Tag Archives: Retroactivity

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000360

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After the trial court denied the defendant’s request at the section 1172.75 resentencing hearing to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (thus reducing his Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life to a doubled determinate term), the Supreme Court concluded that the Reform Act does apply, subject to the finding of unreasonable risk to public safety. The matter is remanded for resentencing consideration accordingly.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. Because section 1172.75 and section 1170.126, thus interpreted, operate harmoniously, the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850

Second Holding:

It is unclear from the record as originally filed how the section 1172.75 proceedings had been initiated. Section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or her own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [CDCR] identifying a defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement. On our own motion, we took judicial notice of a CDCR list, which identifies individuals potentially eligible for section 1172.75 relief; defendant’s name appears on that list.

Authority:

People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332

People v. Newell (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268

People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382 [Lower and appellate courts lack jurisdiction over a request for section 1172.75 relief brought solely by a defendant)

Third Holding:

Construing the discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 as applicable at a section 1172.75 resentencing maintains the integrity of both statutes, such that the two may stand together. The legislative history suggests the voters understood that where a court conducting a resentencing inquiry for Third Strike defendants serving an indeterminate term found relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the defendant would not be entitled to resentencing. Interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating the discretionary public safety determination of section 1170.126 would honor this concern and thus eliminate constitutional doubt.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 865-866

Fourth Holding:

In exercising this discretion, the voters established that the resentencing court may consider: (1) The petitioner’s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, and the remoteness of the crimes; (2) The petitioner’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; and (3) Any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 866, fn. 9

Fifth Holding:

The resentencing court is not bound by the prior dangerousness determination associated with the defendant’s section 1170.126 petition. Rather, section 1172.75 requires that the resentencing court makes a new determination as to whether a defendant’s resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as of the present day. A prior finding that a particular defendant poses a risk to public safety under section 1170.126(f) is unquestionably relevant, and will no doubt be given consideration by a court subsequently resolving a resentencing under section 1172.75 involving an indeterminate Three Strikes sentence.

However, given significant passage of time, it is possible that a defendant who once presented a threat to public safety may no longer do so. For instance, not only may defendants present evidence that they have significantly rehabilitated since a prior section 1170.126 proceeding, but serious illness or advanced age may have substantially reduced the danger to public safety they once posed. Realistically assessing such changed circumstances is appropriately left to the trial court on remand.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878, fn. 17

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000357

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand from the Supreme Court, the prior opinion is amended to vacate the strike finding and prior serious felony enhancement in light of AB 333, enacted after he was sentenced. As held in the original opinion, three of the four counts of felon in possession of a firearm must be vacated, because the same gun was possessed for all four underlying robberies.

First Holding:

The evidence is insufficient to support three of the four charged counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm because he possessed the same gun continuously and can therefore be convicted of only one count. As the Attorney General concedes, the evidence shows a single continuing offense without the interruption in possession necessary for separate crimes. (Indeed, to help prove identity of the perpetrator, the prosecutor relied on the fact that the same gun was used in all the offenses.) We will therefore reverse the judgment and order all but one firearm possession conviction vacated.

Authority:

People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365

Second Holding:

After defendant was sentenced, section 1170(b) was amended to create a presumption in favor of the low term under certain circumstances, including where the defendant was under age 26 at the time of the offense and youth was a contributing factor in the offense. Because that new provision is ameliorative, it applies retroactively to this nonfinal judgment.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039

Third Holding:

The Attorney General does not dispute defendant was under 26 at the time of the offenses but argues resentencing is not required because there is no evidence youth was a contributing factor and the aggravating factors found by the court outweigh the mitigating factors such that the court would not have imposed the low term in any event. But when a court has imposed a sentence while unaware of the extent of its discretion—in this case because the legislation was not yet in effect—resentencing is required unless the record clearly indicates the court would have imposed the same sentence under the new standard. We are not persuaded that a lack of evidence showing youth contributed to the offense obviates the need for remand, as before the enactment of the new law, counsel may have had less incentive to present mitigation on the point, and defendant should now be allowed the opportunity to do so.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1096

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s sentence was increased based on the finding that he was convicted in 2012 of a serious felony. The prior conviction is for assault under former Penal Code section 245(a)(1), which qualified as a prior serious felony because it was found to have been committed to benefit a criminal street gang under the version of Penal Code section 186.22 then in effect. The strike finding and prior serious felony enhancement must be vacated because legislation enacted after his sentencing (AB No. 333) added several elements to the gang enhancement statute and, if the current standard is applied to his 2012 conviction, the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove the new elements. Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. We will therefore remand for possible retrial as contemplated in Fletcher, or for resentencing without an increase to defendant’s sentence based on a prior serious felony conviction.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Fifth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2020, Penal Code section 667.5(b) was amended to limit prior prison term enhancements (for nonviolent offenses not listed in 667.5(c)) to sentences that were served for sexually violent offenses as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b). The amendment applies retroactively and requires the prior prison term enhancements to be vacated because they were not based on sexually violent offenses.

Authority:

SB 136

PEN 667.5

Sixth Holding:

The trial court imposed a concurrent prison term for possessing ammunition, which should have been stayed under section 654 because the ammunition offense is based on the same conduct as unlawfully possessing a firearm, for which the court also imposed a prison term. When resentencing defendant, the trial court shall apply section 654 to stay any prison terms arising from conduct for which punishment is otherwise imposed.

[GARY NOTE: Section 654 now gives the court the discretion to impose punishment for ANY ONE of multiple counts (and stay the punishment on the other(s)) where section 654 applies, and does NOT require that it impose the sentence on the count bearing the greater sentence.]

Authority:

PEN 654

Sixth Holding:

On resentencing, the defendant will be entitled to consideration under the amendments to section 1385 under SB 81 to to limit sentencing enhancements by requiring that great weight be given to evidence of certain mitigating circumstances. By its terms, amended Penal Code section 1385 applies to all sentencings after January 1, 2022, which will include defendant’s resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000354

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Because of legislation enacted since the disposition hearing, the $300 restitution fine is ordered stricken in this Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile proceeding. The statutory change regarding joint and severally liability, however, does not apply retroactively.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now states that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in section 602. Because the judgment is not final, the appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

The modification of section 730.6(b)(3), eliminating joint and several liability for juvenile offenders for direct restitution, is not punitive, but civil. Because it is not ameliorative of punishment, there is no presumption that it applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments. Enacted after the order imposing direct restitution jointly and severally with other parties, it has prospective effect only, and does not apply retroactively to this minor’s case.

Authority:

WIC 730.6(b)(3)

In re J.L. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 388

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Fifth Amendment, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000347

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We reverse and vacate the true findings on the gang murder special circumstances for counts 1 and 4. We also reverse and vacate the true findings on the gang enhancements for counts 1, 2, and 4. We remand the matter to the trial court to allow the District Attorney to retry the gang murder special circumstance and the gang enhancement for count 4 under the current version of the laws as amended by AB No. 333. Principles of double jeopardy preclude retrial as to the gang murder special circumstance for count 1 and the gang enhancement for counts 1 and 2.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 amended section 186.22. The amendment narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang as used for the gang enhancement in section 186.22(b) and the gang murder special circumstance in section 190.2(a)(22). It changed the definition to an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons whose members collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, rather than individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity under the former version of section 186.22. A pattern of criminal activity under former section 186.22(e) required two or more predicate offenses committed on separate occasions or by evidence of such offenses committed by two or more persons on the same occasion.

The amendment changed the requirements of a pattern of criminal activity in four ways. First, a pattern of criminal activity now requires the predicate offenses to be separate from the currently charged offense or offenses. Second, the last predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the commission of the currently charged offense. Third, it requires that the predicate offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to persons. Fourth, the predicate offenses must have commonly benefited a criminal street gang. AB 333 narrowed the common benefit for the gang by the commission of an offense to be more than reputational. The prosecution must show how the predicate offenses provided an actual common benefit to the gang, and that they did not merely enhance the reputation of its individual members.

Authority:

PEN 186.22(g)

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 460-461

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 450

Second Holding:

AB 333 applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments as we have here. The instructions read to the defendant’s jury preceded the effective date of AB 333 and his appeal was pending on that effective date. The new requirements in section 186.22 apply retroactively to his case on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 738-739

Third Holding:

We must reverse the gang enhancements and the gang murder special circumstance if any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion regarding the new requirements of AB 333.

Authority:

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 462

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 739

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 453

Fourth Holding:

The double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The state constitution provides the same protection. A defendant may not be tried a second time for the same offense if the conviction is set aside for insufficiency of the evidence. Our conclusion that the gang special circumstance and the gang allegation were unsupported by sufficient evidence bars retrial.

Authority:

Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 15

People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 454-455, 468

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000343

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The true finding on the defendant’s prior felony strike conviction must be reversed in light of changes to the gang criminal activity statute by AB 333. Defendant’s sentence, as well as the true finding that defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as prior serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes law, is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for any retrial of that allegation, applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333 and for resentencing.

First Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of AB 333. AB 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and enhancements by narrowing the definitions of criminal street gang, pattern of criminal activity, and what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang. AB 333 is ameliorative legislation that applies to nonfinal judgments under the rule of Estrada.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

In Fletcher, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether AB 333 applies to a sentencing court’s determination of whether a defendant’s conviction under the prior version of section 186.22 qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of prior serious felony enhancements. It concluded that where a defendant has suffered a prior conviction under the earlier version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. It also held that it applies retroactively to cases in which the judgment is not yet final.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Third Holding:

That the defendant admitted the prior conviction does not forfeit the issue. Defendant’s admission cannot be construed as knowingly and/or intelligently made because it was prior to the decision in Fletcher. The true finding on defendant’s strike prior should be reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for any retrial of the strike allegation, applying the elements of section 186.22 as amended by AB 333. Notwithstanding the admission of the prior conviction in the trial court, we have discretion to reach the merits.

Authority:

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [an appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 [an appellate court may reach the merits of a forfeited issue in order to forestall a cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel claim]