Tag Archives: Restitution

Case: 000443

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in ordering restitution in the amount of the full retail price of sunglasses that were returned to the victim, a retail store, by the police soon after the theft.

First Holding:

In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.

Restitution shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible. A victim may also seek lost profits.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f)

Second Holding:

A prima facie case for restitution can be made based on a victim’s testimony or other claim or statement of the amount of economic loss. Once a prima facie showing of loss has been made, the burden shifts to defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim.

Authority:

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

Third Holding:

We review restitution orders for abuse of discretion. Where the specific issue is whether the court’s factual findings support restitution, we review those findings for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26

People v. Hume (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 990, 995

People v. Trout-Lacy (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 369, 373

Fourth Holding:

Ordering a defendant to pay retail value is justified when a retailer shows it lost the opportunity to sell the stolen goods to customers at that price — in other words, that it lost profits because of the thefts.

Authority:

People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1178 [retail value of recovered stolen property was not an appropriate measure of restitution when the prosecutor presented no evidence that the victim retailer lost any profits as a result of the theft]

Fifth Holding:

Had the victim been a person who purchased the sunglasses at a store for the retail price, the retail price may have been the accurate measure of damages.

But the victim retailer did not seek lost profits on its restitution request form or introduce evidence at the hearing supporting such a claim. The trial court, in fact, ordered defense counsel to refrain from examining the store manager about the store’s sales volume after the prosecutor objected on relevancy grounds. The restitution award was therefore limited to the replacement cost of like property.

Using retail value as the sole basis to calculate restitution, based on this record, resulted in a windfall to the victim retailer.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f)(3)(A)

People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172 [A restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall]

People v. Valle (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1329, 1333 [awarding purchase price of stolen cell phone that was returned to victim was error when defendant elicited testimony the victim hoped to use or sell the phone]

Case: 000429

Error and/or relief

An insurer is not a “direct victim” eligible for restitution under section 1202.4

First Holding:

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164, 179

Second Holding:

In every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. Victim includes a corporation or any other legal or commercial entity when that entity is a direct victim of a crime. Thus, only the direct victim of a crime is entitled to restitution from the perpetrator of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f)

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1537

Third Holding:

Direct victims include only the real and immediate objects of the defendant’s offenses Insurance companies that suffered the consequences of crime only by reimbursing the crime-related losses of their policyholders do not reasonably fit within this definition. As a result, restitution may not be awarded to insurers that partially reimbursed the direct victims for their losses, and trial courts may not divide the full amount of restitution between the victims and their insurers.

Authority:

People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 233

Fourth Holding:

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded restitution to the insurer. Instead, the court should have awarded the full restitution amount, including any amount awarded to the insurer, to the water district, which was the direct victim of the defendant’s crime, notwithstanding any reimbursement it already received from the insurer.

Authority:

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1537[a restitution order resting upon a demonstrable error of law constitutes an abuse of the court’s discretion]

People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266, 1272 [insurance payments to the victim do not allow the defendant to escape responsibility for the losses he caused]

Fifth Holding:

Because the defendant does not contest the amount of restitution or the water district’s entitlement to that amount on appeal, we vacate the insurer restitution order and remand the matter so the court can order full restitution to the correct victim under section 1202.4.

Authority:

People v. Duong (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540 [remanding so the trial court can order restitution to the victim for the amount that the hospital will accept as full payment for the medical services the victim received at the hospital]

Case: 000349

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court erred in setting restitution without allowing the minor an opportunity to challenge the amount. We reverse the juvenile court’s restitution award and remand the matter for a contested restitution hearing.

First Holding:

The minor had posed as another person and agreed to buy a counterfeit watch. On meeting the seller, he robbed the seller. At the disposition hearing, the seller said he’d paid a specified amount for the counterfeit watch. The minor asked the court to reserve the question of the amount so the minor could research and present evidence on what the market rate was for counterfeit watches. The court denied the motion and set restitution at the sum the seller testified to.

A victim of conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor. For stolen property, the value shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property, whichever is less. A minor has the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution. This statutory directive is meant to afford the minor a reasonable opportunity to challenge the accuracy or validity of the victims’ claimed losses. It is a crucial part of the overall statutory scheme, necessary to satisfy due process, and ensure fundamental fairness in the determination of the restitution ultimately ordered.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391

Second Holding:

The juvenile court’s refusal of the minor’s request for a restitution hearing wherein he could present evidence contesting the victim’s statement to authorities and the probation department recommended restitution order was contrary to section 730.6(b)(2)’s directive and thus an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 804

In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391

Case: 000341

Error and/or relief

The court ordered restitution in the amount of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price rather than the wholesale price of the goods taken from the retailer. The items had been returned to the retailer following the arrest. Rather than attempt to resell the items on its website advertising “like new” items for sale, the retailer simply destroyed them or donated the items. It was error to base the value of the loss at the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. We will vacate the restitution order and remand for a new restitution hearing.

First Holding:

The defendant did not object on the specific ground that the measure should have been the wholesale value, but that it should have been calculated using a diminished value. Nonetheless, even assuming defendant did not properly object to the trial court’s calculation of restitution, reviewing courts may address issues on appeal that present pure questions of law. Because the proper measure of restitution presents a pure question of law, and in light of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [an appellate court has authority to reach a forfeited claim]

Second Holding:

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion. A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed. When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.

Authority:

In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132

Third Holding:

A restitution order is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall; rather, it is intended to compensate for the victim’s actual loss. Here, there is no evidence in the record of any profits the retailer lost due to defendant’s crimes. As the People concede, giving the retailer restitution based on the retail value of the merchandise rather than the wholesale cost would provide a windfall, because such award would exceed the cost to replace those items.

Authority:

People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172, 1178-1180 [holding that hat because prosecutor presented no evidence that the retailer lost any profit due to the defendants’ theft, the court’s restitution order based on the retail price of the merchandise was improper]

Case: 000302

Error and/or relief

The defendants are entitled to retrial on the counts for active participation in a criminal street gang in light of AB 333’s retroactive changes to section 186.22. It was error to order Defendant’s 2 and 3 to be jointly responsible for the funeral expenses of the victim killed by Defendant 1. In addition there were several errors in Defendant 1’s consolidated abstract of judgment that need correction.

First Holding:

During the appeal, the Legislature amended section 186.22’s defendant of a criminal street gang. It narrowed the definition of a criminal street gang to require that any gang be an ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons; it requires that the pattern of criminal activity foundational to a criminal street gang have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang; it also imposed further requirements limiting the offenses on which a pattern of criminal gang activity could be predicated; and it required that for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, any common benefit be more than reputational.

Authority:

AB 333

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206

Second Holding:

The ameliorative amendments apply retroactively to all cases not yet final as of its effective date.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Third Holding:

The trial court instructed the jury on the then-applicable definition of a criminal street gang, omitting several of the requirements that have now been imposed by AB 333. The jury instruction thus relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove all elements of the crime as now defined.

Authority:

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 742

Fourth Holding:

We apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard articulated in Chapman. When a jury instruction has omitted an element of an offense, our task is to determine whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. The question is not whether there is evidence in the record that would support a jury finding of the missing element, but whether we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same had the jury been instructed on the missing element.

Authority:

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th 735, 742-743

People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 449

Fifth Holding:

All three defendants will be entitled to a full resentencing upon remand, independent of the prosecution’s election whether to pursue the gang charge or enhancements on remand. The full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425

Sixth Holding:

We observe, however, that neither Defendant 2 nor Defendant 3 can be ordered to pay restitution for any losses attributable to Defendant 1’s murder of the deceased. Neither of them were charged with any offense involving the deceased, and nothing in the evidence before the jury or the court at sentencing implicated them in his murder. It was accordingly error to make them jointly and severally liable for the deceased’s funeral expenses.

Authority:

PEN 1202.4(f) [authorizing restitution where a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct]

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [unauthorized sentence cannot be lawfully imposed]

Seventh Holding:

Defendant 1’s consolidated abstract of judgment requires correction. First, in case number A, the abstract of judgment erroneously lists as stayed count 2’s multiple-murder special circumstance when the trial court vacated this finding. In case number B, Defendant 1’s conviction for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245(a)(4) is described on the abstract as “Asslt w/deadly wpn/force likely to prod GBI.” We agree that an amended abstract should be reworded to avoid confusion between assault with a deadly weapon (sec. 245(a)(1), (2), or (3))—a serious felony under section 1192.7—and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (sec. 245(a)(4)).

(GARY NOTE–the appellate court did not cite case authority for the correction of the abstract, but it is abundantly clear the court has that authority. I have set forth some below)

Authority:

PEN 1192.7(c) [listing serious felonies]

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1065

[on correction of abstracts]

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2