Tag Archives: Fines and fees

Case: 000369

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred in failing to conduct a full resentencing. The court erred in its calculation of custody credits, both as to postsentence conduct credits and credits for days in actual custody. The abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment as to the restitution fines and the victim restitution order.

First Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of an offense, a sentencing court has a duty to render judgment and impose the penalty authorized by law. Judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. In rendering the judgment, the court must pronounce sentence on each count for which the defendant sustained a conviction. The failure to pronounce a sentence for each conviction results in an unauthorized sentence that can be corrected at any time.

Authority:

PEN 12

People v. Martinez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411, fn. 6

Second Holding:

At the resentencing hearing following our remand in the earlier appeal, the trial court addressed only the errors we identified in our opinion. Our remand order was not so limited. It was for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Smith (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, abrogated on another ground by People v. Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985

Third Holding:

The trial court’s statements suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the effect of our order vacating the defendant’s sentence and remanding for a full sentencing, which was the nullification of the previous sentence. Because the prior sentence no longer existed, the court had to construct an entirely new sentence. By failing to orally pronounce a sentence on the nine counts for which it stayed the sentences at the original sentencing, the court failed to render judgment on all of the defendant’s convictions, resulting in an unauthorized sentence. When the trial court stated it was excluding counts it had previously stayed under section 654, the trial court used the term concurrent in connection with section 654. But where section 654 applies, it precludes any multiple punishment, consecutive or concurrent.

Authority:

People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 297

People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411, fn. 6

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994

People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594

Fourth Holding:

Generally, when an unauthorized sentence is discovered on appeal, a reviewing court affirms the defendant’s conviction and remands the case for the trial court to pronounce a sentence consistent with the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Taylor (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353

Fifth Holding:

Our order for a full resentencing necessarily encompasses calculating the defendant’s custody credits and the appropriate assessments, fines, and restitution awards. When it resentenced the defendant, the trial court was required to credit her with all actual days she had spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Sixth Holding:

A trial court is required to include all aspects of a judgment in its oral pronouncement. That includes fines and direct victim restitution. The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment. Upon a defendant’s request, the trial court must hold a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing ancillary costs, like the court operations assessment (sec. 1465.8(a)(1)) and the court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 70373).

Authority:

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-388

People v. Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1751

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Case: 000354

Error and/or relief

Because of legislation enacted since the disposition hearing, the $300 restitution fine is ordered stricken in this Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile proceeding. The statutory change regarding joint and severally liability, however, does not apply retroactively.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now states that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in section 602. Because the judgment is not final, the appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

The modification of section 730.6(b)(3), eliminating joint and several liability for juvenile offenders for direct restitution, is not punitive, but civil. Because it is not ameliorative of punishment, there is no presumption that it applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. Enacted after the order imposing direct restitution jointly and severally with other parties, it has prospective effect only, and does not apply retroactively to this minor’s case.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(b)(3)

In re J.L. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 388

Case: 000346

Error and/or relief

The court imposed a minimum $300 restitution fine and an assessment of $70 in ancillary costs. The trial court held a hearing and determined that the defendant had the ability to pay. We affirm the order on ancillary costs but remand to give the defendant the opportunity to further challenge the restitution fine under Kopp.

First Holding:

A person convicted of a crime can, and in some cases must, be ordered to pay a variety of punitive fines along with other nonpunitive ancillary costs. Some statutes require the imposition of fines and ancillary costs regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. Other statutes require a finding of the ability to pay or allow for its consideration. Restitution fines under section 1202.4 are considered punitive fines, whereas assessments to fund court facilities and operations are considered ancillary costs. The distinction between punitive fines and other imposed payments is important because it impacts whether a given form of required payment is initially challenged under, and then reviewed under, the constitutional excessive fines clauses, or under the constitutional provision for equal protection.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 12, 14-15, 18 [we analyze fines and ancillary costs separately because different justifications support each, and different constitutional protections apply]

Second Holding:

If requested by a defendant, the court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 25-26, 30 [in light of the Legislature’s provision of fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment]

Third Holding:

In reaching its conclusion that the defendant did not meet his burden to show his inability to pay the ancillary costs, the court considered his potential to earn wages while in prison and his general ability to work, which was within its discretion to do. The trial court did not state that it was relying solely on the defendant’s ability to earn wages while in prison. The court found simply that he is capable of working. The trial court’s conclusion that he had the ability to pay $70 in court assessments was not arbitrary or irrational.

Authority:

People v. Fish (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 730, 739 [collecting cases]

People v. Santos (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 934 [factors to consider in determining ability to pay may include, among others, the defendant’s realistic ability to earn prison wages or obtain employment]

People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490, disapproved in part as stated in Kopp, at p. 23, fn. 17. 490 [trial court may consider potential prison pay during the period of incarceration” in determining inability to pay]

People v. Cervantes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 229 [ability to pay includes the ability both to obtain prison wages and to earn money after release from custody]

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it]

Fourth Holding:

Punitive fines are subject to a different approach. There is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the defendant’s ability to pay, but in such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial discretion rather than by constitutional mandate.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 23

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 22

Fifth Holding:

A court has discretion to impose a nonexcessive fine as punishment, even on indigent defendants. Thus, the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry for excessive fines is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. While ability to pay may be part of the proportionality analysis, it is not the only factor.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 8th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 17

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 21, 23

United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334

Sixth Holding:

Under section 1202.4(b), the restitution fine shall be set at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. The court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. A defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4

Seventh Holding:

A court’s ruling on ability to pay is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating his or her inability to pay the imposed amounts.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 21, 24

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868

People v. Lowery (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1046, 1057, 1053

Case: 000338

Error and/or relief

When it initially granted the defendant probation, the court waived various fines and assessments based on indigence. On revocation of probation, the court imposed a restitution fine and other assessments. Remanded for the court to consider the defendant’s challenges to the fees and assessments in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.

First Holding:

Under the Supreme Court’s holding in Kopp a defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as constitutionally excessive. Because Kopp was decided after entry of the juidgment on appeal here, the defendant should have the opportunity to make such a challenge. Though the court could determine that the issue was forfeited for lack of objection, forfeiture may be excused where to require defense counsel to raise an objection would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8

People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 127 [Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a right derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law.]

Second Holding:

A restitution fine under section 1202.4(b)(1) is required in every case where a person is convicted of a crime unless the court finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. ) Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1), states that the minimum restitution fine is $300 for each felony conviction and that the maximum fine is $10,000. Section 1202.4, subdivision (c), allows the court not to impose the restitution fine for compelling and extraordinary reasons, but states the defendant’s inability to pay is not a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose the minimum fine. Thus, the defendant’s inability to pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine. Inability to pay may be considered only in increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4
People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 13, 30

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 423

People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356

People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1033 [Under section 1202.4(c), the trial court may not consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing the minimum restitution fine of $300, but the court may consider the defendant’s ability to pay if the court imposes a restitution fine above the minimum.]

Third Holding:

Although fines may properly be imposed as punishment for crime, the “excessive fines analysis” under the United States and California Constitutions, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines. But there is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23 and fn. 17

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.8(a)(1) requires, to assist in funding court operations, an assessment of $40 to be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Government Code section 70373(a)(1) requires, to ensure and maintain adequate funding for court facilities, that $30 assessment be imposed on every conviction for a criminal offense. Both costs are mandatory. But equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

GOV 70373(a)(1)

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 9, 15

People v. Robinson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 401, 405

Case: 000310

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support an enhancement based on a finding that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Imposition of a restitution fine is now precluded by subsequent legislation. We modify the judgment to strike the gang enhancement and vacate the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 186.22 was amended by AB 333, significantly narrowing the circumstances in which the enhancement would apply. As amended, the statute now requires, among other things, that the two predicate offenses necessary to establish a pattern of criminal gang activity must each have been committed within a specified date range by two or more gang members for the common benefit of the gang, and this benefit must have been more than reputational. Here, the evidence of predicate offenses offered by the prosecution showed three possible crimes, two of which were committed by a single gang member without anything to indicate a value to the gang that was more than reputational. This is insufficient to establish a basis for the gang enhancement as amended by AB 333

Authority:

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 752–753

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 now prohibits imposition of restitution fines on juvenile offenders. This provision is retroactive. We therefore vacate the $100 restitution fine.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308