Monthly Archives: August 2026

Case 000605

Error and/or relief

Where the minor was not removed from the home, it was error for the court to set a maximum period of confinement.

Holding:

The juvenile court is required to specify the maximum term of confinement only when the court orders a minor removed from the physical custody of their parent or guardian. When the dispositional order includes a maximum confinement term for a minor who is not removed from parental custody, the remedy is to strike the term.

Authority:

WIC 726

In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1744

In re A.C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 590, 591–592

Case 000604

Error and/or relief

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion under section 1172.6 to recall his sentence on his 1999 murder convictions (he had hired someone to kill his father, and that person also killed the defendant’s mother in the process, all while the defendant was away from the home in which they were killed). We conclude the defendant’s acquittal on first degree murder of his mother precluded a finding that he had intended to kill her. We remand for the court to consider whether he remains guilty of his mother’s murder under a theory of implied malice. In doing so, the court should consider his youth at the time of the offense.

First Holding:

The defendant hired a person to kill the defendant’s father. The hiree did so, but also killed the defendant’s mother. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder of the father, but of only second degree murder of his mother. In our view, the defendant’s acquittal of first degree murder as to the mother precluded a finding that he intended to kill her. First degree murder generally requires a premeditated and deliberate intent to kill. Second degree murder requires either an intent to kill without premeditation and deliberation or implied malice—conscious disregard for human life.

Authority:

People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 201

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151–152

Second Holding:

After the defendant’s trial, the Legislature amended the law of murder to eliminate liability based on imputed malice, including the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Section 1172.6 provides retroactive relief to defendants convicted under those now-invalid theories. Under principles of collateral estoppel, a jury’s finding at trial precludes a contrary finding in a section 1172.6 hearing.

Authority:

People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 723–724

People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 385-386 [discussing collateral estoppel]

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings in denying a section 1172.6 petition for substantial evidence. But the preclusive effect of a defendant’s partial acquittal is a legal issue we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383

Fourth Holding:

We presume the jury meticulously followed the trial court’s instructions. We thus conclude the jury found that that the defendant lacked an intent to kill the mother, precluding the trial court’s contrary finding.

Authority:

People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 69, 73

Fifth Holding:

The erroneous finding was not harmless. Although the record could have supported liability under a theory of implied malice, the trial court did not evaluate that theory and we cannot conclude it would have reached the same result if it had. The defendant was 19 years old at the time of the crimes—still on the lower end of the young adult age range. Recent decisions have emphasized that youths may be less able to appreciate risks and consequences and thus that courts must consider defendants’ youth in deciding if they acted with implied malice or reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004, 1007

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416–418

Case 000603

Error and/or relief

The court sentenced the defendant under the One Strike Law (section 667.61), but relied on special circumstances that had not been alleged in the information to impose sentences of 25 years to life on several counts. Because of the lack of notice to the defendant that the specific special circumstances would be relied on, the sentences on those counts are reversed and the matter is remanded.

First Holding:

A defendant has a cognizable due process right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked to increase punishment for the defendant’s crimes.

Due process does not require rigid code pleading or the incantation of magic words. To satisfy due process, it is sufficient for an accusatory pleading to provide the defendant fair notice of a particular one strike sentence the prosecution is seeking and of which facts it intends to prove to support that sentence.

The ambiguity of the one strike allegation is that section 667.61 (a) provides for a 25-year-to-life sentence if the offense is committed under two or more circumstances in subdivision (e), and the information alleged only one circumstance, i.e., multiple victims. While the information notifies defendant of the 25-year-to-life term that applies under subdivision (a), that subdivision is not triggered based on the single subdivision (e) circumstance alleged.

Thus, the information is, at best, ambiguous and confusing as to whether the prosecution intended to seek terms of 25 years to life and, if so, based on which alleged circumstances, rather than 15 years to life based on the multiple victim circumstance.

Authority:

People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 747

In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 721, 720, 723-725

Case 000602

Error and/or relief

Although the trial court had the jurisdiction to correct clerical errors, it had no jurisdiction after the judgment was final to correct judicial errors. Thus, it had no jurisdiction to set aside the credit for time served that it had awarded years earlier. The order eliminating the credits must be vacated.

(Because the new offenses were committed in prison while serving an earlier commitment, the new sentence was required to run consecutively, and he was not entitled to credit for time while serving his term on the original offense to be applied against the new consecutive sentence. Nonetheless, the court originally awarded him nearly two years credit for time served.)

First Holding:

The question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to eliminate custody credits after a final judgment is a pure question of law we review de novo.

Authority:

People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467

Second Holding:

Under the general common law rule, a trial court loses jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has begun. While there are some exceptions to that rule, none justifies the court’s elimination of the defendant’s custody credits.

Authority:

People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344

Third Holding:

A court has inherent power to correct a clerical error at any time. Clerical error, however, is to be distinguished from judicial error which cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered. Here, the trial court’s orders imposing the custodial credits in 2010, 2021, and again in 2024 were plainly judicial—not clerical—errors.

Authority:

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 63

In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 154

Fourth Holding:

Section 1172.1(a)(1) does not apply here, because (1) it was not the Caliofrnia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation secretary who sent the letter pointing out the errors, but a records analyst who sent the letter; (2) the sentencing was not within 120 days of the date of commitment; and (3) the request did not relate to a change of sentencing laws since the original sentencing. Moreover, the sentence was in fact greater than the original sentence.

Authority:

People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 987 [letter came from a case records manager, not the secretary and did not reference section 1172.1 or use the terms recall or resentencing]

People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 791–792

Fifth Holding:

Regarding jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence, we find King to be a better reasoned case than Codinha. King reasoned that the “venerable notion” that an unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time had been rejected by the Supreme Court in In re G.C.. The unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the waiver doctrine, in that a party does not forfeit the right to argue that a sentence is unlawful by failing to object in the trial court. It is not, however, an exception to the requirement of jurisdiction. Rather, in order to invoke the unauthorized sentence doctrine to remedy a judgment of conviction, the trial court must still have jurisdiction over the judgment.

Authority:

People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 635

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129

People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 66

People v. Garcia (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 139, 145–146

People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123

Sixth Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Case 000601

Error and/or relief

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding the defendant is guilty of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, under a still-valid theory, and reversal for resentencing is unwarranted. As for the defendant’s evidentiary challenges, however, we hold the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting and relying on the grand jury transcript and police reports. As a result, we vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing.

First Holding:

SB 1437 was enacted to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. It amended section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder to address felony-murder liability. Through section 1172.6, it provided a means of relief for those whose convictions would no longer be considered murder under the revised law.

Authority:

SB 1437

PEN 1172.6

Second Holding:

In the context of an appeal from a criminal conviction where substantial evidence does not support a conviction, the remedy is generally not a new trial. The sufficiency of the evidence is considered by examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and deciding whether it discloses substantial evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission.

Authority:

People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271–272 [the federal and California Constitutions preclude retrial if a court determines the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law]

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311

Third Holding:

The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that he has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.

Thus, as a general rule, it is well established that if the defendant secures on appeal a reversal of his conviction based on trial errors other than insufficiency of evidence, he is subject to retrial.

Authority:

People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684,

People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1, 6

Fourth Holding:

Although principles of double jeopardy are not implicated in the voluntary section 1172.6 petition process, an insufficient evidence claim, coupled with additional challenges to the admission of evidence, may give rise to an issue of remedy.

If, considering the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing, it signals a substantive failure of proof by the government much like it does in the context of a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, suggesting reversal for resentencing is the appropriate remedy. Under 1172.6(d)(3) if the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the petitioner shall be resentenced.

Authority:

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1068

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875, 896 [directing resentencing be granted on remand where insufficient evidence supported denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after an evidentiary hearing]

Fifth Holding:

On the other hand, a prejudicial procedural error (such as an evidentiary error), on its own, typically signals nothing about whether the petitioner is or is not guilty of murder under the law as amended by SB 1437, but points only to a flawed judicial process. In cases involving only this latter situation, remand for a new evidentiary hearing is ordinarily the appropriate remedy. This remedy is especially apt in the context of section 1172.6, which was created by the Legislature as an act of lenity.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116, 137 & fn. 3 [in the absence of a substantial evidence challenge, prejudicial evidentiary errors warrant remand for a new evidentiary hearing rather than remand for resentencing]

People v. Lopez-Barraza (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1255 [remanding for a new evidentiary hearing where trial court impermissibly relied on evidence admitted at the petitioner’s trial that contradicted jury findings]

People v. Nuno (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1062–1063 [conditionally reversing denial of sec. 1172.6 petition after evidentiary hearing to permit the trial court to reconsider discovery motion, and to order a new evidentiary hearing if additional evidence disclosure was warranted]

People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1067–1068 [sentence modification procedure under sec. 1172.6 is an entirely voluntary process and constitutes an act of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution]

Sixth Holding:

The grand jury transcript is not admissible under section 1172.6(d)(3)’s exception for evidence previously admitted at a prior hearing or trial.

Authority:

People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116

Seventh Holding:

Since Davenport and Cody, appellate courts have considered whether section 1172.6(d)(3)’s hearsay exception extends to transcripts from grand jury proceedings. In Ocobachi, the court held it did not. The court explained the existing hearsay exception for former testimony found in Evidence Code section 1291 requires a showing of witness unavailability) and that the party against whom the former testimony was offered had been given the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.

Unlike former testimony given during a petitioner’s preliminary hearing or original trial, Ocobachi pointed out the person investigated at a grand jury proceeding is not a party but a target who has no right to appear or offer evidence at grand jury proceedings. Thus, unlike in Davenport and Cody, admitting a transcript of grand jury testimony under section 1172.6(d)(3) would require ignoring both provisions of Evidence Code section 1291, creating an overbroad hearsay exception. In contrast, Robinson [review granted] concluded that the grand jury transcript may be considered at the section 1172.6 hearing.

Authority:

People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158–1159

People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 103

People v. Ocobachi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1183

People v. Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 854, 872, review granted Feb. 26, 2025, S288606

Eighth Holding:

The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo. We consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961

People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990

Ninth Holding:

Grand jury proceedings are not adjudicative, unlike hearings and trials in a criminal proceeding, nor are they adversarial. Rather, they are investigatory proceedings: a judicial officer does not typically preside over grand jury proceedings; a defendant does not receive notice of grand jury proceedings; and a defendant has no right to appear, offer evidence, or cross-examine witnesses. Despite similarities in their function, unlike preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings are one-sided investigatory proceedings.

Authority:

Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1026

People v. Petrilli (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 814, 824

People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 595

Tenth Holding:

It would be anomalous for the Legislature to have amended the statute under SB 775 to tighten the evidentiary rules by excluding preliminary hearing testimony under section 872(b) [which allows a magistrate to find probable cause at a preliminary hearing based on the testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer that would otherwise be excluded as inadmissible hearsay], which is subject to cross-examination, but not exclude similar section 939.6(c), testimony received at a grand jury proceeding, which is untested by cross-examination.

Authority:

People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 101 [in construing statutes, courts should strive to avoid anomalous results]

Eleventh Holding:

We agree with the parties that the police reports and related witness statements collected by the police are hearsay because they were created out of court and were offered (and considered) for the truth of the matter asserted. These documents also contain out-of-court statements of witnesses that constitute another layer of hearsay when offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

While there may be an applicable exception for some of the information contained in the police reports, there must also be a hearsay exception for out-of-court witness statements recorded in the documents that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted. Many of the findings taken from the police reports involved nonparty witness statements recorded by the police that were considered for the truth of the matter asserted, but no hearsay exception was identified

Authority:

EVID 1200(a)[hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove that its assertion is true]

People v. Hall (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 831, 844–845 [arrest report admissible under official records exception to hearsay rule to the extent it reported an act, condition, or event observed by law enforcement pursuant to Evid. Code sec. 1280]

Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 192 [observing the general rule that each level of out-of-court statements in documents such as probation and police reports must fall under a hearsay exception to be admitted into evidence]

Twelfth Holding:

Judicial notice extends only to notice of the document’s existence, not necessarily to the truth of the facts contained within a document. Judicial notice of a document is not a vehicle for the admission of hearsay contained within the document.

Authority:

People v. Moore (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 168, 178

People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 458–459 [the fact that a document may be judicially noticed under Evid. Code sec. 452 does not mean all the hearsay statements within the document are admissible or noticeable]

Thirteenth Holding:

Prejudice is shown where it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Fourteenth Holding:

On other questions the defendant has asked us to address, we decline to do so in light of the remand and reversal. As a general rule, we do not issue advisory opinions indicating what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

Authority:

People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084