Monthly Archives: August 2026

Case 000600

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the court to sentence the defendant on one count and stay punishment under section 654 on the two other counts.

First Holding:

Penal Code Section 654 prohibits a trial court from imposing multiple punishments when a defendant commits multiple offenses during an indivisible course of conduct directed toward a single objective.

Authority:

PEN 654

Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one]

Second Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.

Authority:

PEN 654

Third Holding:

The purpose of section 654 is to ensure a defendant’s punishment is commensurate with his or her culpability. That is, a jury can convict a defendant of multiple crimes arising from a single act, but a court can only punish the defendant for one of those crimes. If a court imposes concurrent sentences, then that sentence constitutes double punishment within the meaning of section 654. A course of criminal conduct is a single “act” for purposes of section 654 if all of the offenses committed during the course of conduct were incident to one objective.

Authority:

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211

People v. Miller (1977) 18 Cal.3d 873, 887

Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19

Fourth Holding:

It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. If all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

Fifth Holding:

When a trial court sentences a defendant to separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding each offense had a separate objective.

Authority:

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129

Sixth Holding:

We review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied finding that a defendant had separate intents and objectives for different offenses. Substantial evidence means that evidence which, when viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1414

People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 804

Seventh Holding:

Under section 654, a defendant cannot be punished for both a robbery, and a kidnapping for the purpose of that same robbery.

Authority:

People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639

Eighth Holding:

There is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied (unstated) finding that the defendant formed (1) a separate intent and objective to commit a kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and then (2) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a carjacking, and then (3) formed a separate intent and objective to commit a robbery of the pharmaceuticals.

Authority:

People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1085 [there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced]

Ninth Holding:

On remand, the trial court is directed to impose a sentence for only one of the three convictions, and then stay the sentence on the other two crimes under section 654.

Authority:

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [to implement section 654, the trial court must impose sentence on all counts, but stay execution of sentence as necessary to prevent multiple punishment]

Case 000598

Error and/or relief

In this appeal from the defendant’s resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, we must remand the case for the court to consider the continuing validity of his gang enhancements after AB 333.

First Holding:

The defendant was entitled to have the court consider the changes made to section 186.22 by AB 333, which apply retroactively to his case, because his conviction was not yet final. The ameliorative changes to the gang statute made by AB 333 apply to cases in which sentencing issues remain pending before the superior court following remand. The superior court here did not have the opportunity to consider whether the defendant met the revised requirements for determining whether his gang constituted a criminal street gang, whether it engaged in ‘a pattern of criminal gang activity’, or whether the defendant’s actions were for the common benefit to members of a gang. Accordingly, we remand the matter to allow for that consideration.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

Case 000597

Error and/or relief

For a crime committed when he was under age 18 and for which he was tried as an adult and sentenced to 46 years to life, the defendant filed a petition under section 1170(d) to recall his sentence and be resentenced, claiming he was sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Reversed.

First Holding:

The issue regarding what sentences constitute the functional equivalent of LWOP is one the Supreme Court is set to resolve in Munoz.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

Second Holding:

Defendant maintained he was eligible for resentencing even though he was not given an LWOP sentence because he was serving a sentence that was the functional equivalent of LWOP and treating him as if he were ineligible for resentencing would accordingly violate equal protection principles. We agree with Heard and other precedent that holds defendants who are serving the functional equivalent of LWOP, not just those serving an actual LWOP sentence, must be eligible for section 1170(d) relief pursuant to equal protection guarantees—and the availability of a youthful offender parole hearing does not undercut this conclusion.

Authority:

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 628-629

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 440

Case 000596

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court ordered that the original fines and fees imposed nearly 30 years earlier would remain the same. They are ordered stricken.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2025, section 1465.9 was amended to provide that, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated. Accordingly, the portion of the judgment imposing the restitution fine is vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The $70 fee imposed for AIDS education must be vacated. The original sentencing court imposed this fee pursuant to section 264(b), which states in relevant part: The judge may assess a fine not to exceed $70 against a person who violates Section 261 or former Section 262 with the proceeds of this fine to be used in accordance with section 1463.23. Section 1463.23, however, was repealed effective January 1, 2018. The provision authorizing the AIDS education fee (sec. 264, subd. (b)) was impliedly repealed in 2018, when the referenced statute (sec. 1463.23) was actually repealed, since it is no longer possible for the proceeds of this fine to be used in accordance with section 1463.23. Accordingly, the AIDS education fee is vacated.

Authority:

Repeal of PEN 1463.23

Third Holding:

The abstract of judgment filed in 2024 does not reflect the restitution fine or the AIDS education fee. We further note that the sentencing minute order similarly does not refer to any fines and fees imposed. Nevertheless, it is well established that where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. Accordingly, the clerk of the superior court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and an amended sentencing minute order reflecting that the previously imposed restitution fine and AIDS education fee are vacated.

Authority:

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260–261