Monthly Archives: May 2026

Appellate Principles

Case 000019

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(GARY Note: There is not much discussion in this case. Benoit relief was granted on a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking a finding that the notice of appeal was deemed constructively filed timely. That process is potentially available to a defendant whose notice of appeal was NOT filed with the 60 days (for a felony, 30 days for a misdemeanor), if certain conditions exist.

(The conditions are:(a) the defendant has been incarcerated during the entire period that a notice of appeal may be filed; (b) during that period the defendant requested that the attorney file one (or the attorney has otherwise conveyed to the defendant that the attorney will file the notice of appeal); and (c) the attorney failed to timely file the notice of appeal. The defendant may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court and ask that the court deem the notice of appeal to have been constructively filed timely. Although not discussed in this case,

(Benoit relief is generally NOT granted if the defendant was NOT in custody the entire 60 days, OR if the defendant did not ask the attorney within that 60 days to file a notice of appeal. Other than the reference to the Benoit case, the opinion does not contain any authority. I have added the two pertinent rules from the Rules of Court and a few case citations, none of which appears in the opinion, but I think it’s valuable to understand the importance of meeting that jurisdictional requirement.)

First Holding:

Habeas relief can determine whether a notice of appeal should be deemed timely constructively filed.

Authority:

In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72

Second Holding:

In felony cases, the notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days. In appeals from guilty pleas, any required certificate of probable cause must also be filed within 60 days. No court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal.

Authority:

Rules of Court rule 8.308

Third Holding:

In misdemeanor appeals, the notice must be filed within 30 days.

Authority:

Rules of Court rule 8.393

Fourth Holding:

An untimely notice of appeal divests the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. An untimely notice of appeal is wholly ineffectual. The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss the appeal on motion or on its own motion. [Gary note: Under Benoit, for an incarcerated person who, within that 60-day period, attempts to get the notice of appeal filed, a court that grants relief technically deems that the notice of appeal was constructively filed timely. Under that legal sense, it is not considered a late notice of appeal. In effect, the court is treating the timely attempts by the incarcerated defendant as the “functional equivalent”–MY description, NOT a court’s description–of filing a notice of appeal.]

Authority:

In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119

People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000018

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by imposing upper term sentences; the issue was not forfeited, and as the People concede, the court erred and the error was not harmless.

First Holding:

The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to any factor that may increase the sentence or range of sentence. In Wiley, our Supreme Court addressed section 1170(b)(3)’s prior conviction exception in light of the holding in Erlinger. To avoid any application that would set section 1170(b)(3) at odds with the high court’s constitutional interpretation, the court interpreted] section 1170(b)(3)’s procedure in a manner that is coextensive with high court dictates. Thus, in accordance with Erlinger, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

Second Holding:

Failure to object generally results in forfeiture and can apply to constitutional claims.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1107, 1114 [The forfeiture doctrine is a well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court]

People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406 [A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices if the party did not object to the sentence at trial]

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [a constitutional right may be forfeited by failure to assert the right before the tribunal with jurisdiction to determine it]

People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037

Third Holding:

A claim of violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial is not forfeited by lack of objection as it requires express consent in open court by both the defendant and the defense attorney.

Authority:

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46

Fourth Holding:

An appellate court can exercise discretion to address a forfeited issue.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

Fifth Holding:

Unless stipulated to by the defendant, before the factors in aggravation may be used to justify imposition of the upper term, the defendant has the right to a jury trial to determine whether the factors have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society or that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness. A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776

Amelioration, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000017

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse the court’s denial of the resentencing petition, which was not based on a review of the record, and remand for further proceedings under section 1172.6(c).

First Holding:

The trial court may deny a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage only if the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. If a petitioner files a facially sufficient section 1172.6 petition by indicating, among other criteria, that he meets the statutory requirements for relief,it triggers the prosecution’s duty to submit a response and the petitioner’s right to file a reply on the issue of whether a prima facie case for relief exists.

Authority:

People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1262

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707

People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 456

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558–559

Second Holding:

The record of conviction includes documents from jury trial such as jury instructions and verdict forms.

Authority:

People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296

Third Holding:

We review an order denying a petition at the prima facie stage de novo.

Authority:

People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1262

Fourth Holding:

The right to seek replacement of counsel under Marsden applies at all stages of a criminal proceeding.

Authority:

People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1179

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1096 [Marsden motion sought disqualification of the public defender’s office and individual deputy public defender]

Fifth Holding:

The record of conviction will inform the court’s prima facie inquiry, allowing the court to distinguish clearly meritless claims.

Authority:

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

 

Jurisdiction, Probation Parole PRCS

Case 000016

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) applied retroactively to shorten the defendant’s probation term from four years to two years, thereby retroactively depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation after passage of the two-year mark and rendering the revocation and termination of his probation invalid. [GARY NOTE: Penal Code sections 1203a for misdemeanors and 1203.1 for felonies, and there are exceptions to the one-year and two-year periods mentioned in those sections, so be sure to look at the actual applicable statute if the issue arises.]

First Holding:

Acts committed after the statutory shortening of the length of the probation term do not constitute violations of probation.

Authority:

AB 1950

People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199

Duty of counsel, Gary Musings

Case 000015

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

You might want to draw a cuppa joe for this one.  It’s probably less related to criminal law practice than it is to law office management with regard to criminal clients.  The “Eighth Holding” is not a holding in the opinion, but some speculative observations by me.  “Gary Musings.”

This case presented an unusual set of circumstances involving a request of a defendant for his prior attorney to provide him discovery under the auspices of Penal Code section 1054.9. The outcome of the litigation is not so important (but attorneys, remember that I will send you the actual opinion to your State Bar email address if you ask me for it). But it has some interesting statements on the ethical obligation to turn over a client’s file (something we probably all knew already).

And now for something different: Effective January 1, 2026, the trial attorney must retain a copy of the client’s file (for the entire term of the defendant’s incarceration) for any client whose conviction of a felony resulted in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

What’s new is that previously it applied only to those whose convictions were for serious or violent felonies resulting in a sentence greater than 15 years. (No mention of actual incarceration being required. It’s possible that was simply understood. I haven’t researched that aspect, and as of 1/1/26, I don’t have to.) Instead, the amended version pertains to those convicted of any felony resulting in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for a term of any length.

First Holding:

Counsel has a duty to turn over client’s file to client.

Authority:

State Bar proposed opinion 19-0004 (duty to retain files while client is alive)

State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct rule 1.16

Second Holding:

As of 1/1/26, Penal Code section 1054.9 was be amended to expand its application to any defendant sentenced to a prison term, eliminate the requirement that the defendant first attempt to obtain discovery materials from their attorneys, and broaden the definition of discovery materials to include materials a defendant would be entitled to today (even if not discoverable at the time of the original trial), exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutor’s jury selection notes. Trial counsel shall retain a copy of a former client’s files for the term of that client’s imprisonment.

Authority:

PEN 1054.9

Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890

People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523

Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852

Third Holding:

Review of nonappealable order is by petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692 [after the trial court has ruled, either party may challenge that ruling by a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal]

Fourth Holding:

The appellate Court can treat the appellate opening brief as a petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401

Shrewsbury Management Inc. v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1221–1222

Fifth Holding:

Section 1054.9 was not intended to provide an avenue for a defendant to compel client files from defense counsel.

Authority:

Legislative history, AB 1987 in 2018

Sixth Holding:

The client can complain to the State Bar regarding lack of communication and effort to get files or can sue the attorney.

Authority:

Rose v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 646, 653–655

White v. Molfetta (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 628

Seventh Holding:

Section 1054.9’s purpose is to ensure defendant can compel discovery only from the prosecution, and imposes only a file retention duty on defense counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1054.9

Eighth Holding-Gary Musings:

Well, not exactly a holding in the opinion, but here’s exactly what 1054.9(g) says effective January 1, 2026: “In criminal matters involving a conviction for a felony resulting in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, trial counsel shall retain a copy of a former client’s files for the term of that client’s imprisonment. An electronic copy is sufficient only if every item in the file is digitally copied in color and preserved. To the extent this section imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions on or after July 1, 2026.”  I was curious about the last sentence, as it says “for all felony convictions on or after July 1, 2026.”

That sentence makes no reference to “resulting in incarceration [in CDCR].” So I wondered whether that sentence was intended to be more expansive, or it simply assumed that the only convictions of concern are those mentioned in the first sentence of subdivision (g) (i.e., those resulting in incarceration in CDCR). I looked at the latest Senate Analysis prior to the signing of AB 1036. It seems reasonably clear that the Senate was contemplating retention only of those convictions resulting in CDCR incarceration, despite the lack of reference in the sentence I was curious about. That analysis says, in pertinent part, “[This Bill:] 9) Provides that to the extent this imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions resulting in incarceration in state prison on or after July 1, 2026.”

The final Assembly Analysis is not laid out quite the same way, but it does make reference to the report by the Senate Committee on Appropriations regarding costs, and characterizes it as follows: “Costs (local funds, General Fund) of an unknown amount to public defender offices to comply with the bill’s record retention requirements. The bill permits attorneys to retain digital color copies of evidence rather than storing physical copies of files, so costs may be primarily for additional workload to scan the files for all clients who meet the bill’s new eligibility requirements. General Fund costs will depend on whether the duties imposed by this bill constitute a reimbursable state mandate, as determined by the Commission on State Mandates.”

Although that section pertained to public defenders (because it was in the context of state-mandated costs incurred by government entities), the language “all clients who meet the bill’s new eligibility requirements” is telling. The only eligibility requirements are (a) felony conviction and (b) resulting in CDCR incarceration.

Authority:

Not much of one, Just Gary’s Brain