Case 000587

Error and/or relief

On appeal from a hearing under section 1172.75, the appellate court struck the balance of the restitution fine as it was ordered more than 10 years prior to the resentencing.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended and now provides that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

Second Holding:

Respondent asserts the trial court did not impose the restitution fine nor parole revocation fine at the time of resentencing and therefore it must be stricken for that reason. Generally, respondent is correct.

Authority:

People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 303

People v. Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027 [striking a restitution fine from the record and the abstract of judgment where the court failed to orally impose the fine during the sentencing hearing]

People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [resentencing necessarily requires a court to impose a new sentence, including any fines, fees, and assessments]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [the oral pronouncement of judgment controls]

Third Holding:

In this instance, however, the trial court merely reaffirmed the original judgment with the exception of striking the now-invalid prior prison term enhancement. The judgment following the resentencing is not yet final, we conclude appellant is entitled to have the restitution fine stricken. As appellant’s restitution fine was first imposed more than 10 years ago, it is now unenforceable and uncollectible under section 1465.9(d).

Authority:

PEN 1465.9(d)

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 601, review granted on another issue Mar. 11, 2026, S295038

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745 [absent evidence to the contrary, we presume ameliorative criminal statutes apply retroactively to all nonfinal judgments]

Fourth Holding:

Section 1465.9(d) does not apply to the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. In Kopp, the court vacated any unpaid portion of the defendant’s restitution fine under section 1465.9(d), but nonetheless remanded the matter because a parole revocation fine is still required and was to be set in the same amount as the restitution fine would have been had the court properly considered the defendant’s ability to pay and stayed.

Further, section 1465.9 makes no mention of the parole revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45. We are not to insert a term that was not included in a statute or omit a term that has been included. Although a parole revocation fine is closely related to a restitution fine in that they must be imposed at the same time and in the same amounts, a parole revocation fine serves a different purpose, i.e., to deter a prisoner from violating parole, to incentivize a prisoner’s rehabilitation while on parole, and to recoup costs if parole is violated. That purpose is still relevant where, as here, an inmate might one day be paroled. No principle or authority supports vacating the parole revocation fine.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 12, 24, 30

People v. Massicot (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 920, 925

People v. Preston (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 415, 427, 429

Fifth Holding:

It was unnecessary for the trial court to recalculate the defendant’s credit for time served. The sentence from which this appeal was taken has not yet begun to be served, because it was ordered to run consecutive to the one he is currently serving from another county. Under other circumstances, a court may be required to calculate custody credits on a sentence imposed by another county. The present case presents does not present such a circumstance.

Authority:

People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1126 [in a determinate sentence case, sentencing court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence replaced another county’s sentence; the second county became the sentencing court]