Tag Archives: Discretion

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case: 000269

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the electronics search condition as currently framed is invalid under Lent and In re Ricardo P. We therefore strike the condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider the imposition of a modified electronics search condition in conformance with Ricardo P. and this opinion.

First Holding:

A juvenile court is authorized to impose any reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Notably, the permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults, given that juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and that the state stands in the shoes of the parents in caring for the minor’s well being when it asserts jurisdiction over the minor.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 909–910

Second Holding:

This broad discretion, however, is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. As the Supreme Court has explained, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first question is whether the minor’s use of an electronic device bore a relationship to his assault of the victim with force likely to produce great bodily injury. In the context of electronics search probation conditions, some Courts of Appeal have found that use of an electronic device is related to an offense when the device was used to commit, plan, or facilitate that offense. In this case there was no indication that the minor used an electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his assault of the victim.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720, 724 [electronic device was involved in the offense where defendant met his victim through social media]

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [electronic devices involved in transportation of controlled substances where defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

Fourth Holding:

Other Courts of Appeal have found that electronic devices were not related to an offense when the connection between electronic device usage and an offense was more tangential. For example, in Alonzo M., the mere fact that electronic devices were stolen during the minor’s commission of automobile burglaries and purse snatch robberies did not compel the conclusion that electronic devices related to these offenses. Similarly, in Amber K., the minor’s use of social media before and after a school fight was found to be insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Lent.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 158-164 [observing the condition could not be upheld under either of first two Lent prongs]

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 564–566

Fifth Holding:

As indicated, there appears no dispute the second prong of the Lent test has been met. And for good reason: it is well-established that there is nothing inherently illegal about using electronic devices.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Sixth Holding:

The third prong of Lent requires that we assess whether the electronics search condition requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. The third prong of Lent contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. An abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality is insufficient. A condition can survive only when there is information in the record establishing a connection between the search condition and the probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history and when the burden imposed by the condition is proportionate to the legitimate interests served by that condition.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1121-1122

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166

Seventh Holding:

Following Ricardo P. and Alonzo M., we conclude the broad-ranging electronics search condition burdens the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the probation department’s legitimate interest in monitoring” his compliance with his probation terms, including the order to stay away from the victim.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000261

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing under section 1172.75, the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements as to each count. Pursuant to section 1465.9, we vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Section 1385 provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. It requires that a sentencing court give great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. One or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement. The statute provides an exception when the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. “Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

When a trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, it must not exclusively consider whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the public. Although the current dangerousness of the petitioner is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe not necessarily the same as a currently dangerous defendant who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly. A trial court would find the former to pose a greater danger than the latter.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Third Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1036

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentencing enhancements under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. We must not disturb an exercise of discretion on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fifth Holding:

During the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the superior court should not reduce the sentence beyond striking the prior prison term enhancement because the defendant posed a threat to public safety based on the underlying facts of the case. In response, defense counsel urged the court not to focus on his current risk to public safety. She reasoned that the defendant would still have to serve three consecutive life sentences even if the court struck the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

The court’s discussion of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s prior convictions does not suggest a forward-looking inquiry. Instead, the court relied on past conduct to determine the defendant’s present dangerousness. The court applied a legal standard that was not consistent with Gonzalez. The record does not demonstrate that the superior court considered whether the defendant would endanger public safety if the enhancements were stricken and he was still subject to the indeterminate term. We conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider his future dangerousness if the enhancements were stricken within the context of his indeterminate sentence.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Sixth Holding:

The Attorney General argues that we should presume that the superior court correctly applied the law and conducted a forward-thinking inquiry as to the defendant’s dangerousness. But the superior court did not have the benefit of Gonzalez on the date of resentencing. We cannot presume the trial court knew a standard that did not yet exist.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption does not apply when the sentencing law is not yet established]

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000244

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by imposing a probation condition that required the defendant to submit to searches of her computers, recordable media, and electronic devices. The electronic search condition is not reasonably related to criminality. Because we conclude the electronic search condition is unreasonable under the Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand with instructions to strike the electronic search condition and consider whether a more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable.

First Holding:

In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily valid. Generally, a condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Second Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review a probation condition for an indication that the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000232

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted provisions to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. Pretrial diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

If the defendant is eligible, the court also must determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Fourth Holding:

The trial court failed to apply the presumption that, given the timely diagnoses of mental health disorders, the mental condition contributed to his behavior. The burden then was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence tha there was no causal connection.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Fifth Holding:

However, while eligibility and suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they are met. Because of the existence of this residual discretion, the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in accordance with the current law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000230

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing on the recall of his sentence under section 1172.75, the court failed to recalculate his custody credits upon resentencing. We direct the trial court to correct the custody credits in the resentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Everyone sentenced to prison for criminal conduct is entitled to credit against his term for all actual days of confinement solely attributable to the same conduct. When a defendant is imprisoned and later resentenced, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29-30, 37

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike a prior felony conviction for abuse of discretion. It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. Absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. In addition, we will not reverse a trial court’s sentencing decision merely because reasonable people might disagree. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371, 376-377