Category Archives: Sentencing

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000227

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court erred in its calculation of his custody credits. The court awarded custody credit of 461 days, the amount of custody credit listed on the defendant’s original abstract of judgment from 2012. The matter is remanded to the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s custody credits; the court shall amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served. As stated in section 2900.5, it is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to that section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in section 1213.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 396 [resentencing courts must recalculate actual time served]

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case: 000223

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Sentences for eight of his convictions, which the defendant served concurrently with his completed determinate term, should have been stayed under section 654. The court found the balance of the issues forfeited for lack of objection at the trial level.

First Holding:

A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices if the party did not object to the sentence at trial. The rule applies to cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 751

Second Holding:

In contrast to errors in exercising sentencing discretion, the waiver doctrine does not apply to questions involving the applicability of section 654. Errors in the applicability of section 654 are corrected on appeal regardless of whether the point was raised by objection in the trial court or assigned as error on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549, fn. 3

Third Holding:

In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions of any number of the offenses charged. Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction. Section 654 is its counterpart concerning punishment. It prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission. When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. Imposition of concurrent sentences is not the correct method of implementing section 654, because a concurrent sentence is still punishment.

Authority:

PEN 654

PEN 954

People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226–1227

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000222

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On appeal from resentencing under section 1172.75, the sole contention is that the trial court omitted updating his abstract of judgment with credit for time served as of the date he was resentenced. The case is remanded for the necessary credits correction and amendment of the abstract of judgment to reflect those credits.

Holding:

Absent a new sentence, the court left in place its 2023 amended abstract of judgment, with the same actual-days credit calculation as had been entered at defendant’s original 2015 sentencing. That calculation must be updated.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 40

Abstracts and Minutes, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000220

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant must be resentenced in light of enhancement-related errors and that the minute order from the bench trial on the defendant’s prior convictions requires correction. Therefore, we remand for resentencing and direct the minute order to be corrected.

First Holding:

Several of the errors raised involve the trial court’s exercise of discretion and were forfeited by the defendant’s failure to object below. Nonetheless, we have doubts about whether the trial court in fact exercised its discretion in failing to impose certain enhancements and making other sentencing choices, especially given discrepancies between the court’s tentative sentences and its final sentences. There also appears to be at least one error resulting in an unauthorized sentence that the parties do not raise. Under these circumstances, we find it appropriate to remand for both defendants to be fully resentenced so that the court can ensure the sentences reflect its intent in accordance with the law.

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130

Second Holding:

Weapon enhancements must be either imposed consecutively or stricken. Such an enhancement cannot be imposed concurrently.

Authority:

PEN 1385

PEN 12022

Third Holding:

Unless stricken, prior-serious-felony and prior-prison-term enhancements are added once to each count on which an indeterminate term is imposed and once for the combined counts on which an aggregate determinate term has been imposed.

Authority:

People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1141

People v. Minifie (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1256, 1260

Fourth Holding:

A sentencing court may not impose terms for both a prior-serious-felony enhancement and a prior-prison-term enhancement that are based on the same underlying conviction.

Authority:

People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 612

Fifth Holding:

If a prior-conviction enhancement or punishment for it is stricken in the interest of justice, the enhancement should not also be imposed and stayed under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1008–1009

Sixth Holding:

The trial court should ensure that it sufficiently explains its discretionary sentencing choices on the record.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.406

Seventh Holding:

There were several errors in the minute order that must be corrected.

[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its directive that the abstract be corrected, but the law is very clear that it has that authority. I have cited some cases that the court could have relied on.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Sentencing

Case: 000218

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

There was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant’s prior strikes were based on separate criminal acts, and we remand for resentencing on that basis.

First Holding:

If two strike offenses are based on a single act, the court must dismiss one of the strikes. Prior convictions for multiple criminal acts committed in a single course of conduct may be treated as separate strikes, so long as the convictions are not so closely connected that treating them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Because we conclude that the record does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s state robbery and federal bank robbery convictions were based on separate criminal acts, the matter must be remanded for retrial on the priors and full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638

People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [When part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.]

Second Holding:

At the retrial, the People may produce evidence to prove that the second and third prior strike allegations were based on separate criminal acts than the fourth prior strike allegation.

Authority:

People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234 [Retrial of prior conviction findings is not barred by the state or federal prohibitions on double jeopardy even when a prior conviction finding is reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence]

Sentencing

Case: 000216

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 50 years to life for the murders, plus a determinate sentence of 23 years, 4 months, which included a one-year term for burglary and a 16-month term for attempted robbery. The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654. The judgment is modified to stay the terms imposed for burglary and attempted robbery.

Holding:

The terms for the burglary and attempted robbery should have been stayed under section 654, which prohibits punishment for two crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct. This means that if all of the crimes were merely incidental to or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating a single objective, the defendant may receive only one punishment.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000214

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After the defendant was convicted, but before the judgment became final, AB 333 was enacted, and its application in defendant’s case. We vacate the gang enhancement allegation findings under section 186.22(b), and remand the matter to the trial court to permit the People to elect to retry the gang enhancements or, if the People do not so elect, for the trial court to proceed with resentencing petitioner in conformance with this opinion.

Holding:

AB 333 made substantial changes to the elements of criminal gang activity. These changes apply retroactively to all cases not yet final on the effective date of AB 333, January 1, 2022. A defendant is entitled to relief under AB 333 if an appellate court affirmed the judgment, but sentencing issues were pending upon remand as of its effective date.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

Elements of crime, Sentencing

Case: 000213

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court sentenced the defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the crime of attempted murder with premeditation. The correct sentence for that offense requires the defendant to serve only seven years before parole eligibility. The sentence imposed on count 2 for attempted murder is reversed and the matter is remanded for resentencing only.

First Holding:

When the punishment for attempted murder is a life term, the defendant must be confined for at least seven years before parole eligibility.

[GARY NOTE: The opinion does not specify why attempted murder in this case carries a sentence of life. The crime is described in the opinion simply as attempted murder. However, the normal sentence for attempted murder is a determinate term of five, seven, or nine years, unless it is pleaded and proved that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, per Penal Code section 664(a). Given that the trial court imposed an indeterminate term, I must assume that the attempted murder qualified for a life sentence, in which case section 3046 requires a minimum of seven years, not fifteen years, before parole eligibility.]

Authority:

PEN 3046(a)(1)

Second Holding:

We review the length of the defendant’s attempted murder sentence de novo, as it involves an issue of statutory construction.

Authority:

People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000210

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for full resentencing. The trial court abused its discretion when declining to fully strike the firearm enhancement or strike it and impose a lesser firearm enhancement. The trial court errantly focused only on the defendant’s past and present danger to public safety, and not whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety in the future. The trial court erred in deciding whether striking the enhancement would endanger public safety because, as the record of the sentencing hearing indicates, it focused solely on defendant’s past conduct and the circumstances of the murder. In the context of section 1385, the key question is forward looking—whether striking the enhancement would likely endanger public safety. Thus, even if the trial court struck the enhancement, the defendant would still be serving an indeterminate 15-to-life term with parole eligibility subject to the Parole Board and Governor’s review. The trial court must consider this future-looking issue for purposes of public safety.

First Holding:

A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to have abused it.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694 [reminding that a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion]

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022,Penal Code section 1385 was amended to specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. It reads, in part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so …. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” Subparagraphs (A) to (I) list nine distinct mitigating circumstances, including, as is relevant here, subparagraph (C) where the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. Subparagraph (C) states in this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674

Third Holding:

Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. For a defendant facing a lengthy indeterminate sentence, the inquiry should also take into account that the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time. This future review will act as a safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger public safety.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

 

Sentencing

Case: 000209

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in recalculating the defendant’s custody credits. It stated that he spent four days in custody and earned two days of conduct credit. The court, however, awarded only four days. The matter is remanded for recalculation of presentence custody credits. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Holding:

Under section 4019(e), a defendant begins to earn conduct credits after being committed for a period of four days or longer. Here, the defendant was in custody for four days and was therefore entitled to two days of conduct credit.

Authority:

PEN 4019

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000208

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court resentenced defendant the defendant pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. The court failed to award credit for the time the defendant served in custody. The court imposed repealed fees. The resentencing minute order should be clarified to reflect the proper order in which the defendant must serve the terms comprising his sentence. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to recalculate defendant’s custody credits and to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and minute order as indicated in this opinion and forward a certified copy of the corrected abstract and minute order to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

First Holding:

Were a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts. This means a court resentencing a defendant must credit the defendant with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time. The updated total of credits must then be added to the abstract of judgment.

Authority:

PC 2900.1

PC 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1129-1130

Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group Aug. 2025 update) secs. 15:15, 15:20, 15:24, 26:6

Second Holding:

The trial court was not authorized to impose fees under former Government Code section 29550.2. (Former Gov. Code, sec. 29550.2.) The Legislature repealed that statute effective July 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, sec. 25.) Even if Government Code section 29550.2 were still in effect, the Legislature has declared such fees unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. (Gov. Code, sec. 6111(a).) Accordingly, we vacate the main jail booking fee and the main jail classification fee imposed by the trial court.

Authority:

GOV 6111(a)

Third Holding:

Whenever a person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of imprisonment shall be served first. The minute order for the resentencing hearing states that the determinate is to be served consecutive to the indeterminate sentence. The minute order must be corrected.

[Gary note: The court did not cite any authority for its order to correct the minute order. But there is much authority allowing a court to correct errors in abstracts of judgments and minute orders. I have set forth a few below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2