Monthly Archives: August 2026

Amelioration, Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case 000499

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in determining that the defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 where the now invalid prior conviction enhancement had been stricken at the original sentencing.

First Holding:

Legislation effective at the beginning of 2020 (SB 136) prospectively abolished most prior prison enhancements that were previously imposed under section 667.5(b). Our Legislature made that abolition retroactive in 2022 through SB 483, which enacted section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75. The statute declares invalid most prior prison enhancements imposed before the enhancements were abolished, with just one exception (defendants convicted of sexually violent offenses).

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) applies to enhancements that were imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment, regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed. If the enhancement is no longer authorized under the current version of section 667.5(b), section 1172.75(a) renders the enhancement invalid. And the retroactive invalidation of the previously imposed enhancements in turn mandates resentencing under section 1172.75, according to the procedures set forth therein.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1068

Third Holding:

Upon resentencing, the court will be required to calculate all credits Hernandez has accrued since his initial sentencing and award them against his new sentence.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [the trial court, having modified defendant’s sentence on remand, was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time.]

Abstracts and Minutes, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000498

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court must recaculate credits for time served.

First Holding:

Upon modification of a felony sentence during the term of imprisonment, the trial court must recalculate and credit the actual time the defendant had served on their sentence prior to the modification. Where a defendant has served any portion of their sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence they may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23, 32

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [directing correction of abstract of judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes

Case 000497

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand the matter to the trial court, directing the court to correct its records to conform with the oral pronouncement of judgment at appellant’s 2025 resentencing hearing. Specifically, the minute order should be corrected to reflect that the court struck the section 667.5(b) prior prison term enhancement. Thecourt shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the section 667.5(b) prior prison enhancement was stricken and that imposition of punishment on counts 2 and 3 was stayed pursuant to section 654.

Holding:

When there is a discrepancy between the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and a minute order or an abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Clerical errors may be corrected any time they do not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Appellate Principles, Sentencing

Case 000496

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court should have stayed the sentence on one count under section 654.

Holding:

The defendant was convicted under two separate Penal Code sections for the same act. Section 654 provides that an act punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act be punished under more than one provision. The sentence imposed for count 7 should have been stayed. The defendant requests a remand for resentencing, but we may modify the judgment ourselves to stay the count 7 sentence.

(GARY NOTE: The opinion does not mention whether it concluded that the trial court would have imposed sentence on the count carrying the longer sentence (15 years to life) rather than on the count carrying the shorter term (180 days), a choice that has been restored to the judiciary with the passage of AB 518 several years ago. But the defendant’s total sentence on the numerous counts consisted of several hundred years to life. Allowing the trial court to choose between the counts would likely not have resulted in earlier release. On the other hand, it is conceivable that on remand, the trial court might have had other options on a full resentencing.)

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 139

Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000495

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On recalling the sentence under section 1172.75, the court should have stricken the balance due on the restitution fine ordered more than 10 years previously.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), which provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” Here, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 when it sentenced defendant in 2001. Because more than 10 years have elapsed since the date of imposition, we order the restitution fine vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

Section 1465.9 does not contemplate vacating parole revocation fines under section 1202.45. Section 1465.9(d) does not mention section 1202.45. When a statute is silent on a point, the courts resort to statutory interpretation. The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. When interpreting a statute, our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. To determine the Legislature’s intent, we must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.

There is no support in the plain language of the statute for the premise that the Legislature intended section 1465.9 to provide relief from parole revocation fines. If the Legislature intended such a result, it could have so specified. It did not. As such, we conclude that a section 1202.45 parole revocation fine cannot be vacated under section 1465.9.

Authority:

Waterman Convalescent Hospital Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126

People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587 [inserting additional language into a statute violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes]