Daily Archives: May 24, 2026

Case 000015

Error and/or relief

You might want to draw a cuppa joe for this one.  It’s probably less related to criminal law practice than it is to law office management with regard to criminal clients.  The “Eighth Holding” is not a holding in the opinion, but some speculative observations by me.  “Gary Musings.”

This case presented an unusual set of circumstances involving a request of a defendant for his prior attorney to provide him discovery under the auspices of Penal Code section 1054.9. The outcome of the litigation is not so important (but attorneys, remember that I will send you the actual opinion to your State Bar email address if you ask me for it). But it has some interesting statements on the ethical obligation to turn over a client’s file (something we probably all knew already).

And now for something different: Effective January 1, 2026, the trial attorney must retain a copy of the client’s file (for the entire term of the defendant’s incarceration) for any client whose conviction of a felony resulted in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

What’s new is that previously it applied only to those whose convictions were for serious or violent felonies resulting in a sentence greater than 15 years. (No mention of actual incarceration being required. It’s possible that was simply understood. I haven’t researched that aspect, and as of 1/1/26, I don’t have to.) Instead, the amended version pertains to those convicted of any felony resulting in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for a term of any length.

First Holding:

Counsel has a duty to turn over client’s file to client.

Authority:

State Bar proposed opinion 19-0004 (duty to retain files while client is alive)

State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct rule 1.16

Second Holding:

As of 1/1/26, Penal Code section 1054.9 was be amended to expand its application to any defendant sentenced to a prison term, eliminate the requirement that the defendant first attempt to obtain discovery materials from their attorneys, and broaden the definition of discovery materials to include materials a defendant would be entitled to today (even if not discoverable at the time of the original trial), exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutor’s jury selection notes. Trial counsel shall retain a copy of a former client’s files for the term of that client’s imprisonment.

Authority:

PEN 1054.9

Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890

People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523

Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852

Third Holding:

Review of nonappealable order is by petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 692 [after the trial court has ruled, either party may challenge that ruling by a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal]

Fourth Holding:

The appellate Court can treat the appellate opening brief as a petition for writ of mandate.

Authority:

Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401

Shrewsbury Management Inc. v. Superior Court (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1221–1222

Fifth Holding:

Section 1054.9 was not intended to provide an avenue for a defendant to compel client files from defense counsel.

Authority:

Legislative history, AB 1987 in 2018

Sixth Holding:

The client can complain to the State Bar regarding lack of communication and effort to get files or can sue the attorney.

Authority:

Rose v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 646, 653–655

White v. Molfetta (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 628

Seventh Holding:

Section 1054.9’s purpose is to ensure defendant can compel discovery only from the prosecution, and imposes only a file retention duty on defense counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1054.9

Eighth Holding-Gary Musings:

Well, not exactly a holding in the opinion, but here’s exactly what 1054.9(g) says effective January 1, 2026: “In criminal matters involving a conviction for a felony resulting in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, trial counsel shall retain a copy of a former client’s files for the term of that client’s imprisonment. An electronic copy is sufficient only if every item in the file is digitally copied in color and preserved. To the extent this section imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions on or after July 1, 2026.”  I was curious about the last sentence, as it says “for all felony convictions on or after July 1, 2026.”

That sentence makes no reference to “resulting in incarceration [in CDCR].” So I wondered whether that sentence was intended to be more expansive, or it simply assumed that the only convictions of concern are those mentioned in the first sentence of subdivision (g) (i.e., those resulting in incarceration in CDCR). I looked at the latest Senate Analysis prior to the signing of AB 1036. It seems reasonably clear that the Senate was contemplating retention only of those convictions resulting in CDCR incarceration, despite the lack of reference in the sentence I was curious about. That analysis says, in pertinent part, “[This Bill:] 9) Provides that to the extent this imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions resulting in incarceration in state prison on or after July 1, 2026.”

The final Assembly Analysis is not laid out quite the same way, but it does make reference to the report by the Senate Committee on Appropriations regarding costs, and characterizes it as follows: “Costs (local funds, General Fund) of an unknown amount to public defender offices to comply with the bill’s record retention requirements. The bill permits attorneys to retain digital color copies of evidence rather than storing physical copies of files, so costs may be primarily for additional workload to scan the files for all clients who meet the bill’s new eligibility requirements. General Fund costs will depend on whether the duties imposed by this bill constitute a reimbursable state mandate, as determined by the Commission on State Mandates.”

Although that section pertained to public defenders (because it was in the context of state-mandated costs incurred by government entities), the language “all clients who meet the bill’s new eligibility requirements” is telling. The only eligibility requirements are (a) felony conviction and (b) resulting in CDCR incarceration.

Authority:

Not much of one, Just Gary’s Brain

Case 000014

Error and/or relief

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition for mental health diversion. We agree that the court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on her petition. And we disagree with the People that we can imply from the court’s ruling the missing findings required by the statute. We thus conditionally vacate her no contest plea, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with section 1001.36.

First Holding:

A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard. Application of an incorrect legal standard on Mental Health Diversion requires reversal.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)

Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 552, 584 [trial court applied an incorrect legal standard when it did not apply one of the essential components for deciding whether fees should be awarded under the applicable fee statute]

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Second Holding:

The court reviews denial of Mental Health diversion under the abuse of discretion standard. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Third Holding:

There is a presumption of correctness in court orders. We presume a trial court’s order is correct and indulge all intendments and reasonable inferences to support it. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume a trial court knew and applied the law. When the record clearly demonstrates what the trial court did, we will not presume it did something different.

Authority:

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

Lafayette Morehouse Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384

Paterno v. State of California (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 998, 1015

Case 000013

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in calculating defendant’s custody credits. Because he participated in the sober living program pursuant to a court order, he is entitled to custody credit for the time he spent there. The People concede this issue. We agree with the parties.

First Holding:

Credit for time served that is miscalculated must be corrected.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(a)

Second Holding:

Involuntary time in treatment counts as credit for time served when attributable to the criminal proceedings.

Authority:

People v. Davis (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 771, 777 [Section 2900.5 has two components: First, that the placement be custodial, and second, that the custody be attributable to the proceedings relating to the same conduct for which defendant has been convicted]

People v. Billy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 246, 262-264, [Defendant’s voluntary stay at a rehabilitation facility did not qualify for custody credit under section 2900.5]

Case 000012

Error and/or relief

The restitution fine must be vacated because it was originally imposed more than 10 years ago. The court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already served and credit that against the subsequent sentence.

First Holding:

Restitution fines are uncollectible after 10 years.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

Second Holding:

The court must recalculate credit for time served on resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23

Case 000011

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially committed constitutional and statutory error in imposing the upper term sentence based on aggravating factors not tried to the jury. The factors relied on were: the victim’s particular vulnerability; the offense was carried out with planning, sophistication, and professionalism; the defendant engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society; the defendant had numerous prior convictions and they were of increasing seriousness.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to a jury trial on aggravating factors, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be relied on to impose the upper term (unless they are stipulated to by the defendant).

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

The standard of review for evaluating the improper use of untried aggravating fact is whether error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730

Third Holding:

The parties agree the court erred in relying on those circumstances to impose the upper term on the principal count. Their disagreement centers around whether such error was prejudicial under the circumstances. On the record before us, we conclude it was.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47