Tag Archives: Right to counsel

Duty of the court, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 001096

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant sought relief under section 1172.75 by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court reviewed the petition, struck the two now-invalid prior prison term enhancements and denied the request for resentencing, concluding that the previously entered judgment was final. It did not appoint counsel, there was no full resentencing, and the defendant was not present for the decision.

The court erred. The judgment is reversed with the direction to the trial court to appoint counsel for the defendant and to conduct a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each prior prison or county jail term the defendant served if the defendant had not remained free of custody for the preceding five years. Effective January 1, 2020, SB 136 amended section 667.5(b) by limiting the enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses only.

In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483, which made SB 136’s changes to the law retroactive, and added what is now section 1172.75. Section 1172.75(a), provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(c) sets forth procedures for the trial court to recall sentences that include the now invalid enhancements and to resentence the defendants.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681

Second Holding:

When a defendant is being resentenced under section 1172.75, a resentencing court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

At resentencing, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

The court shall appoint counsel to represent a defendant at resentencing proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(5)

Third Holding:

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to be at all critical stages of the proceeding, including sentencing and resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 673

Fourth Holding:

Other than to strike the one-year prison priors, the trial court declined to conduct a full resentencing, believing it could not do so because the judgment was final. However, section 1172.75, including subdivision (d)(2), applies retroactively to final judgments like the defendant’s.

Because the statute mandates striking the now invalid enhancements, the statute by its express terms—backed by supportive case law—also requires that defendant receive a full resentencing.

Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction and the duty to reconsider the entirety of the defendant’s sentence, not just the one-year prison priors.

Authority:

People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276

Duty of counsel, Sixth Amendment

Case 001082

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the court to not hold a hearing on the defendant’s motion to have his attorney replaced.

First Holding:

Through counsel, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in his Case A. About a month later, he filed in pro. per. a notice of appeal in his Case B. The sentencing hearing had encompassed both cases. The prosecution asserts that the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal in Case B because its notice of appeal was filed after the 60-day deadline.

The notice of appeal must be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced. The liberal construction rule exists to implement the strong public policy favoring the hearing of appeals on the merits.

To be sure, a notice of appeal must identify the particular judgment or order being appealed. However, under the liberal construction rule, courts have held that once a notice of appeal is timely filed from one appealable order, a court can construe it as encompassing a separate, related appealable order as to which it is timely filed, if doing so aligns with the filer’s intent and there is no unfair prejudice to the respondent.

As in Jordan, we deem it appropriate, in the interests of justice, to construe the notice of appeal filed in Case A as sufficient to constitute a notice of appeal in both that case and Case B.

Authority:

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(a)(4)

D’Avola v. Anderson (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 358, 361

K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 878, 882

In re Jordan (1992) 4 Cal.4th 116, 131, fn. 9

Second Holding:

The defendant submitted a motion to replace counsel under Marsden, asserting various claims pertaining to the adequacy of his representation by counsel. The court marked the motion “Received But Not Filed.” The court never held a hearing on the motion.

The law governing a Marsden motion is well-settled. When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance.

Authority:

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 682

Third Holding:

A proper and formal Marsden motion is not required—the defendant need only clearly indicate to the trial court in some manner that he or she is requesting the discharge and replacement of the appointed counsel.

Once the defendant clearly indicates to the trial court a request for the discharge and replacement of appointed counsel, the court must hold a hearing to allow the defendant to explain the basis for the request. Failure to conduct such a hearing is legal error that compels reversal of the defendant’s conviction unless the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

Authority:

People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1178-1179

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 126

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court’s failure to hold a hearing is inadvertent and a defendant fails to press for a hearing, he can abandon his Marsden request. In this case, we conclude that the facts are closer to Armijo (which concluded the defendant did not abandon the motion by failing to press for a ruling) than Jones (which concluded the opposite).

There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing on the Marsden motion was anything other than an inadvertent omission. As in Armijo, the defendant may reasonably have concluded that his motion had been considered by the court and denied.

We cannot speculate on the basis of a silent record that the trial court, after listening to the defendant’s reasons, would decide the appointment of new counsel was unnecessary.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 355, 361

People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 982

Fifth Holding:

We therefore will conditionally to reverse the orders of probation in both superior court cases and remand to the trial court with the following directions:

(1) the court shall hold a hearing on the defendant’s Marsden motion concerning his representation by his attorney;

(2) if the court finds that the defendant has shown that a failure to replace his appointed attorney would substantially impair his right to assistance of counsel, the court shall appoint new counsel to represent him and shall entertain such applications as newly appointed counsel may make; and

(3) if newly appointed counsel makes no motions, any motions made are denied, or defendant’s Marsden motion is denied, the court shall reinstate the orders of probation.

Authority:

People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 92–93

People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1183-1184 and fn. 6

Due process, Duty of counsel, Duty of the court, Effective assistance of counsel, Jurisdiction, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001026

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Twenty-one years after his conviction of murder committed when he was 20, the defendant filed a motion for a hearing under Franklin. The court (Judge A) appointed counsel and set a hearing date to determine whether the defendant was entitled to a full evidence preservation hearing. The defendant’s attorney ultimately filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, requesting that the matter be taken off the calendar, stating that the defendant was not entitled to a Franklin hearing under Hardin. There was no indication that counsel had discussed this with the defendant. The defendant was not present. The court (Judge B) relieved counsel and took the matter off calendar.

The order relieving defendant’s appointed counsel is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall issue an order reinstating counsel and set the request for a formal, noticed hearing in which defendant is given notice and an opportunity to respond.

To the extent defendant maintains upon remand that appointed counsel’s representation is inadequate or ineffective, the trial court is directed to consider any such claim under the principles set forth in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

The trial court is further directed to set a new hearing for defendant’s Franklin motion if the defendant requests such relief upon remand.

First Holding:

Section 3051 offers youth offenders committed for long prison terms an opportunity for early release on parole. It requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender parole eligibility hearing to determine if, based on certain criteria involving the controlling offense, the offender is eligible for parole. The hearing must provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and includes an assessment of the offender’s growth and maturity that takes into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults and the hallmark features of youth.

Given these factors, the California Supreme Court held in Franklin that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth.

Authority:

PEN 3051

People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 113

People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961, 967

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 269

Second Holding:

In Cook, the California Supreme Court extended the availability of a Franklin hearing to a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence have become final. Specifically, it held that an offender entitled to a youth offender parole hearing may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final. To initiate such a proceeding, an offender should file a motion requesting a hearing under the authority of section 1203.01.

Authority:

PEN 1203.01

People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451

People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150

Third Holding:

The proper avenue to request a Franklin proceeding is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and Cook. The motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred. Nothing in Cook indicates the motion must describe with precision the evidence the offender seeks to introduce.

There are no mandatory pleading requirements for a Franklin motion, and the required showing to initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding is minimal: due to the limited resources generally available to inmates, the Cook court reasonably envisioned a simple pleading mechanism to get the process started.

Authority:

People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150

People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 896

Fourth Holding:

A legally sufficient Franklin motion does not automatically guarantee a defendant the right to do so. Rather, such a motion only initiates the process for a Franklin proceeding. Based solely on the motion, the trial court may immediately find a Franklin proceeding is warranted. The trial court may also exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.

The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether testimony is appropriate, or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice. After allowing a defendant an opportunity of this nature, the court may deny further proceedings if it finds they are unlikely to produce fruitful evidence.

Authority:

People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 152

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 149

Fifth Holding:

Courts have subsequently held that a Franklin motion may also be used to raise a challenge to section 3051’s limitations on the availability of youth offender parole hearings on equal protection grounds.

While the California Supreme Court has concluded that section 3051’s exclusion of offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender parole eligibility is not facially unconstitutional, it expressly left the door open to the potential validity of challenges to other exclusions set forth in section 3051 as well as as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.

Authority:

People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 201-202

People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 486-489

People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 864

Sixth Holding:

Generally, a trial court’s removal of appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here, we have determined the trial court’s order granting appointed counsel’s request to be relieved constituted an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1119

People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1190

People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 440

Seventh Holding:

Generally, both the United States Constitution and California Constitution guarantee a basic right of due process, and the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may derive a due process liberty interest from either the Constitution or state law. When the asserted interest is derived exclusively from state law, it will be recognized as within the scope of due process liberty if the state statute protects the interest by permitting its forfeiture only on the happening of specified conditions.

Authority:

U.S. Const., 14th Amend.

Cal. Const., art. I, secs. 7, 15

People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869

People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265

Eighth Holding:

Generally, having undertaken the defense of a criminal case an attorney must continue with his services until he is released by the client or by the court. He may apply to the court for release from further services and for good cause shown may be released, but he may not abandon his representation at will. In light of this principle, it is established that the procedural requirements of sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure govern a change of attorney in a criminal, as well as in a civil, proceeding.

These statutes specify that in order to withdraw from representation, an attorney must either obtain the consent of the client or bring a formal application in the trial court with notice to the client. The legislative purpose of these provisions is to provide certain safeguards to protect the accused.

Authority:

CCP 284

CCP 285

People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 404, 406

Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 558-559 [The sole statutory authority for the removal of counsel is Code of Civil Procedure section 284. That statute is applicable in criminal cases.]

In re Martinez (1959) 52 Cal.2d 808, 813

People v. Bouchard (1957) 49 Cal.2d 438, 440

People v. Kerfoot (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 622, 636

Ninth Holding:

Here, the trial court granted appointed counsel’s request to be relieved without complying with the statutory safeguards intended to afford defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court conducted a hearing and granted the request the day after it was filed.

There is nothing in the record to show that defendant received any notice of appointed counsel’s request to be relieved. Nor was defendant present at the hearing. Such a procedure clearly violated defendant’s right to due process. And an order made in violation of a party’s due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Kerfoot (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 622, 636 [Adequacy of notice is an element of due process of law. There is no due process of law in the complete absence of any notice.]

People v. Williams (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 828, 833 [Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard even where statutory procedures are unclear.]

People v. Johnson (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5

Tenth Holding:

It is well established that a trial judge ordinarily may reconsider his or her own prejudgment rulings. There are limits, however, on the authority of one superior court judge to set aside the order of another judge of the same court. Under article VI, section 4, of the California Constitution, one judge or department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another judge or department of the superior court.

This rule prevents a trial court judge from acting as a one-judge appellate court over another judge. This is true even if the first judge committed legal error in ruling on the matter. The rule also bars a second judge from reconsidering another judge’s discretionary appointment of counsel.

Here, the order relieving counsel was made by a different judge than the one who previously appointed counsel and set the Franklin motion for a hearing.

The record shows that the first judge reviewed defendant’s Franklin motion and, based upon that review, appointed counsel and set the matter for a hearing. Thus, the question of whether defendant had established a prima facie showing sufficient to entitle him to appointment of counsel was already considered and decided by the first judge.

Even if that determination was erroneous, the second judge could not relieve counsel by purportedly reviewing the sufficiency of defendant’s prima facie showing anew and determining that it was inadequate to warrant appointment of counsel. Doing so would have constituted an impermissible reconsideration.

To be clear, a motion to be relieved may be heard by a judge other than the one who initially appointed counsel. However, the motion must be determined on its own merits based upon the showing and arguments presented in conjunction with that request.

Authority:

Calif. Const. art VI, sec. 4

People v. Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, 306

In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426-431 [second judge could not reconsider bail set by first judge even if first judge failed to correctly apply statutes in setting bail]

People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 712-713 [trial judge erred by relieving advisory counsel previously appointed by another judge]

Eleventh Holding:

In our view, the error in this case is akin to structural error requiring reversal. Typically, a defendant who has established error under state law must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result. However, under the California constitutional harmless-error provision some errors are not susceptible to the ordinary or generally applicable harmless-error analysis.

The kinds of errors that, regardless of the evidence, may result in a miscarriage of justice because they operate to deny a criminal defendant the constitutionally required orderly legal procedure all involve fundamental structural defects in the judicial proceedings.

Most errors are amenable to harmless error review because they can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented.

Structural defects, on the other hand, defy analysis by harmless-error standards because they are not simply an error in the trial process, but rather an error affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds. A structural error requires per se reversal because it cannot be fairly determined how a trial would have been resolved if the grave error had not occurred.

Authority:

People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 553

People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1111

Duty of counsel, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000740

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

First Holding:

A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a right to counsel but also allows him to waive this right and to represent himself without counsel.

Authority:

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

Second Holding:

In any case in which a Faretta request for self-representation has been made, the court must evaluate two countervailing considerations: on one hand, the defendant’s absolute right to counsel, which must be assiduously protected; on the other hand, the defendant’s unqualified constitutional right to discharge counsel if he pleases and represent himself.

The right to representation by counsel persists until a defendant affirmatively waives it, and courts indulge every reasonable inference against such waiver.

The waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary—that is, the defendant must actually understand the significance and consequences of the decision, and the decision must be uncoerced. The purpose of the knowing and voluntary inquiry is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.

Authority:

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545

People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 [Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel]

Third Holding:

When confronted with a request for self-representation, a trial court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

Nevertheless, no particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.

Authority:

People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217–218

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,. 835

People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140

Fourth Holding:

On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently invoked his right to self-representation. The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the waiver was invalid.

Authority:

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549

Fifth Holding:

In Jackio, the court held that trial courts are required to advise a defendant desiring to represent himself at trial of the maximum punishment that could be imposed if the defendant is found guilty of the crimes, with enhancements, alleged at the time the defendant moves to represent himself.

In Bush, the court distinguished Jackio and held that, while the better practice would be to inform the accused, on the record, of the maximum sentence, including any maximum monetary fine that could be imposed on a conviction, we have not found any case specifically concluding that an advisement on this point is a constitutional minimum in every case.

Authority:

People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445, 454

People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 473

Sixth Holding:

It is not entirely clear whether the invalid waiver is structural error that is reversible per se or whether the error should be reviewed for prejudice under the standard of Chapman, under which error is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We need not resolve that question because, even if the error was not structural, respondent has not shown the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. There is certainly a reasonable possibility that, faced with a sentence three times longer than he initially had in mind and with no plausible defense to the charges, appellant would have opted to forgo self-representation. And there is also a reasonable possibility appointed counsel could have negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecution that would have resulted in a sentence less than that appellant received.

Authority:

People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 244 [acknowledging but not resolving split of authority]

People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 549

Amelioration, Discretion, Eighth Amendment, Juveniles, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000574

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant filed a petition under section 1170(d) for recall of his sentence. The trial court did not appoint counsel and summarily denied appellant’s petition to recall because it found he had not been incarcerated in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for at least 15 years as required by section 1170(d)(1)(A). We find the trial court’s ruling on the calculation of appellant’s period of incarceration was erroneous as a matter of law, and appellant’s preconviction custody must be included to calculate he had been incarcerated for 15 years when he filed his section 1170(d) petition.

The matter is remanded for the superior court to appoint counsel and conduct the hearing as provided in section 1170(d).

First Holding:

When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing, if the defendant meets additional statutory requirements.

Authority:

PEN 1170(d)

Second Holding:

When a trial court is not aware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion, a defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 771-772

Third Holding:

The empanelment of separate juries at the defendant’s original trial in 2010 was likely based on Aranda and Bruton. Broadly stated, the Aranda/Bruton rule declares that a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when a facially incriminating statement of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the statement only against the declarant. The problem addressed in Bruton and Aranda may be solved by the use of separate juries for codefendants, with each jury to be excused at appropriate times to avoid exposure to inadmissible evidence.

Authority:

People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518

Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123

People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 68

People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1208

People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 27

Fourth Holding:

Appellant filed his petition based on the recall and resentencing provisions of section 1170(d), effective January 1, 2013. Under Graham, the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders who committed non-homicide offenses. In response to Graham, the Legislature enacted section 1170(d), creating a recall and resentencing procedure for certain juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP terms.

Authority:

In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049

People v. Gibson (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 315, 322–323

Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 442

Fifth Holding:

On appeal, we review statutory interpretations de novo. We review the trial court’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence, and do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

Sixth Holding:

Absent a specific statutory definition of “has been incarcerated for at least 15 years” we may look to its plain meaning as understood by the ordinary person, which would typically be a dictionary definition. The Legislature did not use the word sentenced in section 1170(d)(1)(A). Instead, it used the word “incarcerated.”

Based on the plain meaning of “incarcerated,” the defendant’s period of incarceration for purposes of a section 1170,(d)(1)(A) began to run on the date the defendant was placed in jail, i.e., incarcerated, for the relevant charges.

Authority:

People v. Ruiz (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1031, 1032

Seventh Holding:

Section 1171 expressly addresses the trial court’s procedures in postconviction proceedings to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. It defines a postconviction proceeding to mean a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75. Section 1171(c)(1) states that upon receiving a request to begin a postconviction proceeding that is authorized in law, the court shall consider whether to appoint counsel to represent the defendant. This section does not prevent the court from assigning counsel at a later time.

Authority:

PEN 1171