Error and/or relief
The motion to suppress evidence under should have been granted. The juvenile court’s denial of the minor’s motion to suppress is reversed. His admission to the offense is vacated. The juvenile court is directed to enter an order granting the minor’s motion to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle, and we remand the matter for further proceedings.
[GARY NOTE: This was a very fact-intensive ruling on who knew what what and why. Essentially, an officer followed the minor’s vehicle after noticing the registration tag had expired. Through a series of events, the minor left his vehicle legally parked on the street, walked a few blocks away, was found by the officer, was asked questions that he answered truthfully, and in response to a request for the detaining officer, other officers searched the locked car that was a few blocks away (ostensibly to look for registration and identification–after identification had been already been confirmed), revealing contraband.]
First Holding:
In ruling upon a motion to suppress, the trial court judges the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws factual inferences. The appellate court will uphold the court’s express and/or implied findings on such matters if they are supported by substantial evidence, but it independently review the application of the relevant law to the facts.
Authority:
People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761
Second Holding:
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside. Probable cause means that, under the known facts and circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside the vehicle.
Authority:
People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 359, 372
Ornelas v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696
Third Holding:
The accepted practice of modern law enforcement is that an officer often conducts searches at the direction of another law enforcement officer even though the searching officer himself lacks actual, personal knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. When that occurs, the collective knowledge doctrine applies and the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all. The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern police work, the searching officer cannot always be aware of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to search is based on facts known only to his superior or associates. The focus is on knowledge of the person who was the source of the information the searching officers relied on.
Authority:
U.S. v. Jensen (2005 9th Cir.) 425 F.3d 698, 704
Fourth Holding:
Once the officer confirmed the identity of the minor, there was no cause to believe the minor was lying and therefore no probably cause to search. Because officers should not have been inside the vehicle to see the firearm magazine, they could not rely on the magazine to supply probable cause for continuing to search the vehicle.
Authority:
United States v. Ngumezi (2020 9th Cir.) 980 F.3d 1285, 1290 [Because the opening of the car door and leaning into the car constituted an unlawful search, we must consider what remedy is appropriate. The exclusionary rule generally applied in Fourth Amendment cases requires courts to suppress any evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, as well as evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree]
Fifth Holding:
Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, and, to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the place where he is arrested. The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things that might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.
But these justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. When the officer searched the vehicle, the minor was over a block away from the vehicle, in handcuffs. Additionally, the minor had locked the vehicle, and one officer had taken the key away from the minor. Given the foregoing facts, the vehicle was not under the minor’s control at the time of his arrest. Therefore, there was no basis to search the vehicle incident to minor’s arrest.
Authority:
Preston v. U.S. (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367
Sixth Holding:
When examining the propriety of an inventory search, we focus on the purpose of the impound rather than the purpose of the inventory. An inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable. Under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. Once a vehicle has been legally impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search, as long as it conforms to the standard procedures of the local police department. However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.
Authority:
People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 786-787
U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141
Seventh Holding:
The reasonableness of the impoundment depended on whether the impoundment fits within the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience. In other words, a valid caretaking purpose is required. The minor left the vehicle locked and parallel parked on a quiet residential street where other vehicles were parked. The vehicle was not blocking a driveway or impeding traffic. The People failed to introduce evidence as to why the vehicle could not remain parked on the street until retrieved by Mother.
A vehicle with a registration that has been expired for less than six months can remain parked on a public street. The People failed to introduce evidence of when the vehicle’s registration expired. Thus, the People did not demonstrate that the vehicle could be seized due to the registration being expired for more than six months. Given the evidence, there was no reason the police could not have locked the vehicle and left it parked on the street. There is no evidence of a community caretaking function to impounding the vehicle.
Authority:
VEH 22651(o)(1)(A)(i)
U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1141
Eighth Holding:
We are not examining whether the seizure of the vehicle was authorized by state law. Rather, we are examining whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The statutory authorization to impound a vehicle does not, in and of itself, determine the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure. It is evidence of a community caretaking need to impound the vehicle that causes the seizure of a vehicle to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, i.e., where the impound process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.
Thus, we are not persuaded by the People’s assertion that the seizure of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable because it was authorized by the Vehicle Code.
Authority:
Miranda v. City of Cornelius (2005 9th Cir.) 429 F.3d 858, 864-865
South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373
People v. Shafrir (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246
People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762
People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 869
U.S. v. Cervantes (2012 9th Cir.) 703 F.3d 1135, 1142
