Tag Archives: Recall of sentence or resentencing

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000460

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for resentencing under section 1172.75 with directions that the court determine whether reduction of his Three Strikes sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 is appropriate.

First Holding:

Generally, a trial court’s discretionary decision whether to dismiss or strike a sentencing allegation or enhancement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. However, a trial court’s discretion must be guided and controlled by fixed legal principles and exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law. A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the issue at hand.

Additionally, an erroneous understanding by the trial court of its discretionary power is not a true exercise of discretion. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion” of the sentencing court. A trial court that misunderstands the scope of its sentencing discretion cannot be said to have properly exercised that discretion. In such circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates the court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373, 376

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 159

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977

Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 85

People v. Marquez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 797, 803

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8

Second Holding:

Under the original Three Strikes law, a defendant with two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions would be sentenced to a life term for a current felony conviction even if the current conviction was not a serious or violent felony.

In 2012, the Reform Act was enacted under Proposition 36, amending the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain Three Strikes offenders. Under the Reform Act, a defendant with two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, whose current conviction is for a nonserious or nonviolent felony, receives a doubled sentence rather than a life sentence, unless certain disqualifying factors were proven. If the petitioner satisfied the criteria for resentencing, the petitioner was resentenced as a second strike offender with a doubled term, unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651

Third Holding:

Effective January 1, 2020, SB 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to prior terms for sexually violent offenses. Effective January 1, 2022, SB 483 codified section 1172.75, which set forth the resentencing procedure, and applied retroactively to persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes such prison priors. Where a now invalid enhancement was imposed, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The statute directs that the resentencing court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 852

Fourth Holding:

Permitting recall and resentencing of indeterminate sentences in a section 1172.75 hearing does not unconstitutionally amend section 1170.126. First, section 1170.126(k) permits resentencing of defendants subject to section 1170.126 by some alternative means and is, therefore, not the exclusive remedy for nonserious, nonviolent Three Strikes offenders. Under section 1170.126(k) defendants entitled to seek relief under section 1170.126 may access rights or remedies otherwise available. Permitting recall and resentencing of Three Strikes indeterminate sentences under section 1172.75 does not unconstitutionally amend section 1170.126 but rather, incorporates the public safety determination requirements of section 1170.126 into the resentencing process.

When a Three Strikes defendant is resentenced under section 1172.75, the trial court must determine whether resentencing them on their Three Strikes sentences under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Accordingly, we must remand the case to the trial court for its determination on whether resentencing defendant under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If so, the court shall reimpose the indeterminate term. If defendant does not, and he is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence the defendant under the revised provisions of the Reform Act.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 855, 858-861, 863, 869, 878

Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000456

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After ten years, the unpaid balance of any restitution fines are no longer collectible and the restitution order must be vacated.

First Holding:

Section 1202.4(b) mandates that in every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. Section 1465.9 was amended effective January 1, 2025, to add subdivision (d) which requires that, on the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(b)

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The trial court’s reimposition of the fine at resentencing in 2025 did not restart the 10-year clock.

Authority:

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600–601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038 on a different issue

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000451

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the denial of resentencing relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. He contends, and the People agree, the resentencing court erroneously relied on a previously stricken enhancement for a sexually violent offense, as well as an unalleged prior conviction for a sexually violent offense in finding defendant ineligible for resentencing. The record establishes error. We therefore reverse and remand.

First Holding:

The trial court erroneously relied on prior felony convictions to determine that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1172.75, because those prior convictions had previously been stricken in the appeal from the original judgment, leaving no disqualifying prior convictions in place. Section 1172.75(a) invalidates any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

However, a stricken enhancement cannot be a sentence enhancement that was imposed under section 1172.75(a). As noted, this court previously struck the otherwise-disqualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement stemming from defendant’s 1981 conviction. As such, it may not serve as the basis for denying resentencing relief under section 1172.75.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 370

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1007

Second Holding:

More than 30 years ago, defendant was convicted of both a disqualifying felony and robbery. However, for purposes of the current case, the prosecution only alleged a prior prison term enhancement for the 1990 robbery, not the disqualifying felony. The allegation was found true and the enhancement for the prior prison term stemming from the robbery was imposed. Because the enhancement was for robbery, the section 667.5(b) enhancement that became part of defendant’s sentence was not imposed for his conviction of a disqualifying offense as required by the plain terms of section 1172.75. Because a one-year prior prison term enhancement was not alleged, proved, or imposed for the 1990 conviction of an otherwise-disqualifying offense, it may not be used to deny defendant resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 371

Third Holding:

In the appeal from the original judgment more than a decade ago, this court ordered defendant’s judgment modified to strike 10 of his 15 prior prison term enhancements and ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect the change. An amended abstract of judgment filed after the conclusion of that appeal reflected just such a change.

During the resentencing proceedings in the superior court in 2025, the court also addressed a motion by defendant to vacate his remaining restitution fines. The court granted defendant’s request pursuant to section 1465.9(b) and ordered the abstract of judgment amended. A new abstract of judgment issued in July 2025 reflected the change to defendant’s restitution; however, it also listed eight of the 10 previously stricken prior prison term enhancements. This is a clerical error. The abstract of judgment should list imposition of five 1-year enhancements—one on each count—for defendant’s prior prison term served in connection with his med-2000s petty theft conviction.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [Courts may correct clerical errors at any time]

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000450

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2024, the defendant was identified as an inmate eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Without conducting a full resentencing hearing, the trial court struck the defendant’s prior prison term enhancements. No party was present, including counsel for the defendant. The sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for a full resentencing hearing consistent with section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required a court to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each separate prior prison term served for a nonviolent felony, unless the defendant remained free from custody for at least five years. Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature retroactively invalidated prior prison term enhancements imposed under section 667.5(b) prior to January 1, 2020, unless the term was served for certain sexually violent offenses. The Legislature also created procedures, in what is now section 1172.75, for sentencing courts to recall and resentence defendants who were serving prison terms on judgments that included the now invalid enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 667.5

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Under section 1172.75, if a trial court determines a defendant is serving a sentence that includes a now invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. At the resentencing hearing, the court must eliminate the repealed prior prison term enhancement. But that is not the only thing the court is required to do. Section 1172.75 provides specific instructions for the resentencing. The court shall appoint counsel for the defendant and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Section 1172.75 also permits courts to consider postconviction factors in the resentencing inquiry, including evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966

Third Holding:

Here, the defendannt was eligible for relief under section 1172.75 as his prior convictions used for the prior prison term enhancements were not for a sexually violent offense. The trial court struck his prior prison term enhancements. The court, however, was required to conduct a full resentencing hearing, during which the defendant had the opportunity to be present and represented by appointed counsel. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 668, 673–674 [remanding for new hearing under sec. 1172.75 because defendant was not present at hearing and did not waive his presence]

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 346 [defendant’s absence from resentencing hearing constitutes federal constitutional error]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 968, 972 [defendant eligible for relief under sec. 1172.75 is entitled to full resentencing hearing to argue for further relief under other ameliorative changes]

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568 [same]

Fourth Holding:

Upon resentencing the defendant, the court shall recalculate his custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 40–41 [upon remand, trial court responsible for calculating all days defendant spent in custody prior to resentencing and presentence conduct credits prior to original sentencing]

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000448

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends that it was error to proceed to sentencing in the absence of the attorney she retained after counsel was appointed, and that the court abused its discretion when it found that her youth was not a contributing fact. Retained counsel did file a document titled “Limited Scope Substitution of Counsel.” Thereafter, appointed counsel filed a resentencing brief on the defendant’s behalf. The retained attorney did not. At the resentencing hearing, appointed counsel appeared with the defendant. The retained attorney did not appear. We affirm, but the trial court must recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

The trial court did not recalculate the defendant’s custody credits and ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to do the calculation. A trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits when resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]

Second Holding:

We review the defendants’s contentions regarding counsel of choice and selection of sentence term under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. A defendant who desires to retain his own counsel is required to act with diligence and may not demand a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if he arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of trial.

Authority:

People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1004 [trial court has discretion to deny substitution of counsel where it would prejudice the defendant or disrupt the orderly processes of justice]

People v. Blake (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 623-624

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [appellate review of asserted evidentiary error forfeited where defendant failed to make a timely, specific objection]

Third Holding:

Section 1170(b)(6) does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant was under age 26 at the time the crime was committed. Instead, the presumption applies only if the defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in his or her commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991-992

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 [trial court’s sentencing choices reviewed for abuse of discretion]

Fourth Holding:

At oral argument, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in conducting the resentencing hearing without her physical presence. But the defendant failed to raise this contention in her opening brief. Thus, it is forfeited. Forfeiture aside, any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the record before us.

Authority:

People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [Every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration]

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claims not raised in the opening brief are waived]

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 674

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 348

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000447

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant, who was serving a life term under the 1994 Three Strikes Law, was entitled to be resentenced under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, subject to a detrermination of danger to public safety in the context of the Reform Act.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b) is legally invalid. The resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(a)

Second Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual convicted of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of no less than 25 years. The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (an initiative) changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony.

Under the Reform Act’s revised penalty provisions, many third strike defendants are excepted from the provision imposing an indeterminate life sentence and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants That is, they receive a term equal to twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction. A petition process was set up under section 1170.126 for eligible candidates to seek resentencing under the Reform Act. If eligible, the defendant is to be resentenced pursuant to the Reform Act unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651-653

Third Holding:

After section 1172.75 was enacted, the Supreme Court needed to consider whether section 1172.75, by permitting recall and resentencing of indeterminate third strike sentences, amends section 1170.126, in violation of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution. It determined that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000446

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though affirming the lower court’s decision to not exercise its discretion to dismiss the prior serious felony enhancement, there was an error in the calculation of credit for time served.

First Holding:

A trial court’s refusal to dismiss a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed on appeal under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985

Second Holding:

When a trial court declines to strike a five-year sentencing enhancement for a serious prior felony conviction, no error occurs if the trial court evaluates all relevant circumstances to ensure that punishment fits the offense and the offender.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 587

Third Holding:

A trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not aware of its discretion to dismiss or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss,’ or where the sentencing norms established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law, produce an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

But it is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more prior conviction allegations. A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 605

People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029

People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157 [Section 1385(c) does not mean that, whenever a listed mitigating circumstance is present, the trial court must dismiss all enhancements unless it finds dismissal would endanger public safety]

Fifth Holding:

The trial court awarded the defendant the number of days of actual custody credit that reflected his credits from the date of his incarceration to the date of his original sentencing hearing, and ordered the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to calculate credits for the time he has been incarcerated at CDCR. On resentencing, a trial court must calculate a defendant’s custody credits through the date of the resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [when a trial court resentences a defendant on remand, it must credit him with all actual days he spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000439

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Relief is granted on this petition for writ of habeas corpus. The defendant is entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75. In August 2022, pursuant to (now) section 1172.75, the trial court entered an order modifying petitioner’s judgment by dismissing the enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). It is undisputed that petitioner was not notified of the court’s intent to modify the judgment, was not appointed counsel, was not notified of any court proceedings related to modification of the judgment, and did not appear at any such proceedings. It is also undisputed that the court did not conduct a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, what is now section 1172.75 declared invalid most sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b). Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identifies a defendant serving a term for a judgment including a qualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement, the trial court is required to recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The court is also required to appoint counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. Section 1172.75 creates a presumption that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed. It expressly requires the court to consider postconviction factors, including evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing, and it guides the trial court in selecting among the lower, middle, and upper term on each count. In this case, the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, including the application of any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion. It was proper for him to seek relief by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances in this case.

Authority:

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 359–361

In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 449–450 [Frequently used to challenge criminal convictions already affirmed on appeal, the writ of habeas corpus permits a person deprived of his or her freedom, such as a prisoner, to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record, and often represents a prisoner’s last chance to obtain judicial review. A writ of habeas corpus may thus provide an avenue of relief to those unjustly incarcerated when the normal method of relief—i.e., direct appeal—is inadequate]

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000434

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a continuance to obtain documents from the California Department of Corrections (CDCR). We conclude that the error prejudiced defendant because the trial court lacked potential information relevant to exercising its discretion. Additionally, the record does not show that when it denied the requested continuance, the court understood the full scope of its discretion. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b)is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(d)(3) provides that the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. Where defendant’s original sentence included a now-invalid sentencing enhancement the resentencing court must provide a full resentencing hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, one factor to consider is whether a continuance would be useful. Here, a continuance was merited because it would have allowed defense counsel to obtain potential evidence relevant to resentencing from the CDCR. The People did not oppose the requested continuance. The burden of a continuance was minimal because there would have been no need to reschedule witnesses or consider juror inconvenience.

We do not agree that the denial of a continuance was harmless. The record does not indicate the court understood the extent of its discretion when it denied the continuance. The court incorrectly stated that its only discretion was whether to strike the additional 25-to-life gun allegation, when in fact the court had discretion to reduce the 25-year-term to impose a lesser included enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118

People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829, 839–840

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020–1021, 1030 [trial court has discretion to strike enhancement and impose lesser included sec. 12022.53 enhancement or other lesser included enhancement]

Third Holding:

Section 1050(b) generally requires a written motion to request a continuance, but section 1050(c) states that, notwithstanding subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision, albeit absent a showing good cause, sanctions may be imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1050

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case: 000432

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the petition for recall of sentence for attempted murder under section 1172.6 because there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill. We reverse the order denying the petition and remand the matter with directions for the trial court to grant the resentencing petition, vacate the attempted murder conviction, and resentence on the remaining charges.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of the felony murder rule. Except in cases of felony murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. A defendant convicted of murder or attempted murder under a now-invalid theory may petition the sentencing court to have his or her conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts under section 1172.6.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Second Holding:

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted murder under a currently valid theory. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(d)(3)

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings following a section 1172.6(d) hearing for substantial evidence. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

Fourth Holding:

To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. A defendant cannot be convicted of attempting to kill someone if the defendant is not aware that person is present. Because direct evidence of a defendant’s intent is rare, intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.

Authority:

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 191

People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1079

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741

Fifth Holding:

A defendant may be convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor. To be convicted under such a theory, the defendant must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054

Sixth Holding:

Without any evidence that someone inside the co-defendant’s car targeted or otherwise shot at another person when they fired the underlying shots, we can only speculate as to whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill. Speculation is not substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 735

Seventh Holding:

The trial court also improperly relied on its own experience as a former gang prosecutor when it denied the petition, noting that it had prosecuted several cases against members of a gang in the 1990’s in explaining why it found that the defendant acted with the intent to kill. The court’s personal experience is not evidence.

Authority:

Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 236, 286

Eighth Holding:

When admitting a sentencing enhancement, the defendant admits only the facts necessary to establish the enhancement’s elements.

Authority:

People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338

Immigration, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000422

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea under section 1473.7. We reverse the judgment. The superior court shall enter an order vacating the defendant’s conviction pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7(a)(1).

First Holding:

Penal Code section 1473.7 allows those no longer in custody to vacate a conviction if it is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of the conviction.

Authority:

PEN 1473(a)(1)

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

Second Holding:

The superior court denied the defendant’s motion. It concluded that the defendant’s prosecution had no adverse immigration consequences because the charge he pleaded to did not name cocaine as the controlled substance. It also concluded that because he had completed the Deferred Entry of Judgment (DEJ) arrangement and achieved a dismissal, there was no conviction left to vacate. The court erred. In fact, a DEJ disposition can result in adverse immigration consequences.

Authority:

PC 1203.43

Third Holding:

We apply independent review when the record indicates there was no evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319

Fourth Holding:

A conviction of Health and Safety Code section 11350 involving cocaine can have adverse immigration consequences. And in federal immigration tribunals and the Ninth Circuit, a police report forming the factual basis of a plea can furnish details, otherwise missing from charging documents, that allow the imposition of adverse immigration consequences.

Authority:

Lazo v. Wilkinson (9th Cir. 2021) 989 F.3d 705, 714

Matter of Milian-Dubon (B.I.A. 2010) 25 I. & N. Dec. 197, 201,

United States v. Almazan-Becerra (9th Cir. 2008) 537 F.3d 1094, 1097–1100

Suazo Perez v. Mukasey (9th Cir. 2008) 512 F.3d 1222, 1226

In re Sanudo (B.I.A. 2006) 23 I. & N. Dec. 968, 975,

Parrilla v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 1038, 1044

United States v. Ramos-Medina (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 932, 939–940

Fifth Holding:

Under the totality of circumstances in this conceded case, we agree with the parties that the misinformation the defendant received regarding his plea was prejudicial and that reversal to ensure prompt relief under Penal Code section 1473.7(a)(1), rather than remand, is appropriate.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 321, 325–326

People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559

Immigration, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000421

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The superior court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7 because he did not provide a declaration from his defense counsel at the time of his plea or his counsel’s case file, despite the defendant’s diligent efforts in attempting to contact his prior counsel, who had retired since representing him. After independent review, we conclude the defendant met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, error affecting his ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the immigration consequences of his plea and reverse the denial of his motion.

First Holding:

Under federal law, a noncitizen convicted of a crime of domestic violence is deportable. This includes an offense under section 273.5(a). A section 273.5 conviction is also a crime of violence under federal immigration law. If a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 365 days for a crime of violence, the offense qualifies as an aggravated felony conviction. This designation carries even harsher consequences. A noncitizen who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is conclusively presumed deportable and is subject to mandatory removal. An aggravated felony conviction renders a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary relief allowing some deportable aliens to remain in the country. Accordingly, removal is a virtual certainty for a noncitizen found to have an aggravated felony conviction, no matter how long he has previously resided here.

Authority:

8 U.S.C. sec. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)

8 U.S.C. sec 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

8 U.S.C. sec. 1228(c)

8 U.S.C. sec.1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C)

18 U.S.C. sec. 16(a)

People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 666-667

People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 903-904

Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 1080, 1083

Second Holding:

Penal Code section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. To establish a prejudicial error under section 1473.7, a person need only show by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) he did not meaningfully understand or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea; and 2) had he understood the consequences, it is reasonably probable he would have instead attempted to defend against the charges.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 862

Third Holding:

The focus of the first prong of the inquiry is on the defendant’s own error in not knowing that his plea would subject him to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. There is no additional need to establish the petitioner’s mistake was caused by some third party. A defendant may show, but is not required to show, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The error supporting section 1473.7 relief need not be one made by defense counsel or the court but may be one made by the moving party herself if supported by contemporaneous evidence.

Authority:

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 958-959

People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 713-714 [At the heart of the prejudicial error analysis is the mindset of the defendant and what he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken]

People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16

People v. Ruiz (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067

People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1008 [ineffective assistance of counsel not required for relief]

People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 311

Fourth Holding:

A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel or to submit contemporaneous documentation from the time of the plea. Rather, the inquiry under section 1473.7 requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, which necessarily involves case-by-case examination of the record, and no specific kind of evidence is a prerequisite to relief. Even a court’s advisement that a guilty plea will result in immigration consequences does not preclude a petitioner from demonstrating that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. Depending on the surrounding circumstances, even a warning that deportation will result is not a categorical bar to relief. A general advisement under section 1016.5 does not establish meaningful understanding of immigration consequences.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320, 325

People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1175

People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962

People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998, 1011 [petitioner may present sufficient evidence of his lack of understanding such that the court’s advisement cannot be taken as irrebuttable proof that defendant likely would have entered his plea notwithstanding adverse immigration consequences]

Fifth Holding:

As to the prejudice prong, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences and must corroborate any assertions with objective evidence. A reasonable probability does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311,

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 530

People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 714

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 959

People v. Soto (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 602, 610

Sixth Holding:

We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7 motion. Under independent review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. If the superior court heard testimony, we give particular deference to any factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of witnesses. But where, as here, the facts derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, there is no reason to conclude the trial court has the same special purchase on the question at issue; as a practical matter, the trial court and this court are in the same position in interpreting written declarations when reviewing a cold record in a section 1473.7 proceeding. Ultimately it is for the appellate court to decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish prejudice under section 1473.7.

Authority:

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527-528

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 959