Tag Archives: Credit for time served

Case: 000167

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating the presentence custody credits. He actually served more time than the court calculated. We award him the additional days he is entitled to and direct the trial court to issue a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order to reflect the correct award.

Holding:

Upon conviction, a criminal defendant is entitled to credit for actual time served. This time includes confinement from the date of arrest to the date when the sentence commences. Generally, a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody. When a defendant is convicted of a violent felony as defined by section 667.5(c), however, work time is accrued at a rate of no more than 15 percent. Any miscalculation of credits results in an unauthorized sentence, and an unauthorized sentence may be corrected upon discovery.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

PEN 4019(a)(1)

PEN 4019(f)

PEN 2933.1(a)

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

Case: 000165

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in reimposing an unenforceable restitution order and in failing to update the defendant’s custody credits. Though the court did not orally reimpose the fine or recalculate credit for time served, the amended abstract of judgment reflects the fine and the credits he received at the defendant’s original sentencing.

First Holding:

The restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4(b) Must be vacated because it is over 10 years old.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. The defendant is entitled to an updated abstract that accurately reflects the amount of custody credits earned.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

Case: 000159

Error and/or relief

The defendant was entitled to conduct credits.

Holding:

The defendant was awarded 175 days credit for presentence custody but no conduct credits. Because he was convicted of a violent felony, section 2933.1 limits the conduct credit to 15% of the number of days in actual custody. He thus was entitled to an award of 26 days conduct credit—i.e., 15 percent of 175.

Authority:

PEN 2933.1

Case: 000146

Error and/or relief

A defendant is entitled to credit for actual time spent in custody before the commencement of a prison sentence, even when the sentence is indeterminate. The court is directed to recalculate the amount of custody credit he should receive.

First Holding:

Section 2900.5 entitles a defendant to credit for actual time spent in custody before the commencement of a prison sentence, even when the sentence is indeterminate.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793

People v. Herrera (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1365

Second Holding:

A sentence for possession of specified weapons while confined in (or being conveyed to or from) any penal institution is to be served consecutively.

Authority:

PEN 4502

Third Holding:

Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Case: 000129

Error and/or relief

The trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court never imposed fines or fees other than restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Board, and must recalculate his actual custody credits.

First Holding:

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that the court waived the imposition of a restitution fine and the parole revocation fine and other fines and fees.  [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority for correction of the abstract of judgment, but the law is clear that it has the authority to do so, and I have listed some authorities below.]

Authority:

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387–388

People v. Gobert (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

As the People did not object in the court below, the People have forfeited the issue of the propriety of the trial court order waiving the restitution and other fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

Third Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing. [GARY NOTE: the court did not cite authority for remanding for the court to determine custody credits, but the law is clear, per the authorities I have set forth below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Case: 000122

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in failing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to twice the principal term for the underlying crime, as opposed to the 25-year-to-life sentence it reimposed. The People concede both of these points. We vacate the defendant’s sentence, and remand for a full resentencing with directions to recalculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

Even where the defendant is serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law, on recall the trial court is required to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act in a section 1172.75 proceeding absent a finding of unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

Second Holding:

When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody (whether in jail or prison) up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Case: 000121

Error and/or relief

The court failed to recalculate the actual time defendant had served pursuant to the sentence for which he was being resentenced and reflect those credits in the amended abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [The trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody]

Second Holding:

Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical error can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Case: 000114

Error and/or relief

We conclude that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the defendant’s presentence custody credits and his sentence on the attempted murder count. We accordingly modify the judgment to correct these sentencing errors and affirm the judgment as modified.

First Holding:

While a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole becomes eligible for parole after serving seven years, the correct sentence to be imposed remains life with the possibility of parole, plus any determinate enhancements. The abstract of judgment, which currently describes the sentence on the attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation as “seven years to life,” must be corrected accordingly. [Gary note: The court did not provide its authority for ordering that the abstract of judgment be corrected, but there are many cases it could have cited. I have listed some below, which were not in the opinion but support the correction.]

Authority:

PEN 3046(a)(1)

PEN 664(a)

People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4 [shorthand pronouncement of seven years to life where statutory term is life with the possibility of parole is incorrect because it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Second Holding:

The trial court miscalculated the credit for time served. The defendant is entitled to three additional days, and the abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly. [GARY NOTE: The court did not provide any authority for this correction, most likely because it is so obvious that it must be corrected. Authorities supporting the court’s order (but not cited by the court) could include those I set forth below, among others.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527

Case: 000106

Error and/or relief

The trial court modified the defendant’s sentence only to the extent required under sections 1172.75 and 1170.18, but otherwise left the balance intact, finding that the defendant remained a danger to the public. The case is remanded for the trial court to calculate the days of actual custody and to correct the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Because the sentence was modified under PC 1172.75, the trial court erred in not calculating the actual days in custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s finding that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(1)

Third Holding:

The clear and convincing evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that it is highly probable the facts which he asserts are true.

Authority:

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998

Fourth Holding:

The narrow definition of danger to public safety under PC 1170.18 does not apply to the undefined term of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. [GARY NOTE: after the opinion in this case 000106 was filed, the Supreme Court ruled in Guevara that it was constitutionally necessary to apply the Three Strikes Reform Act’s understanding of the term “unreasonable risk to public safety” within the meaning of section 1170.126 (enacted by initiative) in order to reconcile the application of section 1172.75 (enacted by the Legislature) to those who would otherwise qualify but are serving a sentence under the Three Strikes Law (an initiative provision).]

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 374, 374-375

[People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838]

Fifth Holding:

The abstract of judgment incorrectly reflects a determinate term of 14 years instead of 10 years, and it must be corrected. [GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority, most likely because the error and solution are obvious. There are many relevant cases supporting this holding, some of which I have set out below.]

Authority:

People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–938

People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

Case: 000105

Error and/or relief

The section 12022.7(a) enhancement, which was stayed at sentencing, must instead be stricken under subdivision (g) of the statute because infliction of great bodily injury is an element of battery with serious bodily injury; and the trial court improperly limited the defendant’s presentence conduct credits to 15 percent of actual days served.

First Holding:

A sentence cannot be enhanced by section 12022.7 for infliction of bodily injury if that is an element of the underlying offense.

Authority:

PEN 12022.7(g)

Second Holding:

Great bodily injury is an element of battery with serious bodily injury.

Authority:

People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375–1376

People v. Otterstein (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1550

People v. Johnson (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 384, 391

People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1616

People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531

People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696–697

Third Holding:

Serious bodily injury is the essential equivalent of great bodily injury.

Authority:

People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831

People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 117 [noting that a true finding on a great bodily injury enhancement would effectively establish the elements of the charged battery with serious bodily injury]

Fourth Holding:

Section 246 is not a violent felony per se so section 2833.1 does not limit behavior credit to 15 percent.

Authority:

In re Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476, 491E

Case: 000096

Error and/or relief

Our review has disclosed the trial court’s failure to award updated custody credits at the resentencing hearing. We will remand the matter solely for this purpose and otherwise affirm.

Holding:

The trial court failed to award updated custody credits at the resentencing hearing. Where there is a modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that time against the subsequent sentence.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Case 000090

Error and/or relief

Remand for resentencing is required because (1) the trial court erred by failing to impose and then stay execution of the sentence on the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and (2) the trial court erred in failing to resentence the defendant to a single aggregate term of imprisonment for this case and another case for which he is serving a term of 24 years. We accept the People’s concession and remand the matter for resentencing.

First Holding:

At sentencing, the trial court did not orally pronounce a sentence for the infliction of great bodily injury enhancement. The matter is accordingly remanded for the trial court to impose and stay execution of the three-year sentence on the Penal Code section 12022.7(a) enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1127-1130

Second Holding:

When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes in different cases and a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed, the aggregate term for those cases is the sum of the principal term and subordinate term. In this instance, the trial court did not impose a single aggregated term. We will therefore remand for the trial court to do so.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

Rules of Court, rule 4.452 [setting forth the procedure for imposing consecutive sentencing under PC 1170.1]

Third Holding:

During resentencing, the trial court shall award the appropriate custody credits for the aggregate term. [Gary note: the court cited no authority on the recalculation of credits, likely because the error is so obvious. But I have listed the statute and a leading case below.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37 [Having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, the court was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time]