Tag Archives: Credit for time served

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Duty of the court, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case 000831

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court should have recalculated the defendant’s custody credits. Further, the abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that the court reimposed the restitution fine and suspended it. In fact, the court did not reimpose the fine, and thus this is clerical error that must be corrected.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment erroneously includes a restitution fine. Section 1465.9(d) provides that upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

In fact, the trial court did not reimpose the restitution fine, so this appears to have been a clerical error. Therefore, we remand so the court may correct the abstract of judgment.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its order directing correction, but there are many cases the court could have relied on. I have set forth several below the Penal Code section in the Authority section below.)

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

There was an error in calculating the defendant’s days of custody credit. Remanded for the court to calculate the correct number of days.

(Gary note: Again, the court cited no authority for this obvious solution, so I have set forth a few below.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 33–34

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396–397

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000830

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(Gary note: This was not a “win,” even under my generous standards, but I have included it because it instructs on the duty of the court to recalculate credit for actual days served since the prior sentencing, but the trial court does not calculate the conduct credits earned since the original sentencing.)

The trial court erred in awarding presentence conduct credit for time the defendant spent in custody between his original sentencing and the time he was resentenced following remand from his earlier appeal.

Holding:

It was error for the court to calculate credits under section 2933.1 for conduct of the defendant in custody between the date of his original sentencing and the date of his resentencing as a result of his prior appeal.

The court should have calculated the days in actual custody (along with whatever local conduct credit the defendant earned prior to his original sentencing).

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilation [CDCR] will then determine what conduct credit the defendant is entitled to following his original sentencing. An appellate remand solely for correction of a sentence already in progress does not remove a prisoner from the Director of the CDCR’s custody or restore the prisoner to presentence status. A defendant’s temporary removal from state prison to county jail as a consequence of the remand did not transform him from a state prisoner to a local presentence detainee.

When a state prisoner is temporarily away from prison to permit court appearances, he remains in the constructive custody of prison authorities and continues to earn sentence credit, if any, in that status.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 33–34

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396–397

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000818

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court impermissibly and prejudicially relied on aggravating factors not found true by a jury to sentence the defendant to the upper term on the assault count. The defendant is also entitled to conduct credts in addition to his actual presentence time in custody.

First Holding:

The People presented certified documents of five prior felony convictions. The certified documents showed that appellant had served a prison term for the 2002 convictions. The trial court found the People proved two aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: that appellant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and that appellant had served a prior prison term. At sentencing, the trial court relied on these two factors in imposing the upper term on the assault count.

This was error, as the proposed aggravating factors should have been presented to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, if not stipulated to by the defendant.

Under the federal constitution, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

When the constitutional right to jury trial is involved, there must be an express waiver. It is undisputed that appellant made no such express waiver in this case. When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review.

Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086, 1087

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Second Holding:

With respect to numerosity, appellant was convicted of five offenses over a period of 18 years, with an additional 22 years elapsing between the most recent prior offense and the instant offense. Appellant was [more than 60] years old at the time of trial. We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found appellant’s prior crimes numerous.

While the evidence may have been sufficient to support a finding that the aggravating factor was true, that is not the proper inquiry when assessing prejudice under Chapman. Instead, we must ask whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 848 [Three robberies in the course of 49 years of life may strike some jurors as an obviously numerous number of convictions, but we are unsure 12 people unanimously would agree with this evaluation beyond a reasonable doubt]

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Third Holding:

As for increasing seriousness, under current case law, the determination that a defendant’s prior convictions are of increasing seriousness may be made by reference to the range of punishment provided by statute for each offense. Or it may be determined by a comparison of the offenses respective elements.

While a jury certainly could find increasing seriousness, we are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that they would have, particularly in light of our Supreme Court’s recent caution regarding increasing seriousness that the determination is a comparative and qualitative one. These realities make it difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Fourth Holding:

The defendant is entitled to 166 days of presentence conduct credit in addition to the 167 days of actual credit awarded by the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 4019(f)

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000809

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court miscalculated the credit for time served and gave the defendant one less than he earned. That abstract of judgment msut be corrected as well.

Holding:

The trial court awarded defendant 278 days of actual custody credit and 278 days of conduct credit, for a total of 556 days. However, defendant was arrested on February 21, 2024 and sentenced on November 25, 2024. The court therefore should have awarded him 279 days of actual custody credit, and 278 days of conduct credit, for a total of 557 days of presentence custody credit. The minute order and abstract of judgment both credit defendant 279 actual days and 278 conduct days but nevertheless record 556 as the total number of days. Accordingly, we will order the judgment modified to reflect the correct number of total credit days.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1457

People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000777

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the court should have recalculated his credit for time served.

Holding:

Upon resentencing that results in a modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the subsequent sentence. It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5(d)

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000776

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court failed to pronounce sentence on two of the counts. This was error. Also, the court must recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid.

Once the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identifies those persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) to the sentencing court, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. A recall effectively vacates the defendant’s original sentence and commitment.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399, 402

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances]

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360

Second Holding:

The resentencing under section 1172.75 shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. In resentencing, the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(1)

Third Holding:

In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. If a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed the sentencing judge must pronounce the court’s judgment and sentence, stating the terms thereof and giving reasons for those matters for which reasons are required by law.

At a sentencing hearing, the court must orally pronounce the sentence on the record. Since the court recalled defendant’s sentence under section 1172.75, it effectively vacated his original sentence and thus should have orally pronounced all components of the sentence on the record at the resentencing hearing.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.433(c)(5)

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn 9

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [Rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement]

Fourth Holding:

There was also an error in the sentencing, in that the sentence on one count was a life term, but the count was not a serious felony and should have been sentenced as a determinate term.

It is well established that when the trial court pronounces a sentence that is unauthorized by the Penal Code that sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed whenever the mistake is appropriately brought to the attention of the trial court or the reviewing court. When the mistake is discovered while the defendant’s appeal is pending, the appellate court should remand the case for a proper sentence.

Authority:

People v. Benton (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 92, 102

Fifth Holding:

The trial court should recalculate defendant’s custody credits on remand.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(d)

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.]

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case 000769

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The final abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the defendant’s custody credits. We remand the matter with instructions to modify the final abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

When a defendant is resentenced following an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must determine all actual time the defendant has already served and recalculate the defendant’s actual custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

Second Holding:

The court determined that the defendant was in custody for [period A, more than 240 days] from arrest to original sentencing, and [period B, more than 1,000 more days] between the sentencing and resentencing hearings. The two numbers should have been added together to arrive at the total credit for time served. The abstract, however, treated the two numbers separately, listing the larger number [period B] as actual days in custody and the smaller number [period A] as conduct credits instead of actual days in custody, resulting in a failure to reflect an additional [more than 35 days] of conduct credit on [period A]. We direct the court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 188 [appellate court may order modification of inaccuracies in abstract of judgment]

People v. Moore (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 783, 788 [modifying judgment to correct conduct credits]

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000764

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by not staying punishment for the second count under section 654. Also, the court must recalculate the credit for time served on resentencing. Further, the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects that the defendant stands convicted of a count that was reversed in the prior appeal.

(Gary note: This was mentioned only in a footnote, and there was no express direction for correction. But the court did order resentencing “consistent with this opinion,” which most likely implies a direction that the subsequent abstract of judgment accurately reflect the record.)

First Holding:

Section 654(a) states that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654(a)

Second Holding:

Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an act or omission may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective.

We first consider if the different crimes were completed by a single physical act. If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single intent and objective or multiple intents and objectives. At step one, courts examine the facts of the case to determine whether multiple convictions are based upon a single physical act.

When those facts are undisputed the application of section 654 raises a question of law we review de novo. However, we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311–312

People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 795

Third Holding:

A review of the record indicates that there was but one act constituting the crime. Accordingly, the sentence on count 2 should have been stayed.

Authority:

PEN 654

Fourth Holding:

While we do not address the trial court’s failure to recalculate the defendant’s actual days of presentence custody credits because it was not raised by the defendant and we are remanding the matter for resentencing, we note that trial courts are required to do so.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41

Fifth Holding:

(Gary note: the court mentioned in a footnote that the abstract incorrectly lists a conviction of an offense that was reversed in a prior appeal. It made no express direction for correct of the abstract, but there is much authority that would have supported such an order, some of which I set forth below.)

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000731

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was resentenced under section 1172.75. We remand with directions to the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s custodial credits and to reimpose the restitution order with joint and several liability.

First Holding:

When the defendant was originally sentenced in 2008, the trial court imposed a restitution order of (more than $50,000) on all three defendants. The court ordered joint and several liability, that is, each defendant is entitled to a credit for any actual payments by the other. The trial court has the authority to order direct victim restitution paid by all defendants jointly and severally. On resentencing, the court reimposed an order for restitution in the same amount, but did not make an order of joint and several liability. To prevent the possibility of unjust enrichment—a double recovery by the victim—the restitution order must be corrected to reflect joint and several liability.

Authority:

People v. Blackburn (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1535

People v. Leon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 620, 622 [if two defendants convicted of the same crime caused economic loss, a court may impose liability on each defendant to pay the full amount of the economic loss, as long as the victim does not obtain a double recovery]

Second Holding:

The trial court erred in delegating the recalculation of the defendant’s custody credits to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The trial court should have recalculated and pronounced the number of custody credits the defendant had garnered to the date of resentencing. When a prison term already in progress is modified the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 000725

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment fails to reflect the total credit for time served as of the date of resentencing. It must be corrected accordingly.

First Holding:

(Gary’s note for context: The abstract of judgment following resentencing under section 1172.75 listed only the credit for time served ordered originally in 1989. The order in this Case 000725 directs that the abstract of judgment be corrected, but in fact, it was the trial court that declined to recalculate the credit for time served, leaving it up to the Department of Corrections. The case authority cited by the court–Buckhalter–does state that the court has a duty to recalculate the credit for time served when a person is resentenced.)

The amended abstract of judgment fails to reflect the appropriate calculation of custody credits for time already served by the defendant. The judgment is affirmed subject to the clerk correcting the abstract of judgment upon remand to award the defendant [more than 13,000] days of custody credit.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 41

Second Holding:

(Gary’s second note: It is not a win for the defendant, but there was another abstract of judgment error, this time understating the sentence that was imposed.

(The court ordered that, in addition to reflecting the revised credit for time served calculation, the abstract must reflect that the sentence was enhancement by two years for a firearm use enhancement that was omitted from the calculation of the sentence. The error omitting the enhancement was merely a repeat of the erroneous abstract more than 30 years earlier, which also failed to reflect the enhancement despite the court’s oral imposition of it.

(Though not a win for the defendant, I’m including this information because it once again demonstrates the importance of checking abstracts of judgment. While this one favored the defendant until the Court of Appeal spotted the error, many, many errors in abstracts reflect harsher treatment of the defendant than actually imposed by the court. Also, the court cited no authority for correction of the abstract, but I have listed several cases here that the court could have cited.)

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000715

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The trial court should have stayed punishment of the ammunition possession count under section 654 and the defendant deserves one more day of custody credit.

First Holding:

The trial court erred in imposing punishments for both counts 2 (felon in possession of a firearm) and 3 (felon in possession of ammunition). The only ammunition was that in the pistol, so possessing the firearm and possessing the ammunition inside were one act within the meaning of section 654. The trial court therefore should have imposed and then stayed the defendant’s sentence on count 3.

There is no indication that the court would exercise its overall sentencing discretion any differently had it stayed sentence on one of the counts. To correct the sentence and avoid the unnecessary expense of producing the defendant for a sentencing hearing that will not change his actual prison time, we exercise our authority to modify the judgment by staying the execution of the defendant’s sentence on count 3.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Wright (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 832, 846

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 138

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473

Second Holding:

The defendant asserts his due process and jury trial rights were violated when the trial court, rather than the jury, determined that counts 2 and 3 involved discrete acts under section 654. The defendant’s claim raises a question of law, which we independently review.

Authority:

People v. Scott (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1271

Third Holding:

Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct punishable under more than one criminal statute. When a trial court determines that section 654 applies to a particular count, the trial court must impose sentence on that count and then stay execution of that sentence.

Authority:

People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 263, 267

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1466

Fourth Holding:

The defendant relies on the principal that virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt. While that is a correct statement of a principle, that principle is inapplicable to the statutory prohibition on double punishment described in section 654.

Section 654 is not a sentencing enhancement. On the contrary, it is a sentencing reduction statute which, therefore, does not implicate the Sixth Amendment prohibition against judicial fact finding to increase criminal sentences.

Authority:

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 846

Fifth Holding:

A court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. The circumstances justifying departure from the Three Strikes law must be extraordinary, and an abuse of discretion in this regard is even more extraordinary.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 641

Sixth Holding:

The defendant is entitled to one additional day of custody credit because the trial court did not award the defendant any credit for the day of sentencing. The abstract of judgment must therefore be amended to reflect that the defendant has two days of custody credits.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for this order, most likely because it seems so obvious. But there is statutory and case authority the credit for time served includes the day of arrest and the day of sentencing, some of which I have provided below.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 235-236

People v. Morgain (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 454, 469 [defendant is entitled to credit for the date of his arrest and the date of sentencing]

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

People v. Heard (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1027 [appellant is entitled to credit for both the date of his arrest and date of sentencing]

People v. Browning (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1412 [day of sentencing counted for presentence custody credits even though it was only partial day]

In re Jackson (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 439 [a partial day in custody counts as a day in custody]

Seventh Holding:

The defendant did not assert his Second Amendment claims in the trial court. Nonetheless, a defendant may raise a facial constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal, which we independently review.

Authority:

People v. Gomez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 419, 437

Eighth Holding:

The defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge is forfeited. However, we will assess the defendant’s claim that the failure to raise the issue constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

(Gary note: the court went on to conclude that the firearm and ammunition possession charges were not unconstitutional as applied to him. I have not included the detailed discussion as it was basically a recitation of historical treatment of persons who were deemed “disarmed” by their prior conduct.)

Authority:

People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946

People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958

Ninth Holding:

When firearm regulation is challenged under the Second Amendment, the Government must show that the restriction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. A court must ascertain whether the new law is relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, applying faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.

Applying that standard in Anderson, the First District Court of Appeal found that sections 29800(a)(1) and 30305(a)(1) are facially valid under the Second Amendment. Several California courts of appeal have come to the same conclusion. We agree with the reasoning of these cases, and we reject the defendant’s claim that they were wrongly decided. Accordingly, the defendant’s facial challenge fails.

Authority:

United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680, 681

People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577, 586–600

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1212

People v. Gomez (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 419, 439

People v. Bey (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 144, 162

Tenth Holding:

The defendant asserts his due process and jury trial rights were violated when the trial court, rather than the jury, determined that counts 2 and 3 involved discrete acts under section 654. The defendant’s claim raises a question of law, which we independently review.

Authority:

People v. Scott (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1265, 1271

Sentencing

Case 000700

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It appears that the trial court miscalculated the defendant’s credit for time served. The matter is remanded for it to recalculate the credit. The People do not dispute that the custody credits may have been incorrectly calculated, but that the record is not clear as to the date of defendant’s release on bond. The People recommend a return to the trial court for it to recalculate the custody and conduct credits. Based on the People’s concession, we will order limited remand to the trial court to calculate presentence custody credits.

Holding:

Prisoners confined to jail prior to sentencing for a felony conviction are among those entitled to Penal Code section 4019 credits.

Authority:

People v. Duesler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 273, 275