Error and/or relief
The trial court improperly denied the defendant’s request for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 by applying the wrong standard in determining that he did not satisfy the statute’s public safety requirement. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court.
First Holding:
A trial court may grant a defendant pretrial mental health diversion if the defendant has a qualifying mental health disorder. The court has discretion to grant pretrial diversion if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in the statute and the court finds that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under the factors set forth in the statute. A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder; and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36
People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626–627
Second Holding:
For any defendant who satisfies the eligibility requirements, the court must then find the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if all the following criteria are met: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(c)
Third Holding:
Section 1170.18, in turn, defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). Thus, a trial court must determine whether the defendant is likely to commit an offense known colloquially as a “super strike.” Qualifying super strikes include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment.
Authority:
PEN 1170.18(c)
PEN 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149, 1150-1151
People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 851, fn. 11
Fourth Holding:
Mental health diversion is discretionary, not mandatory, even if all the requirements are met. But this residual discretion must be exercised consistently with the principles and purpose of the law, which includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(a)
PEN 1001.35
People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892–893
Fifth Holding:
We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
Authority:
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449
Sixth Holding:
The trial court’s comments, coupled with the fact the court did not expressly find a likelihood that the defendant would commit a super strike, suggest the court was expanding the meaning of “public safety” in section 1001.36 beyond the likelihood that the defendant will commit a limited subset of violent felonies. This was improper.
Authority:
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896–897 [trial courts cannot create an alternative meaning of ‘public safety’ inconsistent with sec. 1001.36(c)(4)]
Seventh Holding:
We do not find the Watson standard of prejudice applicable here. Under the Watson test, an error is harmless unless it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error. The Watson standard is appropriate in circumstances where the trial court understood the nature of its discretion but, for example, relied on an improper factor in exercising that discretion or failed to state its reasoning. It does not apply where the court was unaware of the extent of its lawful authority in a particular context, because determining what choice the trial court is likely to make in the first instance is far more speculative.
Because the record suggests the trial court did not understand that its discretion in deciding the defendant’s motion was constrained by section 1001.36’s narrow definition of public safety, we cannot be confident that the court was aware of the scope of its discretion under section 1001.36. Defendants are entitled to decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion” of the court. A court that is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers cannot exercise that informed discretion. The appropriate remedy in such circumstances is to remand unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. The Watson standard is thus inapplicable.
Authority:
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426
In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 716
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
People v. Doron (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1, 9–10 [concluding remand was required under Gutierrez where trial court did not apply correct standard in denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion]
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 774 [Gutierrez standard applied where trial court was unaware that its discretion to select a prison sentence was constrained by a presumption against the upper term]