Tag Archives: Discretion

Equal protection, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case: 000187

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant contends on this appeal that the trial court erroneously found he was not entitled to a Franklin hearing in his petition for writ of habeas corpus and erred in denying his Franklin motion as successive. In 2018, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting a Franklin hearing.

(The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing.)

That court (in 2018) denied that petition on the basis that he was not eligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he would already be released before reaching the 15 years’ threshold for youth offender parole. In 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The trial court denied that motion on the grounds that it was a successive motion. The People agree with defendant that the court erred when it denied his motion as successive. We conclude the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing as successive. We reverse the court’s order and remand for the court to consider defendant’s motion under Penal Code section 1203.01.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2014, SB 260 (2013–2014 Reg. Sess.) enacted sections 3051, 3046(c), and 4801(c) to provide a parole eligibility mechanism for youthful offenders. Defendants who were 25 years old or younger at the time they committed the offense and were convicted of a determinate term are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing during their 15th year of incarceration. The Franklin court had held that a defendant seeking to preserve evidence following a final judgment should be given an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his youth offender parole hearing.. Franklin authorized trial courts to receive any documents, evaluations or testimony that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. For defendants whose judgments were final, the proper procedure to obtain a Franklin hearing is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and the Cook decision.

Authority:

PEN 1203.01

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261,283-284

People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 618

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Second Holding:

There is no express bar to successive motions or requests for a Franklin hearing under section 1203.01. The defendant’s section 1203.01 motion should not have been denied as successive.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439

Third Holding:

The trial court’s order denying a defendant’s Franklin motion is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. In deciding whether the court abused its discretion we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Critical to the resolution of this case, we note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 459

People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749

People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746

Fourth Holding:

Although defendant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on defendant’s subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook. As such, the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the sole basis he had already sought a Franklin hearing by filing a habeas petition. Therefore, the court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s Franklin motion as successive.

Authority:

ADIn re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 457-458

Discretion, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000178

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The People concede that the court erred in finding the him ineligible for diversion. The judgment is conditionally reversed, the order denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion is vacated, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to reconsider his diversion motion consistent with this opinion. If the trial court again denies the motion, the judgment shall be reinstated.

First Holding:

A trial court may grant mental health diversion to defendants who satisfy the eligibility and suitability requirements set forth in the statute. A defendant is eligible for diversion if he or she has been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder and that disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. A defendant is suitable for diversion if the defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment, the defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial, the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In making this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011

Third Holding:

Under the statute, a trial court must presume that a defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the crime, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. The prosecution bears the burden of presenting such clear and convincing evidence. The absence of evidence proving that a defendant’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant’s mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offenses.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 404

Discretion, Duty of the court

Case: 000174

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

After reviewing the petition and the parties’ briefing, we conclude that, at a pretrial hearing in May 2024, the court erred in denying petitioner’s request for a bail review hearing after petitioner showed changed circumstances entitling him to such a review. Therefore, we grant the petition and direct the trial court to hold a new bail review hearing. The court held that circumstances had changed between the former bail hearing and the current because a Court of Appeal published an opinion disagreeing with another appellate court’s conclusion that pretrial detention is the only option if bail is set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford but is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests. In failing to address the conflict between the two opinions, the court abused its discretion.

First Holding:

Under section 1289, after a defendant has been admitted to bail upon an indictment or information, the court in which the charge is pending may, upon good cause shown, either increase or reduce the amount of bail. Such good cause must be founded on changed circumstances relating to the defendant or the proceedings.

Authority:

PEN 1289

In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 430

Second Holding:

If the court properly determines nonfinancial conditions are insufficient to protect the state’s interests, but that imposing a money bail condition (alone or in combination with nonfinancial conditions) would adequately protect the public and the victims and ensure the arrestee’s presence in court, the court must consider the individual arrestee’s ability to pay and set bail at a level the arrestee can reasonably afford. If money bail set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests, then the trial court’s only option is to order pretrial detention, assuming the evidentiary record is sufficient to support the findings necessary to justify such an order.

Authority:

In re Brown (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 296

In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135

Third Holding:

The appellate court held that circumstances had changed between the former bail hearing and the current because a Court of Appeal published an opinion disagreeing with another appellate court’s conclusion that pretrial detention is the only option if bail is set at a level the defendant can reasonably afford but is not sufficient to protect the state’s compelling interests. In failing to address the conflict between the two opinions, the court abused its discretion. The Kowalczyk court had disagreed with the Brown court’s earlier conclusion that a pretrial detention order is the only option when a bail amount the defendant can afford is insufficient to protect the public and ensure the defendant’s presence in court. The Kowalczyk court concluded that under Humphrey, if a court makes the findings necessary to support a detention, the court may set bail in an amount higher than a defendant can afford.

Authority:

In re Kowalczyk (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 667

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000170

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The sentence impose at the resentencing under section 1172.75 must be vacated because the court imposed unauthorized sentences on the two gun enhancements, thus requiring a remand for full resentencing. Any sentence imposed on the section 12022.5 enhancements shall be in accordance with the terms specified under current law.

First Holding:

Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b) is legally invalid. When a judgment includes such an enhancement, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. It shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.

The statute requires the court to apply changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires full resentencing for all defendants who qualify for recall of sentence under the statute. The court may revisit all prior sentencing decisions and has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 36

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425

Third Holding:

Though the term imposed for the firearm enhancements permitted the then-upper term of five years imposed at sentencing in 1984 under a triad of three years, four years or five years, the triad has since changed to three years, four years, or ten years. Reimposition of the five years is no longer an option because it is no longer part of the available triad. The court cannot impose the upper term of 10 years, because section 1172.75 specifies that the court may not impose a sentence longer than the original one. Further, imposition of a sentence higher than was available at the time of the offense would encounter ex post facto problems. Because of the unauthorized sentences on the firearm enhancements, the matter must be remanded for full resentencing, and the defendant will have another opportunity to seek the dismissal of his prior strike conviction.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 79-80 [ex post facto violated by imposing enhancements that could not have been imposed at the time of the offense]

People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 256-257 [permitting prosecution of a case that could not have been refiled under prior law violate ex post facto proscription]

Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000168

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2024, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the trial court a letter providing it with authority to resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.1 in light of the court’s newfound discretion to dismiss prior serious felony enhancements. The court appointed defendant counsel and set the matter for a hearing. After the hearing, the court stated it was not going to exerciseits discretion, that it was leaving the sentence in play as originally sentenced, and it denied the motion.

The trial court erred in denying recall and resentencing without finding that the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18(c), as required to overcome the presumption in favor of recall and resentencing provided for in section 1172.1(b)(2). The trial court failed to understand the proper scope of its discretion in light of the mandated presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. Thus, it abused its discretion in rendering its order denying relief. We deem it appropriate, here, to remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the CDCR’s recommendation pursuant to section 1172.1.

First Holding:

A court may at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary [of CDCR] or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state prison recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Where such a resentencing request is made, there is now a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in 1170.18(c).

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(b)(2)

People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040

Third Holding:

“Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is defined as an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). Those offenses—known as super strikes—include, among others, any homicide and any serious or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.

Authority:

PEN 1170.18(c)

People v. Braggs (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351

Fourth Holding:

Where the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing, the court is also now required to hold a hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate), state on the record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel for the defendant. Furthermore, when recalling and resentencing pursuant to its provisions, the court shall apply any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(6)–(8), (b)(1)

People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040

People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s resentencing determination for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 231

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156–158 [court abused its discretion in granting motion for new trial based on erroneous legal standards]

In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159–160, 167 [juvenile court abused discretion in applying incorrect standard in disqualifying minor’s counsel]