Tag Archives: Prejudice

Discretion, Jury trial, Sixth Amendment, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000407

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although the defendant initially decided not to testify at his trial, he changed his mind just before oral argument, after the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss one of the counts and denied the defense motion for acquittal. As the People concede, it was error for the court to deny his request.

First Holding:

It cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49

Second Holding:

After a litigant rests their case, the trial court has wide discretion to reopen a criminal matter to receive additional evidence. When this court reviews a trial court’s decision to preclude the defense from reopening the case to present additional evidence, we must consider four factors: (1) The stage the proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence. The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to testify is subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard enunciated in Chapman.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 66

People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1069

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 871–872

Third Holding:

With respect to the first factor, the state of the proceeding, when the defendant has recently rested his case, closing argument has not begun, and the jury has not been instructed, granting defendant’s request does not entail any great inconvenience. Only 25 minutes passed between when the defense rested and when the defendant expressed that he wished to testify.

Authority:

People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 757

Fourth Holding:

As to the defendant’s diligence, the trial court asserted it could not reopen the case because the defense had moved for acquittal, and the prosecution had dismissed count 2. This rationale is not supported by the law. Section 1118.1 provides, in relevant part, that if a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without first having reserved that right. Here, the court took the defendant’s waiver and allowed the defense to rest before hearing its motion for acquittal. Thus, when the defendant decided to testify, the defense had to make a motion to reopen, which the court denied. Under section 1118.1, the court should have ruled on both the motion for acquittal and the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss before inquiring about the defendant’s decision to testify. Had this procedure been followed, the defendant would have had the opportunity to offer evidence after the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.

Authority:

PEN 1118.1

Fifth Holding:

The third factor is whether reopening the case will cause the jury to give undue emphasis to the new evidence. A jury may accord undue weight to evidence which is admitted close to the time deliberations begin. Here, at the time the defendant changed his mind, the jury had not been told whether he intended to testify. Further, although the court had advised the jury that the presentation of evidence was complete, that advisement occurred only shortly before the defendant changed his mind. For these reasons, we have no reason to believe that the jury would have afforded undue weight to his testimony if the court had reopened the defense case and this factor also shows an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521

Sixth Holding:

The final factor, the significance of the evidence, also shows error by the trial court. The most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself. This was not a lopsided case with overwhelming and incontrovertible evidence of guilt, as demonstrated by the jury’s acquittal on count 1. Courts must evaluate whether the interests served by restricting a defendant’s right to testify justify the limitation imposed on this most basic right of a defendant in a criminal case—to present his own version of events in his own words. Here, the trial was relatively short and involved a single defendant, and the jury instructions and closing arguments had not yet occurred at the time Mendoza made his request. The defendant’s testimony may have been highly significant and could have altered the outcome of the case. Under this four-factor test, the court’s decision constituted an abuse of its discretion.

Authority:

Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 56

Seventh Holding:

Finally, as the parties agree, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury deliberated for over three hours and acquitted the defendant of count 1, suggesting it entertained doubts about at least certain aspects of the prosecution’s case. It cannot be said that the jury necessarily would have reached the same result if the court had permitted the defendant to testify.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

Juveniles, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000402

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated section 1170 and the defendant’s right to a jury trial by relying on aggravating factors that were not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated to under to section 1170(b). And the court must conduct a Franklin hearing.

First Holding:

On January 1, 2022, SB 567 went into effect, amending section 1170. Section 1170 now authorizes a trial court to impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. However, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(3)

Second Holding:

While not directly addressing section 1170, the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt or freely admitted in a guilty plea. An exception to this allows a trial court to find only the fact of a prior conviction. Under that exception, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834, 838

Third Holding:

In accordance with Erlinger, Wiley held that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. The court also addressed two specific aggravating factors specified in the Rules of Court–the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and a defendant’s unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole, and held that each must be found true by a jury before it can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

Rules of Court rules 4.421(b)(2) and (b)(5)

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082-108

Fourth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Fifth Holding:

In selecting the upper term on count 5, the trial court relied on the defendant’s extensive serious record. While the court did not refer to any specific aggravating factor, it appears the court relied on, at the very least, the increasing seriousness of his prior convictions or sustained juvenile petitions. However, a jury determination is required before a court can rely on this aggravating factor to justify an upper term sentence. Here, there was no jury trial, stipulation, or jury trial waiver on this factor in aggravation. Accordingly, the court’s reliance on this factor to impose an upper term sentence was error.

Authority:

People v. Wiley [(2025)] 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Sixth Holding:

The determination of whether these prior convictions are of increasing seriousness is a comparative and qualitative one, which makes it difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court. A rational juror may not have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt. As we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found this aggravating factor true, the error was not harmless. As the trial court erred and the error was not harmless, we will vacate the sentence and remand the case for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Wiley [(2025)] 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087, 1090

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Seventh Holding:

The trial court also misunderstand its responsibility to conduct a Franklin hearing itself, believing that it was a parole matter to be handled by the Parole Board. A Franklin proceeding gives an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Parole] Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to give great weight to youth-related factors in determining whether the offender is fit to rejoin society. On remand, the court must conduct a Franklin hearing.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

Effective assistance of counsel, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000400

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Where the defendant’s judgment was not final when Proposition 57 was passed (making major changes in the treatment of juvenile offenders as adults), and counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek application of Proposition 57 on appeal, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court to consider whether it would have transferred the case to the adult court for prosecution as an adult even under Proposition 57 (in which case, the conviction will be reinstated as of that date) or to instead proceed by juvenile adjudication (in which case the court must conduct a dispositional hearing).

First Holding:

Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing of criminal charges against a juvenile by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated. The provisions apply to every minor to whom it may constitutionally apply [i.e., it is retroactive to judgments that were not final prior to its passage].

Authority:

People v. Superior Ct. (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 305-306

Second Holding:

Where a judgment that was final before Proposition 57 was passed is reopened, as when a sentence is vacated under habeas corpus, the judgment is no longer final and is subject to the provisions of Proposition 57.

Authority:

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152

Third Holding:

To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, the defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. We defer to trial counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. In this instance, however, the defendant’s attorney submitted a declaration that she had no tactical reason for not raising Proposition 57 on direct appeal demonstrates constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard set forth above. The defendant was prejudiced by the failure to raise the Proposition 57 issue earlier, because it provides ameliorative benefits.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687

People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925

People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207

Appellate Principles, Elements of crime, Jury trial, Pleading, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000389

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Consolidation and cross-admission of unrelated charges was improper and prejudicial under the circumstances of this case, and we will therefore reverse the judgment for possible retrial. Due to insufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt under certain murder theories presented to the jury, we will bar the prosecution from pursuing those theories in any retrial.

First Holding:

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence to support the judgment. To overturn a jury’s finding, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.

Authority:

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919

People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755

Second Holding:

First degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder must be committed with express malice—i.e., willfully. The remaining elements of premeditation and deliberation are generally established through the following types of evidence: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing—what may be characterized as planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim, and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a reason which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).

The evidence of premeditation and deliberation is generally sufficient when there is evidence of all three types or at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). These factors discussed in Anderson, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(1)

People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 662

People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27

People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125

Third Holding:

Where, as here, offenses in separate cases meet a statutory basis for consolidation, a defendant bears the burden to make a clear showing of prejudice to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the cases. In our review, we examine the record before the trial court when it denied defendant’s severance motion and consider: (1) the cross-admissibility of the evidence in separate trials; (2) whether some of the charges are likely to unusually inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that the total evidence may alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) whether one of the charges is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges converts the matter into a capital case.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160-161

Fourth Holding:

We first address the charges’ cross-admissibility, because a finding of cross-admissibility generally negates the possibility of prejudice. Evidence of other crimes can be admitted to prove the offender acted according to a certain plan, or acted with a particular motive, if a degree of similarity exists between the past and present crimes so as to permit a reasonable inference that the offender must have entertained the same intent in both instances

Authority:

People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 38

People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 926

Fifth Holding:

There exists a hierarchy, or continuum, with respect to the degree of similarity that is needed for cross-admissibility, depending upon the purpose for which introduction of the evidence is sought. To be admissible to demonstrate a distinctive modus operandi, the evidence must disclose common marks or identifiers, that, considered singly or in combination, support a strong inference that the defendant committed the crimes. To be admissible to show intent, however, the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. To be cross-admissible to establish motive, the offenses need not necessarily be factually similar but must share a direct logical nexus.

Authority:

Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1222

People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392

People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 121

People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15

People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018 [the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense]

Sixth Holding:

Disputed identity is a factor to be considered in weighing the probative value of allegedly cross-admissible evidence of intent against the likelihood of undue prejudice due to its admission.

Authority:

People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 394, fn. 2

People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372, 390–391

People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1301–1303

People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109 [to be admitted, evidence of other crimes must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352]

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case: 000387

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in using aggravating factors that were neither found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact nor admitted by the defendant.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(1) through (3) provides the court may impose the upper term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term. As amended, section 1170(b) altered the trial court’s sentencing discretion and created a presumption against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts are properly proven and the trial court concludes the term is justified. Unless a defendant stipulates to the facts, or waives his or her jury trial right, that aggravating factfinding role now resides solely with the jury The trial court may also consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction. A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 760, 768, 773

Second Holding:

A violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to reversal and remand unless we can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding’ with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768, 775

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Wiley (2025)17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087