Tag Archives: Elements of crime

Case: 000094

Error and/or relief

We reverse the defendant’s convictions for kidnapping to commit robbery in counts 11 and 12, and we reduce the convictions in counts 11 and 12 to the lesser included offense of felony false imprisonment by violence or menace.   We remand the matter for a full resentencing as to all counts, so that the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

First Holding:

Kidnapping for robbery requires a simple kidnapping in which the movement increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the intended underlying offense. The increased risk may be of either physical or psychological harm.

Authority:

PEN 209(b)(1)–(2)

People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 11–12

People v. Waqa (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 565, 577

People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 886

Second Holding:

In a simple kidnapping or kidnap for robbery involving an associated crime, the jury should be instructed to consider whether the distance a victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the movement’s substantiality. Such consideration is relevant to determining whether more than one crime has been committed, and is amply supported by the case law. An associated crime for the purposes of simple kidnapping is any criminal act the defendant intends to commit where, in the course of its commission, the defendant also moves a victim by force or fear against his or her will.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 644, 671

Third Holding:

Whether movement is incidental and whether it increased the risk to the victim are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 470

Fourth Holding:

If in the course of a robbery a defendant does no more than move his victim around inside the premises in which he finds him or her—whether it be a residence or a place of business or other enclosure—his conduct generally will not be deemed to constitute the offense proscribed by section 209. Indeed, most movements that have been found to be insubstantial or merely incidental to the underlying crime have been within a building, or within the premises of a business. It is not unusual in the course of a robbery for a robber to move the victims to one spot to make it easier for the robber to search for valuables and flee undetected. Although measured distance is relevant, no minimum distance is required to satisfy the asportation requirement so long as the movement is substantial. Each case must be considered in the context of the totality of its circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1140

People v. Power (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 126, 139

People v. Leavel (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 823, 834

People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1152

People v. Corcoran (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 272, 279 [holding that movement of 10 feet was a substantial distance in connection with a robbery]

Fifth Holding:

In general, to prove the crime of simple kidnapping, the prosecution must prove three elements: (1) a person was unlawfully moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the movement was without the person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person was for a substantial distance.

Authority:

People v. Hartland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 71, 77

Sixth Holding:

Where, as here, the appellate court finds there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for a greater offense, we may modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense. We remand the matter for a full resentencing as to all counts, so that the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1181, subd. 6

PEN 1260

People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 748

People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590, 601

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Seventh Holding:

Our Supreme Court has long recognized that under sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260, an appellate court that finds that insufficient evidence supports the conviction for a greater offense may, in lieu of granting a new trial, modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense.

Authority:

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671

Case 000081

Error and/or relief

[Gary note: Grabba cuppa. This case rivaled Fort Knox for gold.]

We agree with the parties that the gang offense must be reversed and the gang-related allegations must be vacated, and that the sentences on several witness dissuasion counts may be readdressed upon remand. We further agree with the defendant that the prosecution should not have been permitted to play and introduce two rap music videos under Evidence Code section 352, although we conclude that the error was harmless given our reversal of the gang offense and the vacation of the gang-related allegations. In addition, we find that the defendant has established a prima facie case that the prosecution violated the California Racial Justice Act by playing and using the rap music videos at trial, and we remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine if a violation of the California Racial Justice Act has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

First Holding:

AB 333 made the following changes: First, it narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, AB 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Third Holding:

AB 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Fourth Holding:

Fourth, AB 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Fifth Holding:

We determine whether substantial evidence supports a jury’s finding by inquiring whether evidence was presented from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof. Although we assess whether the evidence is inherently credible and of solid value, we must also view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of every fact that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that evidence.

Authority:

People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 488

Sixth Holding:

Speculative testimony by a gang expert does not constitute substantial evidence to support a gang enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 288

People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 964 [Where there is no proof the defendant acted in association with or at the direction of the gang, the prosecution cannot rely on the joint nature of the offense to establish either the requisite benefit to the gang or the specific intent to promote the criminal activity of gang members]

Seventh Holding:

We also will vacate the gang-related firearm allegations under section 12022.53(b) and (e)(1).

Authority:

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 746 [reversing affirmance of firearm enhancement because the firearm enhancement alleged under section 12022.53(e)(1) is contingent on a true finding on the gang enhancement under section 186.22]

People v. Campbell (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 350, 376 [the amendments AB 333 made apply retroactively to the gang-related gun use enhancement under section 12022.53(e)]

Eighth Holding:

Because we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the conviction on the gang offense and the true findings on the gang-related allegations under the law at the time of the defendant’s trial, the defendant may not be retried concerning these matters.

Authority:

United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131

Ninth Holding:

The California Supreme Court recently held that Evidence Code section 352.2 [rap video evidence] does not apply retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. Evidence Code section 352.2 has at best an attenuated and inconsistent connection to reduced punishment and there is good reason why the Legislature might not have intended for its approach toward the admissibility of creative expressions to apply retroactively, and thus the inference of retroactive application does not attach to the statute. However, the court noted that Evidence Code section 352.2, by providing additional direction for evaluating the admissibility of creative expressions, sets forth several factors that trial courts already might have folded into an evaluation of whether this type of material was admissible under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101.

Authority:

People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 692, 693

Tenth Holding:

While the Supreme Court’s decision in Aguirre dictates that Evidence Code section 352.2 does not apply retroactively to the defendant’s case, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by permitting the prosecutor to play the videos in his opening statement and by admitting evidence of the videos. A Racial Justice Act [RJA] violation occurs when an attorney in the case exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, among other circumstances. A central premise of the RJA is that bias can be unconscious and implied as well as conscious and express.

Authority:

PEN 745

Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 824

Eleventh Holding:

To forestall the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of his’s RJA claim. This approach is particularly appropriate here, where we can discern no rational tactical reason for the defendant’s counsel not raising the RJA issue when counsel already filed a motion for a new trial concerning the playing and use of the rap music videos.

Authority:

People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 92 [reviewing court may reach forfeited claim where ineffective assistance of counsel claimed]

People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1074 [addressing merits of forfeited RJA claim because defendant alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object]

Twelfth Holding:

The fact that the prosecutor did not utter the words in the video does not foreclose an RJA claim. The RJA expressly includes in its description of qualifying acts an attorney using racially discriminatory language, but it also includes an attorney otherwise exhibiting bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.

Authority:

PEN 745(a)(2)

Thirteenth Holding:

The RJA does not define racial bias or animus, but it specifies that the moving party is not required to prove intentional discrimination. Indeed, the statement of Legislative intent behind the RJA’s enactment states that the act was aimed at addressing the use of racially incendiary or racially coded language, images, and racial stereotypes in criminal trials. Based on the lack of probative value the videos had, the danger of racial bias that the “A Day in the Life” video particularly presented, and the manner in which the prosecutor used the videos at trial, we conclude that the defendant has satisfied his initial minimal burden to produce facts that, if true, establish that there is more than a mere possibility of an RJA violation.

Authority:

PEN 745(c)(2)

People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 656

Fourteenth Holding:

Challenges for cause are constitutionally guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Our state Constitution provides the same general right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. In California, criminal defendants are allowed an unlimited number of challenges to prospective jurors for cause, which the defendants must use before exercising any peremptory challenges.

Authority:

People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 916

Fifteenth Holding:

On forfeiture of jury challenge because defendant still had peremptory challenges available, the defense was afforded 30 total peremptory challenges, with 20 of the challenges being joint challenges and the remaining 10 split between the two defendants. The defense had peremptory challenges available when it accepted the jury as seated. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected requests to abandon the forfeiture rule concerning denials of juror challenges for cause in analogous situations where the three requirements to preserve the issue for appeal were not met.

Authority:

People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 143

People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 425-426

People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1209-1210

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 61

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 45-46

People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186

People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1290

Sixteenth Holding:

Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome. In applying this statute we evaluate the risk of undue prejudice, that is, evidence that uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues, not the prejudice that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.

Authority:

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724

People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 148

Seventeenth Holding:

A trial court’s discretionary ruling under Evidence Code section 352 will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 372-373

People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124

Eighteenth Holding:

The weighing process under Evidence Code section 352 depends upon the trial court’s consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon the mechanical application of automatic rules. The record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value, but no more is required. We review the trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting evidence under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse and will not disturb the court’s ruling except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Authority:

People v. Megown (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 157, 164

Nineteenth Holding:

A trial court’s admission of evidence, including gang testimony, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Coneal (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 951, 964

Twentieth Holding:

When evaluating the admission of rap music, courts have recognized it has minimal probative value to the extent that it depends on construing the lyrics as literal statements of fact or intent without a persuasive basis to do so. We have also held that the relevance of rap lyrics is further diminished when they lack foundation. These foundational components include whether the defendant authored the lyrics. Thus, absent some meaningful method to determine which lyrics represent real versus made up events, or some persuasive basis to construe specific lyrics literally, the probative value of lyrics as evidence of their literal truth is minimal.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 477, 478

Twenty-first Holding:

We do not mean to suggest that lyrics are never probative of their literal truth. For example, where lyrics are written within a reasonable period of time before or after the charged crime and bear a sufficient level of similarity to the charged crime, their probative value as a statement of fact is increased. It may also be that lyrics with sufficient corroboration from other evidence will have increased probative value. However, corroborating evidence may also render the lyrics cumulative.

Authority:

People v. Coneal (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 951, 96

Twenty-second Holding:

Section 29800(a)(1) states that any person who has been convicted of a felony, who has been convicted of an enumerated offense, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug and who owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony. As relevant here: This offense has three elements: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) the defendant knew that he possessed the firearm, and (3) the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958

Twenty-third Holding:

Where a defendant will stipulate to ex-felon status, evidence of the nature of his prior convictions still may and should be withheld from the jury, since such evidence is irrelevant to the ex-felon issue. Thus, to prove the third element of a violation of section 29800(a)(1), one of two alternatives may be used: (1) The prosecution can prove the conviction in open court, and that proof can include both the fact that the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony offense as well as the nature of the felony involved; or (2) the defendant can stipulate to having a felony conviction and thereby keep from the jury the nature of the particular felony. When the defendant stipulates to a prior conviction, “the court ‘sanitizes’ the prior by telling the jury that the defendant has a prior felony conviction, without specifying the nature of the felony committed.

Authority:

People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173

People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 261, 262

Case 000078

Error and/or relief

The defendant was improperly prosecuted under Penal Code section 594, rather than Penal Code section 4600, for damaging two safety cells while on special watch. Section 594 generally prohibits malicious damage to property not one’s own in cases other than those specified by state law. In contrast, section 4600 specifically addresses the destruction or injury of jail or prison property by an inmate. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including any retrial the People may elect to pursue.

First Holding:

The defendant’s conviction for felony vandalism under section 594 was improper, as a more specific statute was available.

Authority:

PEN 594

PEN 4600

Second Holding:

When a general statute includes conduct covered by a more specific statute, prosecution must proceed under the specific statute. This principle, known as the Williamson rule, prevents the government from circumventing legislative intent by charging a defendant under a broader statute carrying a harsher penalty.

Authority:

In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654

People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86

Third Holding:

The Legislature’s intent was to exclude from section 594’s scope conduct addressed by other, more specific statutes, such as section 4600’s prohibition against damaging jail property. Reading the two provisions together gives effect to both and avoids rendering section 4600 superfluous, consistent with well-settled rules of statutory construction.

Authority:

Imperial Merchant Services Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 390 [statutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect, meaning that we should not construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous]

Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 22 [We do not presume that the Legislature performs idle acts, nor do construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous]

River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1228

Case 000040

Error and/or relief

Two of the convictions for a lewd act upon a child of 14 or 15 years must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that victim was under 16 years old at the time of the crimes. The People concede and ask us to modify the verdicts to the lesser included and affirm as modified. Remanded for full resentencing.

Holding:

Where the appellate court finds there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for a greater offense, it may modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense.

Authority:

People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590, 601

Case 000038

Error and/or relief

Because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish the defendant is ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 on his manslaughter conviction as a matter of law, the court reversed and remanded the matter for the court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing on that count.

First Holding:

A defendant who pleaded no contest to manslaughter is eligible for resentencing if the charging document permitted the prosecution to pursue a conviction under the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other imputed malice theory.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211

Second Holding:

Absent exceptional circumstances, appellate courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court.

Authority:

Bullock v. City of Antioch (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 407, 417, fn. 7

Case 000028

Error and/or relief

Substantial evidence does not support the true finding on the prior strike allegation. At trial, the prosecution introduced documentary evidence that the defendant was convicted in 2019 of violating section 246.3(a) along with another offense, and the defendant admitted the convictions. The evidence did not prove whether he violated section 246.3(a) by personally using a firearm, or instead if his guilt was based on his vicarious liability as an aider and abettor. The prosecution therefore failed to introduce substantial evidence that his conviction for violating section 246.3(a) constituted a strike as defined by Penal Code section 1192.7.

First Holding:

The evidence was insufficient to prove personal use, so the prior conviction was not proved as a strike.

Authority:

People v. Watts (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 589, 596

Second Holding:

Penal Code section 246.3 is a strike under as any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm or as any felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon.

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c)(8)

PEN 1192.7(c)(23

Third Holding:

Section 246.3 can be used as a strike only if the defendant personally used the firearm.

Authority:

People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 111-112

Fourth Holding:

Where the prior conviction is for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, one or more of which would not qualify it as a strike, and if it cannot be determined from the record that the offense was committed in a way that would make it a strike, a reviewing court must presume the offense was not a strike.

Authority:

People v. Watts (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 589

Fifth Holding:

On reversal for insufficiency of evidence of a prior conviction, the issue may be retried.

Authority:

People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239

Case 000024

Error and/or relief

GARY note: The winning issue was relatively simple, but in affirming the overall conviction, the court shared several principles I thought worthy of reporting, even though many did not bear on the dual use of enhancements.

For the attempted murder of the victim in count 3, the trial court should have stayed the three-year enhancement for great bodily injury under section 12022.7 because it also imposed a term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for personally and proximately causing great bodily injury with a firearm. We will modify the judgment so that it accords with the law.

First Holding:

Where multiple prison terms are improperly imposed as in this case, the reviewing court may modify the sentence to stay imposition of the sentence

Authority:

People v. Hunter (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1537

Second Holding:

It is improper to impose the enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7 in addition to enhancement under section 12022.53(d), and it must be stayed.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 941, 949

People v. Hunter (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1537

Third Holding:

If an error violates a defendant’s federal constitutional rights, reversal is required unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 745

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 615

People v. Concha (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1087

Fourth Holding:

A harmless error analysis may include consideration of implausible defense testimony and closing argument to the jury.

Authority:

People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 195

People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 243

People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 881

Fifth Holding:

With respect to errors alleged regarding the conviction of the murder, the error can be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even under the Chapman standard, as the court concludes in this instance.

Authority:

People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 983-984

People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 755

Wright v. West (1992) 505 U.S. 277, 296

Hanrahan v. Thieret (7th Cir. 1991) 933 F.2d 1328, 1340

Phelps v. Duckworth (7th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 1410, 1413-1414

Sixth Holding:

The standard of review on sufficiency of evidence is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution.

Authority:

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

Seventh Holding:

Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.

Authority:

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

Eighth Holding:

A conviction for attempted murder requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and proof of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing that goal. But a finding of willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation requires more than a showing of an intent to kill.

Authority:

People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 153

People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 282

Ninth Holding:

When reviewing a claim the trial court erred in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal (sec. 1118.1) that was made at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the appellate court considers the evidence as it stood at that point,

Authority:

People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-1213

Tenth Holding:

It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate error based on the appellate record and with meaningful legal analysis with adequate citation to the record.

Authority:

People v. Dauterman (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 603, 609

Eleventh Holding:

Arguments not raised below are forfeited.

Authority:

People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1022-1023

Twelfth Holding:

The court conducts de novo review to detemine if jury miscontrued or misapplied the law.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833, 838

Thirteenth Holding:

Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646

Fourteenth Holding:

Errors in the abstract of judgment may be corrected.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181

 

Case 000008

Error and/or relief

The defendant appealed from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter to the lower court because the evidence was insufficient to support the finding defendant aided and abetted the murder of the officer.

First Holding:

In this instance, the appellate court found that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant aided and abetted the murder.

Authority:

SB 1437

People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869

Second Holding:

A trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence. Under this standard, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

Third Holding:

Under a direct aider and abettor liability theory, the prosecution must prove the person who is not the actual killer engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent to aid and abet the target crime of murder.

Authority:

People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 124

Fourth Holding:

Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712-713

Fifth Holding:

It is well settled that aiding and abetting the commission of a crime requires some affirmative action.

Authority:

People v. Partee (2020) 8 Cal.5th 860, 868

Sixth Holding:

A person present at the scene of a crime—even one who is the criminal’s companion, knows a crime is being committed, fails to prevent it, and later expresses approval of it—is not guilty of aiding and abetting the crime if he takes no action to aid or encourage the crime.

Authority:

In re K.M. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 323, 329

 

Case 000002

Error and/or relief:

Mere presence at the scene is not substantial evidence to support conspiracy.

Holding:

Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish participation in a conspiracy to commit that crime or aiding and abetting its commission.

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 165 [Because the law will not recognize a rule of guilt by association, we insist on proof of a defendant’s knowledge of, and specific intent to further, [a conspiracy’s] unlawful ends]

People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 72

In re Michael T. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 907, 911 [Mere presence at the scene of a crime which does not itself assist its commission or mere knowledge that a crime is being committed and the failure to prevent it does not amount to aiding and abetting]