

When it initially granted the defendant probation, the court waived various fines and assessments based on indigence. On revocation of probation, the court imposed a restitution fine and other assessments. Remanded for the court to consider the defendant’s challenges to the fees and assessments in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.

First Holding:

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Kopp a defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive. Because Kopp was decided after entry of the juidgment on appeal here, the defendant should have the opportunity to make such a challenge. Though the court could determine that the issue was forfeited for lack of objection, forfeiture may be excused where to require defense counsel to raise an objection would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 127 [Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a right derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law.]

Second Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4(b)(1) is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. ) Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), states that the minimum restitution fine is $300 for each felony conviction and that the maximum fine is $10,000. Section 1202.4, subdivision (c), allows the court not to impose the restitution fine for compelling and extraordinary reasons, but states the defendant’s inability to pay is not a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose the minimum fine. Thus, the defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4
People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13, 30

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 423

People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356

People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1033 [Under section 1202.4(c), the trial court may not consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the minimum restitution fine of $300, but the court may consider the defendant’s ability to pay if the court imposes a restitution fine above the minimum.]

Third Holding:

Although fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime, the “excessive fines analysis” under the United States and California Constitutions, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. But there is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 and fn. 17

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) requires, to assist in funding court operations, an assessment of $40 to be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Government Code section 70373(a)(1) requires, to ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, that $30 assessment be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Both costs are mandatory. But equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373(a)(1)

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 15

People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 405

Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000336 (There is no 000335)

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have stayed the sentence for either the assault or the battery conviction.

First Holding:

Although Code of Civil Procedure section 269 provided defendant with a statutory right to a certified shorthand reporter rather than an electronic recording, we conclude violation of that statutory right was harmless. The proceedings were recorded electronically and extensive transcripts were prepared based on the recordings.

The California Supreme Court has held that the trial court’s failure to comply with Penal Code section 190.9, requiring that all proceedings in a capital case be conducted on the record with a court reporter present, was harmless where the record was nevertheless adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.

Similarly, here, defendant possessed a statutory right to a certified court reporter, but the trial court’s inability to comply with that right, regardless of the reason, was harmless so long as the electronic recording produced an adequate appellate record.

(Gary note:  You might want to look at Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court (Contra Costa County) 8/10/26 S288176, in which the Supreme Court recognized the right to a verbatim transcript, whether by certified shorthand reporter or electronic, despite the Government Code section 69957 proscription against use of electronic recording other than in limited exceptions.  While the case was a civil dispute, the principles would seem to apply in criminal cases as well.  It’s at least worth looking at, because it may be useful on the quality of the transcript process even where criminal proceedings are electronically recorded.)

Authority:

CCP 269

People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1256-1258 (Hajek and Vo were abrogated on another point by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216)

Second Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654

Third Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.

Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives. Section 654 prohibits multiple sentences where the defendant commits different acts that violate different statutes but the acts comprise an indivisible course of conduct engaged in with a single intent and objective.

Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311

People v. Latten (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 574, 577

People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143

Fourth Holding:

Section 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence. Thus, unless the record clearly indicates which sentence the trial court would stay, remand is required to permit the trial court to exercise its discretion.

Authority:

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000334

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the conclusion of the hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court miscalculated the credit for time served, and the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct credits.

Holding:

The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct days of custody credit.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628

People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428, fn. 8

Sentencing

Case: 000333

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by sentencing appellant to a consecutive mid-term of eight years on count 6, because he was convicted of only a single relevant offense. The mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme in section 667(d) can apply only when a defendant stands convicted of multiple enumerated sex offenses

Holding:

The trial court sentenced appellant to a consecutive mid-term of eight years on count 6 under section 667.6(d)(1). But as the parties correctly note, the mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme in subdivision (d) can apply only when a defendant stands convicted of multiple” enumerated sex offenses under this statute. Here appellant was convicted of only one offense under section 667.6(e) and therefore the sentence on count 6 must be reconsidered.

Authority:

People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 594, fn. 5

Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case: 000332

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse count 5 because section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one weapon at the same time and place in prison.

Holding:

Section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one unlawful weapon at the same time and place in prison.

Authority:

People v. Rowland (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 61, 64-67

(GARY NOTE: The opinion in Rowland relied on People v. Kirk (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 58, which held that possession of more than one sawed-off shotgun at the same time could result in only one count of conviction under what was then section 12020.

(What was then section 12020 has since been broken down into numerous sections by the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010. Its provisions were spread among many new code sections. Best to look at the charging document for the charge, but also look for separate sections that may define the terms.

(Subsequent to Kirk, the Legislature amended what was then section 12001 (now section 17800) to clarify that possession of more than one prohibited weapon simultaneously constituted separate offenses, each of which could be charged. The legislation specified the code section affected by the amendment, and Rowland relied on the absence of mention of section 4502 to conclude that possession of more than one weapon simultaneously under section 4502 still was limited to a single count, at least in part on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). The holding in this Case 000332 applied to section 4502. Rowland and its progeny should be used very carefully, and be cited only if its rationale has not been legislated away with respect to your given facts.)

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case: 000330

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On this appeal from denial of the defendant’s petition under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage, where the petition consisted of a check-box form, we remand with instructions for the trial court to consider any amended allegations filed by the defendant within 30 days of remand.

First Holding:

In 2019, the Legislature enacted SB 1437, which altered the rules of murder liability to ensure culpability more closely matched punishment. As part of this reform, the Legislature amended section 188 to prohibit imputing malice based solely on a defendant’s participation in a crime. In effect, a defendant can no longer be convicted of murder under an aiding and abetting theory merely because a killing was a natural and probable consequence of another intended offense.

Authority:

PEN 188

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 472

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839

Second Holding:

To provide retroactive relief, SB 1437 also established a resentencing process, now codified in section 1172.6. This statute permits individuals convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory of imputed malice to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and seek resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)

Third Holding:

Once the court receives such a petition, the section 1172.6 process unfolds in three distinct stages. At the first stage, a petitioner need only submit a facially sufficient petition that alleges the statutory prerequisites for relief. If the petition is facially valid, the petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel, if requested, and the matter proceeds to the second stage. At the second stage, the trial court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. If the court finds the petitioners have met their burden of establishing a prima facie case, the court must then issue an order to show cause and proceed to the third stage: an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioners remain guilty under current law.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562

Fourth Holding:

Patton makes clear that at the second stage a trial court may consider uncontroverted facts from the record of conviction. This includes an evaluation of preliminary hearing evidence to determine whether a still-valid theory of liability supported the conviction. However, Patton also teaches that at the second stage petitioners have the opportunity to show why they are not ineligible, despite what might appear in preliminary hearing transcripts. To meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case for relief, the petitioner must provide nonconclusory allegations that alert the court and prosecution to the issues to be decided at the evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000325

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred when it sentenced the defendant to an upper term sentence without affording him a jury trial on aggravating factors. Remanded for retrial on the factors in aggravation.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that, in selecting a term of imprisonment, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Notwithstanding this rule, a court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Under section 1170(b), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Third Holding:

In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837

Fourth Holding:

The California Supreme Court applied Erlinger to California’s determinate sentencing scheme. In Wiley, it overruled its prior decisions Black and Towne that had found it constitutionally permissible for a trial court to determine whether a defendant’s crimes were of increasing seriousness or whether the defendant’s performance on probation was unsatisfactory. A trial court’s determination of those aggravating factors without the defendant’s consent violated section 1170(b)(2).

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1084-1086 [expressly overruling People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63 and People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799]

Fifth Holding:

A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with the jury trial requirement is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069,1090

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

Here, the trial court relied on its own files to find that the defendant had two prior felony convictions for which he served prison sentences, and found that his performance on supervision had been unsatisfactory. The California Supreme Court has cautioned against attempting to determine whether a jury would have found true aggravating circumstances that require an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts. The reviewing court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance. To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776

Seventh Holding:

On remand, the parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant evidence to support or contest the factual support for the aggravating circumstances set out in the California Rules of Court. The court may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances justify such a sentence. If it cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 777-778

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000324

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court should have stayed the sentence on one of the defendant’s convictions under section 654. Therefore, we modify his sentence to stay the sentence on that count. We also order the trial court to correct errors in the defendant’s abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Section 654 provides that a defendant may be punished only once for an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. The statute itself literally applies only where such punishment arises out of multiple statutory violations produced by the same act or omission. However, because the statute is intended to ensure that a defendant is punished commensurate with his culpability, its protection has been extended to cases in which there are several offenses committed during a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time. Where the defendant committed more than one offense during a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time, the court looks to the defendant’s intent and objective to determine whether any of the offenses are subject to section 654. Whether section 654 applies to a given case is a question of fact for the trial court. In this case, based on statements made by the court on more than one occasion, the only reasonable conclusion is that the court determined the assault with a semiautomatic firearm in count 12 involved the same act or criminal objective as the robbery against the same victim in count 10.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 193

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354

Second Holding:

The abstract contains several errors. It stated that the court imposed, but stayed under section 654, several firearm and bodily injury enhancements on nine of the counts. In fact, however, the court dismissed those enhancements under section 1385. The abstract states that the sentences on three of the counts were full consecutive terms. In fact, the court imposed a consecutive term of one-third the midterm on each, as required under section 1170.1(a). And the abstract states that the total time on attached pages was four years and four months, whereas the actual total on the attached pages is fourteen years. On remand, the trial court shall ensure the amended abstract of judgment does not contain these errors.

[Gary note: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, likely because it recognized there will be a new abstract of judgment issued to reflect the effect of section 654 on one of two counts. Had the Court of Appeal chosen to specifically order correction of the existing abstract, it would have found authority under one or more of the cases I have set forth below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000323

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Remanded for retrial of the strike prior allegation. The amended version of section 186.22 must be applied in determining whether prior convictions with a gang enhancement qualify as serious felonies under the Three Strikes law.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature passed AB 333, which amended section 186.22. This legislation narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang, the definition of a pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. Moreover, because these changes are ameliorative in nature, they apply to nonfinal judgments on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, relying in part on the present conditional phrasing of section 1192.7(c)(28)—which applies to any felony offense that would also constitute a felony violation of section 186.22–the Supreme Court held that current law (i.e., AB 333) applies to the determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28). The Supreme Court also concluded that there was insufficient evidence in that case that the defendants’ convictions were obtained under AB 333’s more stringent requirements because the only evidence presented were the abstracts of judgment, which merely showed the offenses and gang enhancements. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the strike prior findings and directed the Court of Appeal to remand with instructions to retry the gang allegations under AB 333’s amendments to section 186.22.

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(28)

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 603-604

Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

000321

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by imposing sentence on the robberies which served as the predicate offenses for his murder conviction under the felony murder theory. We remand for full resentencing so the trial court may determine whether section 654 applies to all of the underlying robberies or to only one, and to correct other errors (if any) that the parties asserted in this appeal.

First Holding:

Section 654 provides that the same act or omission shall not be punished under more than one provision of law. Thus, where felony murder is the sole theory of murder under which the case was prosecuted, section 654 precludes imposition of separate terms for the predicate felonies for the theory of felony murder, for which defendant received his first degree murder sentence.

Authority:

PEN 654
People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 898

Second Holding:

An appellate court normally reviews the trial court’s factual determinations in applying section 654 for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618

People v. Jacobo (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 53-54

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000320

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

This is not exactly a win for the defendant, but it reinforces the proper application of section 654. In this instance, the trial court simply did not impose any sentence on a count that the court determined section 654 applied to. It resulted in reversal of the sentence, with a direction that the court impose a sentence on all counts, including the one to which section 654 applied, and stay execution as to that count. Interestingly, the abstract of judgment actually reflected that the court had imposed and stayed sentence under section 654. Reaffirming my supplication that we should always examine abstracts of judgment, as it truly is not uncommon for them to contain errors.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the trial court imposed the upper term for count 2 and stayed the sentence under section 654. However, the court did not impose sentence for count 2 during the sentencing hearing. Where, as here, a discrepancy exists between the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 893

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

Second Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Stated differently, section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission. When section 654 is applicable, the accepted procedure is to sentence defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on certain of the convictions to which section 654 is applicable.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 337

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 796 [when a court determines that a conviction falls within the meaning of section 654, it is necessary to impose sentence but to stay the execution of the duplicative sentence]

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380 [when section 654 applies, it is improper to impose no sentence or to stay imposition of the sentence]

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473 [when section 654 applies, the trial court imposes an unauthorized sentence by failing to sentence defendant on all counts]

Third Holding:

Because the sentence is unlawful, we remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing purposes. On remand a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 381

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067