Category Archives: Sentencing

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000266

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.75, the trial court struck some of the enhancements, but resentenced him to a life term on the balance under the Three Strikes Law as before. Under subsequently decided case law, the trial court should have considered imposing a sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The matter must be remanded for resentencing. In addition, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to including the correct custody credits.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 provides that once the trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. In so doing, the trial court is directed to follow specific instructions while resentencing. For example, it provides that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. In addition, when resentencing, the court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants. The electorate additionally authorized persons presently serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme by filing a petition for recall of sentence. If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors, section 1170.126 provides that he or she shall be resentenced pursuant to the Reform Act unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms: prospective, by exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 231

Fourth Holding:

In Guevara, the California Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a full resentencing under section 1172.75 also permitted the trial court to consider resentencing in accordance with the Reform Act. It held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 must be construed as incorporating the public safety determination under section 1172.126 as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent felony offenders to obtain the benefit of the Reform Act during resentencing.

The court noted that the voters’ intention in passing the Reform Act, particularly by including the requirement of whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, was to strike a balance between reform and safety, and such an intention would be honored by interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s public safety override. Therefore, if a defendant demonstrates eligibility under the Reform Act at a section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court must first determine whether resentencing the defendant under the revised provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If no such risk is demonstrated, the court shall resentence the defendant pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: Proposition 47 in 2014 included a definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was much more specific and more restrictive on what qualified as such than the undefined same language contained in the Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Because Proposition 36 was an initiative, it cannot be amended by the Legislature except as state in Proposition 36. Section 1172.75’s enactment does not qualify to amend Proposition 36. Therefore, the more restrictive definition in PC 1170.18, enacted by Proposition 47, is not the measure for determining whether relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Instead, the standard arising from Proposition 36 applies. Although not in conjunction with section 1172.75, the Supreme Court has previously determined that the more restrictive definition enacted in Proposition 47 did not change the broader standard enacted by Proposition 36 two years earlier. See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347

Fifth Holding:

At the conclusion of the resentencing proceedings, the trial court indicated that it did not need credits; as a result, the number of credits on the abstract of judgment was left blank with a note indicating that “CDCR to recalculate credits.” When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing, as well as the conduct credits ordered at the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397

Amelioration, Jurisdiction, Sentencing

Case: 000264

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand from a grant of habeas corpus reversing the conviction of attempt murder, it was error for the court to simply strike the punishment attached to that reversed count and fail to conduct a full resentencing. The trial court did not explicitly state it was recalling the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1. However, the court’s actions at the 2023 hearing make clear that it did.

First Holding:

Courts generally lack jurisdiction to modify a defendant’s sentence once execution of the sentence has begun. Section 1172.1 provides an exception to that general rule. It states a trial court may, at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary of the CDCR or the district attorney, recall a defendant’s sentence and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced. When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.1, the trial court must consider postconviction factors and apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PC 1172.1

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344 [Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced]

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 636–637

Second Holding:

After announcing the People were conceding the defendant’s motion for recall and resentencing, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss the gang allegation under section 1385. Assuming the defendant’s judgment of conviction was final at the start of the hearing—as the trial court believed it to be—the court had authority to grant the People’s motion only if it first recalled the defendant’s sentence. In other words, the fact that the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss shows it first recalled the defendant’s sentence under section 1172.1

Authority:

PEN 1170.1

PEN 1385

People v. Barraza (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 114, 121, fn. 8

People v. Kim (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 117, 123

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 666–667 [Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively only to cases that are not yet final]

Third Holding:

By recalling the defendant’s sentence, the trial court effectively vacated the entire judgment, not just the portion related to the gang allegation. Therefore, the court was required to resentence the defendant on each count and enhancement in the same manner as if he had not previously been sentenced. The court also was required to apply changes in the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219 [the recall of appellant’s sentence effectively vacated his original sentence and commitment]

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360 [recall of a defendant’s sentence nullifies the original sentence]

People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163 [once a court has determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the result is vacatur of the original sentence]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [the “full sentencing rule” applies when a court recalls a sentence under former section 1170(d), a predecessor to section 1172.1]

Fourth Holding:

The court dismissed the gang allegation, but it did not orally pronounce a sentence on the murder conviction or the firearm enhancement, even by reference to the original sentence. Nor is there any indication that the court applied the changes to the law since the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement]

People v. Wilshire Ins. Co. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 521, 532 [at sentencing, the court must orally pronounce the term of imprisonment]

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [trial court erred by failing to pronounce sentence on a count before staying its execution]

Fifth Holding:

The defendant did not forfeit his right to a full resentencing by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. Generally, a defendant must raise an issue in the trial court to preserve it on appeal. However, that general rule does not apply to an unauthorized sentence, which a defendant may challenge on appeal despite not objecting below. Here, the trial court recalled the defendant’s sentence, which effectively vacated his entire sentence. However, it never pronounced a new sentence on the murder conviction and firearm enhancement. The court’s failure to do so resulted in an unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219

People v. Crabtree (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1327 [court committed unauthorized sentencing error by failing to pronounce a sentence on a count before ordering it stayed]

Sixth Holding:

Even if the forfeiture rule applied, we would exercise our discretion to consider the issue on the merits in order to forestall an inevitable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate courts have discretion to consider issues not preserved for review]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399–400 [declining to apply forfeiture rule where defendant failed to object to the lack of full resentencing under section 1172.75]

Seventh Holding:

Where, as here, the defendant did not receive a full resentencing to which he was entitled, the proper disposition is to remand for a full resentencing. Accordingly, we remand the case for the trial court to resentence the defendant in accordance with section 1172.1. In doing so, the court must consider postconviction factors and apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. When resentencing the defendant on remand, the court may not reinstate the gang allegation it dismissed under section 1385.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 [remanding case for resentencing where the defendant was entitled to, but did not receive, a full resentencing under section 1172.75]

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1278–1279 [same]

People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228 [when the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing]

Duty of the court, Jury trial, Pleading, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000263

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in not holding a hearing under Marsden when the defendant attempted to have substitute counsel. The trial court erred in imposing the upper term based on its own conclusion that the defendant’s prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. The matter is remanded for the trial court to hold a proper Marsden hearing. If the court grants the motion, the court must appoint new counsel to represent her and conduct a new trial. If the court denies the motion, the court is to reinstate the convictions. The judgment is reversed, and the trial court is directed to give the People an opportunity to prove applicable aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury (or the court, if if the defendant waives her right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances) and to resentence the defendant.

First Holding:

When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. Once the defendant clearly indicates to the trial court a request for the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel, the court must hold a hearing to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the request. A proper and formal’ Marsden motion is not required—the defendant need only clearly indicate to the trial court ‘in some manner’ that he or she is requesting the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 863-864

People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1179

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

Second Holding:

The trial court erred in not holding a Marsden hearing when the defendant said she wanted to fire her court-appointed attorney. While stating a desire to fire one’s court-appointed attorney, without more, may not be sufficient to require a Marsden hearing, the trial court interrupted the defendant after she said “I feel like” and did not allow her to say more. And though the defendant never said she wanted to replace her current attorney with a different court-appointed attorney, that’s because, when the defendant began to explain why she did not want her current attorney to represent her, the court did not give her the chance to state her reasons.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90 [if at any time during criminal proceedings, a defendant requests substitute counsel, the trial court is obligated, pursuant to Marsden, to give the defendant an opportunity to state any grounds for dissatisfaction with the current appointed attorney]

People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346 [refusal by the trial court to afford a defendant an opportunity to set forth the reasons underlying his request for the substitution of appointed counsel constitutes an abuse of discretion]

Third Holding:

The trial court’s concern that the defendant’s request during jury selection was a delay tactic was legitimate, but it did not justify refusing to hold a Marsden hearing that would allow the court to hear her reasons and weigh them against the effects of delaying the trial.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 627, 652 [delay in resolving a Marsden motion is a significant factor that the court is obligated to consider in evaluating the timeliness of the defendant’s request to substitute counsel]

Fourth Holding:

The court also erred in ruling that the defendant’s only choices were to retain an attorney or represent herself. Those were not her only two choices. She also had the right to make a showing under Marsden, if she could, she was entitled to substitute counsel.

Authority:

People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 573 [defendant may request substitute counsel at any time during criminal proceedings]

People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 90 [same]

Fifth Holding:

The standard for prejudice regarding a denied Marsden motion is under Chapman. Under the Chapman harmless error standard, the burden is on the People, not the defendant, to demonstrate that the violation of the defendant’s federal constitutional right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Loya (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 932, 945

People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 601

People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 349

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

The court imposed the upper term based on the court’s finding that the defendant’s prior convictions and adjudications were numerous and of increasing seriousness. The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. the aggravating circumstance the trial court relied on here in imposing the upper term, increasing seriousness of the defendant’s prior convictions, was not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury (or by the court after a jury trial waiver).

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742

Seventh Holding:

Such an error is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.

Here, the court relied on only one aggravating circumstance: prior convictions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness. Determining whether that allegation is true, however, requires a comparison and evaluation of the relationship among a defendant’s prior convictions, and a determination as to their relative seriousness. As a result, it involves something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them. While the evidence may have been sufficient to support a finding of increasing seriousness, a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion based on the totality of the defendant’s criminal conduct and the applicable sentences for those transgressions. Because a rational juror could find the defendant’s convictions were not of increasing seriousness, the error is not harmless under Chapman.

Authority:

AD

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000261

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing under section 1172.75, the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements as to each count. Pursuant to section 1465.9, we vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Section 1385 provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. It requires that a sentencing court give great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. One or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement. The statute provides an exception when the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. “Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

When a trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, it must not exclusively consider whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the public. Although the current dangerousness of the petitioner is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe not necessarily the same as a currently dangerous defendant who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly. A trial court would find the former to pose a greater danger than the latter.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Third Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1036

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentencing enhancements under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. We must not disturb an exercise of discretion on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fifth Holding:

During the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the superior court should not reduce the sentence beyond striking the prior prison term enhancement because the defendant posed a threat to public safety based on the underlying facts of the case. In response, defense counsel urged the court not to focus on his current risk to public safety. She reasoned that the defendant would still have to serve three consecutive life sentences even if the court struck the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

The court’s discussion of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s prior convictions does not suggest a forward-looking inquiry. Instead, the court relied on past conduct to determine the defendant’s present dangerousness. The court applied a legal standard that was not consistent with Gonzalez. The record does not demonstrate that the superior court considered whether the defendant would endanger public safety if the enhancements were stricken and he was still subject to the indeterminate term. We conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider his future dangerousness if the enhancements were stricken within the context of his indeterminate sentence.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Sixth Holding:

The Attorney General argues that we should presume that the superior court correctly applied the law and conducted a forward-thinking inquiry as to the defendant’s dangerousness. But the superior court did not have the benefit of Gonzalez on the date of resentencing. We cannot presume the trial court knew a standard that did not yet exist.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption does not apply when the sentencing law is not yet established]

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092

Abstracts and Minutes, Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Vicarious liability

Case: 000260

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing on his petition filed under section 1172.6 for recall of sentence in light of the changes in homicide law, the trial court denied the defendant’s resentencing petition on the ground the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt he aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The trial court did not conclude that the defendant was the direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor in an express malice murder. The trial court misidentified the relevant life-endangering act and thereby used an incorrect legal standard for determining the defendant’s mens rea for aiding and abetting implied malice murder.

We therefore reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing using the correct life-endangering act and consistent with this opinion. The trial court did not address the defendant’s convictions on counts 2 through 4 for attempted murder. Sentencing relief under section 1172.6 extends to attempted murder. In conducting a new evidentiary hearing following remand, the court shall make findings and rule on the defendant’s resentencing petition on the attempted murder convictions. The amended abstract of judgment indicates that the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. That is incorrect: He was convicted by a jury, not pursuant to a plea agreement. The abstract of judgment must be corrected accordingly.

First Holding:

The trial court denied the defendant’s resentencing petition on the ground the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt he aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The trial court did not conclude that the defendant was the direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor in an express malice murder.

Murder is committed with implied malice when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. A defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder. Notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990

Second Holding:

Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990-991

Third Holding:

A life-endangering act is the act that proximately causes death. To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. Here, the life-endangering act was the shooting by the co-defendant at the vehicle carrying the victim.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713, fn. 27

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 643

Fourth Holding:

Although a homicide might have more than one proximate cause, to suffice for implied malice murder, the perpetrator’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must involve a high degree of probability that it will result in death.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 963

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989

Fifth Holding:

The co-defendant perpetrator’s act of bringing the gun to the anticipated confrontation with the other gang did not in itself give rise to a high probability that death would result. Rather, that act merely created a dangerous situation in which death was possible depending on how circumstances unfolded. Deeming a life-endangering act to be the act of the co-defendant perpetrator bringing the gun to the fight comes precariously close to a natural and probable consequences theory of liability: Bringing the gun to a gang fight becomes life endangering only because a natural and probable consequence of doing so is the gun is fired and someone is killed. [GARY NOTE: Implicit in that example is that the change in the homicide law eliminated the natural and probable consequences rationale as supporting a murder conviction of the non-killer.]

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989

Sixth Holding:

By misidentifying the life-endangering act committed by the perpetrator, the trial court used the incorrect legal standard for determining mens rea for aiding and abetting implied malice murder.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991 [using incorrect life-endangering act constitutes legal error]

Seventh Holding:

We have the ability to order the correction of clerical errors in an abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–187

Pleading, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case: 000259

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for a full resentencing hearing because the trial court unconstitutionally relied upon its own factfinding to impose the upper term on defendant’s conviction, and the error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

On January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170 to provide that the trial court shall, in its discretion impose a sentence not to exceed the middle term except in the following circumstance: The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of’ an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Notwithstanding these provisions, the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 748

Second Holding:

The trial court’s factfinding role as to a defendant’s prior convictions is specifically exempted from the Sixth Amendment jury trial right. However, any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial. For example, a defendant is entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 767

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1084-1085

Third Holding:

A court’s determination that a defendant has suffered prior criminal convictions on separate occasions, that the offenses were close in time, and that they were similar or intertwined in purpose and character runs afoul of constitutional proscriptions and must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082-1083 [Error for court to impose additional time based on its qualitative assessment of the offenses time, location, character, and purpose]

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Fourth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086 [error not harmless where a rational jury could have concluded that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s convictions were of increasing seriousness]

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,742-743, 760-761, 768, 775 [We may find the omission harmless if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the omitted fact was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence]

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000258

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court’s minutes reflect the waiver of fees that the court ordered waived. The abstract of judgment, however, imposes the court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment as financial obligations against defendant. It is clear in this case that the abstract of judgment does not reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment as to the court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment. The abstract of judgment must be corrected accordingly.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Abstracts and Minutes, Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case: 000257

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A jury found the defendant guilty of one count of murder, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The trial court sentenced him on each count of conviction and did not stay the sentence on any count. The court improperly sentenced him on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm when he had only committed a single violation of that crime. The court erred when it sentenced him for being both a felon in possession of a firearm and a felon in possession of ammunition. We vacate defendant’s conviction on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and stay his sentence for being a felon in possession of ammunition. The abstract of judgment incorrectly marks trhe determinate term on count 2 as “M” for middle term rather than “H” to reflect the high term that was actually imposed, and must be corrected.

First Holding:

Possession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing offense. In the case of continuing offenses, only one violation occurs even though the proscribed conduct may extend over an indefinite period. The crime of possession of a firearm by a felon continues for as long as the possession of the firearm continues and is not completed until the possession has ceased. Therefore, where there is no evidence that the defendant relinquished his possession of a firearm, or that his possession was interrupted for a time, he can be convicted of only one count of that offense. The defendant possessed the same firearm on both dates charged in the information. The People did not present any evidence to show that the defendant ceased his possession of that firearm at any time between the murder and the arrest. We therefore vacate defendant’s conviction on count 4.

Authority:

People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365, 366-367

Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 525, fn. 1

People v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2d 103, 112

Second Holding:

Section 654 provides that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. The statute bars multiple punishment for separate offenses arising out of a single occurrence when all of the offenses were incident to one objective. It prohibits punishment for both unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition when the only ammunition at issue was either found inside or fired from the firearm.

Authority:

People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 498

People v. Broadbent (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 917, 922–923

People v. Sok (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88, 100

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 138

Third Holding:

Where multiple punishments have been improperly imposed, the proper procedure is for the reviewing court to modify the sentence to stay imposition of the lesser term. Here, the trial court should have stayed the punishment on count 3, the lesser term. We will therefore modify the judgment to stay the sentence on that count.

Authority:

People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119, 131

People v. Broadbent (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 917, 922–923

People v. Sok (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88, 100

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 138

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment for the determinate term on count 2 be modified to reflect that the defendant was sentenced to the high term (“H”), rather than the mid-term (“M”).

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 187

Sentencing

Case: 000256

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After a jury convicted the defendant of one count of kidnapping to commit a sex offense and five counts of forcible rape, he was sentenced to 25-years-to-life on one of the forcible rape counts, plus concurrent life terms on the remaining counts. The trial court also dismissed all fines and fees, although the abstract of judgment shows imposition of two $200 restitution fines. The sentence on the kidnapping to commit a sex offense count should be stayed because that count and the forcible rape count constituted a single criminal act. The court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that no restitution fines were imposed.

First Holding:

Section 209(d) provides that a person may be charged with a violation of section 209(b) and section 667.61, but that a person may not be punished under section 209(b) and section 667.61 for the same act that constitutes a violation of both section 209(b) and section 667.61.

Authority:

PEN 209(d)

People v. Adams (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 170

Second Holding:

Here, the defendant kidnapped the victim to commit a sex offense, and this act formed the basis for his convictions. Additionally, because the victim was not released until after she was dropped off near her relative’s house, there was only one kidnapping offense. Thus, there was a single common act, and the punishment on count 1 (kidnapping to commit a sex offense) must be stayed.

Authority:

People v. Thomas (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1334 [The forcible detention of a victim is an element of kidnaping and as long as the detention continues, the crime continues]

Third Holding:

At the sentencing hearing the trial court expressly dismissed all fines and fees in the interest of justice. The abstract of judgment, however, reflects the imposition of a restitution fine in the amount of $200 under section 1202.4(b) and a suspended parole revocation restitution fine of $200 under section 1202.45. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. If the clerk includes fines in the court’s minutes or the abstract of judgment that were not part of the oral pronouncement of sentence, those fines must be stricken from the minutes and the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967

Fourth Holding:

Respondent argues the restitution fines are mandatory, and the trial court must impose them unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record. Respondent notes the trial court did not provide any compelling or extraordinary reasons on the record, and the only referenced reason was defendant’s inability to pay, which is not a compelling and extraordinary reason to not impose a restitution fine. Respondent requests we correct the abstract to impose the minimum restitution fines, or remand the matter to the court for the limited purpose of either imposing the fines or stating extraordinary and compelling reasons for not imposing the fines. We decline to do so. Because the district attorney failed to object to the court’s omission of a statement of extraordinary and compelling reasons, the waiver doctrine bars the People from obtaining the relief they seek on appeal. Thus, respondent cannot challenge the court’s failure to impose restitution fines in this appeal.

Authority:

PEN 1204.2

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000255

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in not applying the ameliorative provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.

First Holding:

PEN 1172.75

Authority:

Under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, a defendant with two or more strikes will be sentenced to a doubled term rather than to a life term (that carried a minimum of 25 years or longer, depending on the offense) that was required for a third strike (regardless of the nature of the new felony) under the original Three Strikes law, unless the new offense is a serious felony, as defined. [There are some exceptions to the Reform Act not applicable here, essentially related to large quantities of drugs, sex offenses, use of or armed with firearms or other deadly weapons, or the intent to cause great bodily injury, or if the prior convictions were of the sort enumerated as disqualifying.]

Second Holding:

PEN 1170.12

PEN 667(e)

PEN 1170.126

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Third Holding:

In Guevara, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. It remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court to determine whether sentencing that defendant (Guevara) under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If it so determined, the superior court was to reimpose the indeterminate term. If the superior court did not determine that resentencing Guevara would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and Guevara was otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence him pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: The Guevara court did not limit the determination of public safety risk to the definition subsequently enacted in conjunction with Proposition 47, which did define it in section 1170.18. The standard to be applied was the pre-Proposition 47 definition that had traditionally been applied under the Three Strikes Reform Act. That was necessary for the two sets of provisions to be constitutionally reconciled. This aspect was not mentioned in the unpublished opinion summarized here.]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000254

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment for both the murder and the burglary during which it occurred. In addition, the defendant is entitled to one more day credit for time served.

First Holding:

Section 654 provides in relevant part that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. It bars the imposition of multiple sentences for a single act or omission, even though the act or omission may violate more than one provision of the Penal Code. It has long been interpreted to preclude multiple punishments not only for a single act that violates more than one statute, but for an indivisible course of conduct. If all of the offenses were merely incident to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1413

People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1042–1043

Second Holding:

On appeal, we review factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence test, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People. We review de novo the legal question of whether section 654 applies.

Authority:

People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794

Third Holding:

Burglary consists of entry into a house with the intent to commit a felony. Thus, ordinarily, if the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended felony, section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for both. Here, the record reflects that the intent and objective of both the burglary and the murder were the same, and this was the prosecution’s theory of the case at trial. Accordingly, in light of the evidence introduced at trial, the jury instruction on burglary, and the prosecutor’s argument, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s order to sentence defendant consecutively on these counts. Rather, one of the sentences on counts 1 or 2 should be stayed pursuant to section 654. And, because section 654 provides the court with discretion with regard to which sentence will be stayed, remand is necessary for the court to exercise its discretion in modifying defendant’s sentence.

[GARY NOTE: Don’t ignore the importance of this last statement. While it may be hard to imagine a case in which a judge would sentence on the burglary and stay the sentence for the murder, the judge does have that discretion under section 654. You may have a case where your client may be more sympathetic and the crimes not so divergent in their relative seriousness. It is not inconceivable that you could persuade a judge to impose and execute sentence on the lesser evil committed by your client, staying execution of the sentence on the more serious offense.]

Authority:

People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 [When a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes]

Fourth Holding:

Defendant was entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit because the court failed to include the day of his arrest.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5


People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647


People v. Valdes (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 953, 955 [the day of arrest counts as a custody credit day]

Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000253

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Insufficient evidence supported the defendant’s perjury conviction. We reverse the perjury conviction. His excess presentence custody credits must be applied to reduce his parole period. The record does not permit a determination of the precise number of excess custody credits. Because we are remanding for resentencing, we direct the trial court to calculate and determine the appropriate application of those credits.

First Holding:

A conviction under section 118(a) requires proof that the challenged statement was made under penalty of perjury, and that the sex offender registration form signed by the defendant did not contain such a declaration. Because the statutory element was not established, reversal is required.

Authority:

PEN 118(a)

Second Holding:

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In conducting that review, we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Reversal for insufficient evidence is warranted only where it appears that, under no hypothesis whatsoever, is there sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

Authority:

People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053

People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331

Third Holding:

Section 118(a) provides that a person commits perjury when he or she certifies under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter that he or she knows to be false. Proof that the false statement was made under penalty of perjury is therefore an essential element of the offense. Here, the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) Form 8102S signed by the defendant states: “I certify the information provided is true and accurate. I understand failure to comply with the registration requirements, providing false information on the form, or failing to provide accurate information is punishable as a criminal offense.” The form does not state that the certification is made under penalty of perjury. Because the prosecution failed to establish this essential statutory element, the evidence is insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for perjury under section 118(a). Accordingly, the conviction on that count must be reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Tafoya (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 868, 902

Fourth Holding:

Section 2900.5 requires that all days a defendant spends in custody—including time in jail or a rehabilitation facility—be credited against the defendant’s term of imprisonment, which expressly includes any period of parole prior to discharge. By the time the defendant was sentenced, he had already served enough days in custody to qualify for release on parole.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

In re Ballard (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 647, 650

Fifth Holding:

The parties and trial court disagreed on how to calculate the time expected to complete a 16-month term against which the known number of days in custody would apply, but approaches proposed are flawed. Section 7(b)(13) defines a “month” as a “calendar month.” A calendar month is not a fixed number of days, but rather the space of time from any day of any such month to the corresponding day of the next, and may therefore vary in length. Consequently, a sentence expressed in months cannot be converted into a predetermined number of days by multiplying months by 30, nor by fractionalizing a year into parts. Instead, the proper calculation depends on the defendant’s actual dates of incarceration and release. Because the record does not disclose the precise date of the defendant’s incarceration, we cannot determine the exact number of days constituting his 16-month term. Accordingly, this issue must be remanded for the trial court to calculate his sentence based on his actual custodial dates and to apply any excess custody credits to reduce his parole period as required by section 2900.5

Authority:

PEN 7(b)(13)

In re Kemper (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 434, 439, fn. 2

People v. Superior Court (J.C. Penney Corp., Inc.) (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 376, 414, fn. 23 [a three-month statutory period may range from 89 to 92 days depending on the specific dates involved]