Error and/or relief
A sentence of more than 72 years to life plus two life terms imposed in 1995 on a 16-year-old minor is the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for resentencing under section 1170(d)(1).
If the court resentences, the court must then consider whether to transfer the case back to juvenile court for a transfer hearing to determine whether the matter should be retained under juvenile court jurisdiction or transferred back to adult court, applying Proposition 57.
First Holding:
Section 1170(d)(1) allows juvenile offenders to petition for recall and resentencing after 15 years of incarceration if they were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
Authority:
PEN 1170(d)(1)
Second Holding:
A sentence of 72 years eight months to life, plus two life sentences is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence, and therefore, the defendant is eligible for resentencing under equal protection principles. As the two life sentences carry a minimum of seven years on each, the effective sentence in this matter is more than 86 years to life. Under that sentence, the defendant would not be released before he reached 102 years of age.
Authority:
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435
People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1056
People v. Mendez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 47, 50, 68 [sentence of 84 years to life was the equivalent of LWOP and constituted cruel and unusual punishment]
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 273 [under sec. 3046, where two indeterminate sentences run consecutively, a defendant must serve the full minimum term of each before becoming eligible for parole]
Third Holding:
A petition under section 1170(d)(1) must include a statement describing the defendant’s remorse, work toward rehabilitation, and a statement that one of four qualifying circumstances is true.
The four qualifying circumstances under section 1170(d)(2), are:
(A) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law.
(B) The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall.
(C) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant.
(D) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse.
Authority:
PEN 1170(d)(2)
Fourth Holding:
Recall and resentencing entitles eligible defendants to the benefits of retroactive ameliorative changes to the law, such as Proposition 57, which eliminated the prosecution’s right to file charges for eligible crimes against a minor directly in adult court without a fitness or transfer hearing.
Authority:
People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 449
People v. Montes (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 48-49 [ordering superior court to transfer case to juvenile court to hold hearing under Prop. 57 where court had recalled LWOP sentence under sec. 1170(d)(1) for a defendant who had committed crimes when he was 17 years old]
People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 304, 309 [Proposition 57 constituted an ameliorative change to the criminal law, and therefore, it applies retroactively to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.]
People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161-162 [once a superior court recalls a sentence, it becomes nonfinal, and Proposition 57 applies retroactively]
People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 971, 996 [because sentence was vacated under (what is now section 1172.6), defendant’s sentence became nonfinal for purposes of Proposition 57]
Fifth Holding:
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit a homicide.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. In sentencing a juvenile homicide offender the trial court must have the ability to impose a sentence less than LWOP after taking into account youth-related factors and whether the offender may be rehabilitated.
Tha California Supreme Court in Caballero applied the holding in Graham to a 110 years-to-life sentence, describing the sentence as a term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence.
Authority:
Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 82
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 477
People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 265, 267-268
Sixth Holding:
In Contreras, the California Supreme Court considered whether a lengthy term-of-years sentence, though not clearly exceeding a juvenile offender’s natural lifespan, may nonetheless impinge on the same substantive concerns that make the imposition of LWOP on juvenile nonhomicide offenders impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.
The Contreras court concluded that sentences of 50 years or more to life for juvenile nonhomicide offenders were the functional equivalent of LWOP sentences for purposes of the Eighth Amendment because, as contemplated by Graham:
(1) confinement with no possibility of release until age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely to allow for reintegration into society;
(2) a juvenile offender who has no chance to leave prison for 50 years has little incentive to become a responsible individual;
(3) a 50-years-to-life sentence, though less harsh than LWOP, is still an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile, who will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender;
(4) Graham’s observation that juveniles have limited ability to consider consequences when making decisions applies to a sentence of 50 years to life just as it does to a sentence of LWOP; and
(5) a judgment that a juvenile offender will be incorrigible for the next 50 years is no less questionable than a judgment that the juvenile offender will be incorrigible forever.
Authority:
People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 356, 364
Seventh Holding:
By leaving section 1170(d)(1) in place after enacting section 3051 (which sets up a scheme of parole eligibility consideration for juvenile and young offenders), the Legislature has signaled its preference for section 1170(d)(1) to persist rather than to be stricken, thereby ensuring section 1170(d)(1) provides relief in addition to the relief provided by section 3051.
Authority:
People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1063