Category Archives: Elements of crime

Case 000679

Error and/or relief

Count ten as pled created a legal impossibility requiring reversal of the trial court’s acceptance of defendant’s plea agreement.

First Holding:

A claim not presented in the opening brief and was first raised in the appellant’s reply brief is deemed waived.

Authority:

People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9

Second Holding:

Generally, a guilty or no contest plea precludes appellate consideration of issues related to guilt or innocence, including the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Nonetheless, a defendant may still assert that his, her, or their admission included a legal impossibility.

Authority:

People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 114

People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1365

Third Holding:

The term ‘legal impossibility,’ as applied to a choate [sic] crime, is merely a catch phrase for saying that, as a matter of law, the statute under which the defendant is charged does not prohibit his, her, or their conduct. Put another way, legal impossibility exists when the facts as admitted cannot constitute the crime pled to, such as where the victim’s characteristics fall outside of the statutory definition.

Authority:

People v. Jerome (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094, 1099 [setting aside plea to oral copulation of a minor under 14 where the victim was 15]

People v. Richardson (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 360, 371-375 [setting aside no contest plea to human trafficking of a minor where victim was not a minor]

People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781 [a death certificate is not an instrument within the meaning of section 115, so it was legally impossible for the defendant to be guilty of section 115 for attempting to forge a death certificate]

Fourth Holding:

We conclude that because section 134 [essentially, falsifying a document for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose] is not one of the specifically enumerated offenses in section 653f(a) [solicitation of another to commit specified crimes] and given that the elements of a section 134 offense do not necessarily establish one of the specifically enumerated offenses, defendant’s plea to violating section 653f(a) by committing a violation of section 134 has resulted in a legal impossibility requiring reversal.

Authority:

People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 784, 786

Case 000671

Error and/or relief

The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for sexual penetration by force upon a child.

First Holding:

To evaluate the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, and then determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  

We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.

But we cannot, however, venture beyond the evidence presented at trial, and may consider only those inferences that are reasonably supported by the record. A reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. It must logically flow from other facts established in the action, and it cannot be based entirely on the suspicions of the officers involved in the case and the conjecture of the prosecution.

Authority:

People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167–168

Second Holding:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether retrial is permissible for purposes of double jeopardy, we must consider all of the evidence presented at trial, including evidence that should not have been admitted. Because the record contains no evidence that could support a reasonable inference that the defendant sexually penetrated the victim with a foreign object, insufficient evidence supports a verdict of guilt on that count. Double jeopardy bars retrial on that count.

Authority:

People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296

Lockhart v. Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 39

Third Holding:

When a trial or appellate court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction of a greater offense, it can reduce the conviction to a lesser included offense that is supported by the evidence.

Authority:

PEN 1181(6)

PEN 1260

People v. Goolsby (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1225

People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 677

Case 000663

Error and/or relief

Substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction for exhibiting harmful matter to a minor.

First Holding:

The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well established. In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. A reversal for insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Authority:

People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639

People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357

Second Holding:

Under section 288.2(c), “harmful matter” is defined in section 313. Section 313(a) states that harmful matter means matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

This definition is virtually identical to the constitutional standard of obscenity set forth in Miller. We conclude the record does not contain evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the video the defendant showed them minor was harmful matter within the meaning of section 288.2(a)(2) and section 313. Therefore, substantial evidence does not support the defendant’s conviction, and we will reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

Authority:

Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24

People v. Dyke (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1383

Third Holding:

Nudity or depictions of sexual intercourse or other sexual activity do not, by themselves, make a movie obscene.

Authority:

People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1291

Fourth Holding:

The defendant may not be retried on this count.

Authority:

United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131

Case 000654

Error and/or relief

The court imposed the wrong sentence for the consecutive term.

First Holding:

In one count, the defendant was convicted of second degree robbery (sec. 211). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggravated term of five years, which was ordered to be served consecutively at a subordinate term of one year four months. Because the robbery was a second degree felony, the middle term is three years in prison. As such, the consecutive subordinate term must be one-third the middle term, or one year. Thus, the sentence on that count must be reduced from 16 months to one year. We may correct this unauthorized sentence on appeal without remanding for a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1170.1(a)

PEN 1260

People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 171–172

Second Holding:

The defendant argues that he should have been charged with only one count of attempting to dissuade a witness rather than the 10 charged and found true. The ten calls all occurred on the same day over a span of six hours. The issue is whether appellant may be lawfully subject to multiple convictions. We review this claim de novo.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Duffy (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 257, 261

Third Holding:

Section 954 defines what charges can be joined in one action. This statute does not permit multiple convictions for the same offense based on the same act or course of conduct. However, section 954 authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct offenses. As a result, a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, such as grand theft, based on separate and distinct criminal acts, even if the acts were all part of a single overarching scheme.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650

People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 74

Fourth Holding:

Determining whether a defendant has committed one or more criminal acts requires identifying what the Legislature intended to punish as a single offense under the relevant statute. Courts refer to this inquiry as determining the statute’s unit of prosecution. Courts should look to the characteristics of the crime, including both (1) the factual circumstances of the defendant’s criminal conduct and (2) the elements of the crime as defined by the Legislature in the relevant statute.

Authority:

Moore v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 441, 461

People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 199-200

People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 744 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.)

Fifth Holding:

Section 136.1(a)(2) makes it a crime to knowingly and maliciously attempt to prevent or dissuade a witness from attending or giving testimony at a trial, proceeding or inquiry authorized by law. In relevant part, malice is defined under this statute as an intent to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of justice. This crime is completed upon any attempt.

Authority:

PEN 136.1

People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1519

Sixth Holding:

A trial court’s decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A defendant bears the burden to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. In the absence of such a showing, a reviewing court presumes the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on appeal. Moreover, a decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. Instead, the decision must be so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.

Authority:

PEN 669(a)

People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 71–72

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377

Seventh Holding:

Once a trial court lawfully decides to impose consecutive sentences on convictions for violating section 136.1, section 1170.15 applies. If a person is convicted of a felony, and of an additional felony that is a violation of section 136.1 or 137 and that was committed against the victim of, or a witness or potential witness with respect to, or a person who was about to give material information pertaining to, the first felony the Penal Code provides that those subordinate terms shall consist of the full middle term.

Authority:

PEN 1170.15

Eighth Holding:

In relevant part, the rule against the dual use of facts prohibits a trial court from relying on the same fact “to impose both the upper term and a consecutive sentence. Only a single factor in aggravation is needed to support imposition of an upper term. Likewise, only one relevant and sustainable fact may explain a series of consecutive sentences. We presume the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350, fn. 12

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377

Ninth Holding:

There is a developing split of authority regarding application of the forfeiture doctrine regarding the low term presumption under section 1170(b)(6). We need not decide that issue. Although the court did not specifically mention subdivision (b)(6), we presume it knew of that provision.

Authority:

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1039, 1044 [forfeiture doctrine applied when defendant failed to raise in the trial court the presumption in favor of a lower term]

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994, fn. 8 [sec. 1170 mandates application of the lower term presumption and is not subject to forfeiture]People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 874, 905

Tenth Holding:

Under the cumulative error doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have cumulative prejudice. A claim of cumulative error is essentially a due process challenge. The issue is whether the defendant received a fair trial. Here, appellant’s claim of cumulative prejudice is without merit because we have rejected the individual claims. After reviewing the entire record, we are confident that appellant received due process throughout the entire proceeding, including sentencing.

Authority:

In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32

People v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436

People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009 [a defendant is “entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one”]

Case 000624

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding unlawful detention or unlawful arrest. The judgment is reversed. Because there was sufficient evidence that a properly instructed jury could have returned the same verdict, double jeopardy principles do not apply and the matter may be retried.

First Holding:

All criminal defendants have the right to a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the charged offense.

A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the law.

Similarly, if the trial court decides to provide supplemental instruction to the jury during deliberation, we review de novo the legal accuracy of any supplemental instructions provided.

Authority:

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824

People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579

People v. Parker (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271

Second Holding:

Section 69 provides that every person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law is punishable by a fine or by imprisonment. Similarly, section 148(a)(1) prohibits resisting an officer in the performance of duty, though the resistance need not be forceful or violent.

Authority:

PEN 69

PEN 148

People v. Hupp (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 946, 950

In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 22

Third Holding:

The lawfulness of an officer’s conduct is an essential element of both offenses because there is no distinction between performing a duty and lawfully performing a duty, since an officer who is acting unlawfully cannot be said to be performing his or her duty. And the prosecution has the burden of proving the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the lawfulness of the officers’ conduct is an essential element upon which the trial court had a sua sponte duty to properly instruct the jury.

Authority:

In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 25

People v. Southard (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 424, 435

Fourth Holding:

To convict defendant of a violation of section 69 or 148, the prosecution was required to prove, and the jury was required to find, that officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties. The pattern jury instructions include definitions for various scenarios in which an officer can be considered engaged in a lawful performance of duty, including during a detention, an arrest without a warrant, and an arrest for a misdemeanor offense. (CALCRIM 2670.)

However, the trial court did not give any of these definitions to the jury. Nor did the trial court offer its own definition for the jury to consider. In essence, the trial court instructed the jury that it was required to find that the officers were engaged in a lawful performance of duty but provided no definitions or guidance to the jury regarding how to make this finding. This was clearly error.

Authority:

People v. Serrano (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 902, 913 [Where a term or phrase has a special definition for purposes of a statute, the failure to define it for the jury is error.]

People v. Reyes (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1598, 1601 [Failure to define terms essential to an element of an offense is “equivalent to the omission of an element from the definition of the crime given to the jury.]

Fifth Holding:

The question of reasonable or probable cause is ordinarily one for the court and, where there are disputed facts to be resolved by a jury, the jury is to be told that if it finds the facts in a designated way such facts do or do not amount to probable cause.

Authority:

Roberts v. City of Los Angeles (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 625, 629-630

Sixth Holding:

Whether an offense has been committed in an officer’s presence is determined by whether the officer could testify to actual knowledge to every element of the offense.

Authority:

People v. Garrison (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 549, 557

In re Alonzo C. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 707, 714

People v. Welsch (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1044

Seventh Holding:

When the jury is misinstructed on an element of the offense reversal is required unless we are able to conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In such cases, a reviewing court must determine whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict absent the error. Here, we cannot say with any confidence that the jury would have reached the same verdict had it been properly instructed in this case.

Authority:

People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348

People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831

Eighth Holding:

It has long been settled that the Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition against successive prosecutions does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction. However, a settled exception to this rule permitting retrial after a successful appeal occurs when a conviction has been reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence.

Thus, even where reversal is required based on instructional error, an appellant’s arguments regarding insufficiency of the evidence should be considered to determine whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy principles. The inquiry at this stage is to determine whether, if properly instructed, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 852-853

People v. Wetle (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 375, 388

People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 608-609;

In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1224 [Where instructional error occurs, retrial is barred if defendant can show there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction even when the law is properly construed.]

Ninth Holding:

While an offense may be considered a “wobbler” punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony, its status as a wobbler has no bearing on the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. This is because the commission of a wobbler is a felony at the time it is committed and remains deemed a felony unless charged as a misdemeanor by the People or reduced to a misdemeanor by the sentencing court.

Authority:

People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 857-858

People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685