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Case Summaries

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Amelioration, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000481

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Denial of the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.6 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the court to redetermine whether petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life, taking into consideration his youth at the time of the offense. We also conclude substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that petitioner aided and abetted the murder with intent to kill and the denial of the petition therefore cannot be upheld on this alternative ground.

First Holding:

Although petitioner briefly argued in the superior court that his youth should be considered in the court’s analysis of whether he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, the superior court did not address this argument. Indeed, the superior court may have felt compelled to conclude, based on the state of the law at the time, that petitioner’s youth was not a relevant factor, given that petitioner was a young adult at the time he committed the offense and not a juvenile.

We continue to find there was substantial evidence for the trial court to conclude that the defendant acted with indifference of human life, but pending this appeal, there have been cases that squarely hold that the court should consider youth of a nonjuvenile in that determination.

If we do not address this issue, petitioner may be able to file a second petition for resentencing in the superior court to have the court consider his youth as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life. In the interests of justice and for the sake of judicial economy, we address this argument on the merits. We conclude that petitioner is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing to apply new law relating to the effect, if any, of his youth on the court’s reckless indifference finding.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1008

Second Holding:

We review the court’s findings for substantial evidence. Under this standard, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with reckless indifference.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988

People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 885

Third Holding:

In the first stage of this appeal–before review was granted and the matter was transferred back to this court–petitioner raised the argument (that the court should take into consideration the defendant’s youth) in his reply brief for the first time. Ordinarily, we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. As such, this argument was not addressed in our prior opinion.

Authority:

In re Luke H. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1090

Fourth Holding:

During the pendency of this appeal, the appellate court in Jones addressed the relevance of youth to the reckless indifference finding in a case involving a young adult who was 20 years old at the time of the offense.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091–1093

Fifth Holding:

In Oliver, the appellate court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court was required to consider the petitioner’s youth (23 years of age) in reference to the petitioner’s mental state, but held that its failure to do so was harmless under the standard of Watson

Authority:

People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 488–489 and fn. 8

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Sixth Holding:

In Pittman, the court applied the Watson standard and concluded there was a reasonable possibility the failure to consider the petitioner’s youth impacted the trial court’s decision. The court noted inferences of immaturity could be drawn from the fact that the petitioner was 21 years old when he participated in the attack with two peers who were 16 and 17 years old. Additionally, the crime suggested the participants acted impulsively, under the influence of rashness, and while intoxicated. Thus, the court determined the interests of justice were best served by remanding for the court to consider whether youth impacted the petitioner’s ability to form the requisite mental state for second degree murder.

Authority:

People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417-418

Seventh Holding:

In Jiminez, the appellate court agreed that there had been a significant change in the law governing young adult offenders since the ruling on the first petition, and therefore the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case did not apply. In this regard, the court noted that early cases addressing this issue of a petitioner’s youth applied only to juvenile offenders under the age of 18, and only to the major participant and reckless indifference findings.

Thereafter, however, the law was expanded to hold that youth was a consideration for other mental state requirements, including implied malice, and additionally expanded to include young adults who were in their late teens and early 20’s when they committed the crimes. Additionally, the Legislature had enacted similar changes to a variety of statutes to expand youth-related considerations to persons 25 years of age and younger. The court also determined that the error in failing to consider the petitioner’s age was not harmless under the Watson standard.

Authority:

People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001-1004

Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing

Case 000480

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by failing to apply Penal Code section 1170(h)(5)(A) and (B), regarding mandatory supervision, after sentencing the defendant to county jail.

First Holding:

Punishment for a conviction of possession for sale of methamphetamine is governed by section 1170(h), which provides that punishment shall be by imprisonment in county jail. Although the section 12022(c) firearm enhancement directed imprisonment in state prison, section 1170(h)(9) required the sentence to be punishable as directed by the underlying offense. Under section 1170(h)(5)(A) and (B), a court imposing a sentence under subdivision (h)(1) must suspend execution of a concluding portion of the term for a period selected at the court’s discretion, known as mandatory supervision, unless it finds, in the interest of justice, that it is not appropriate in a particular case.

This section creates a statutory presumption in favor of the imposition of a period of mandatory supervision in all applicable cases, and, if the court denies mandatory supervision, it must state its reasons on the record. Given that the court ordered a term of imprisonment in county jail under section 1170(h), it is appropriate to remand for resentencing for consideration of mandatory supervision.

Authority:

PEN 1170(h)

Second Holding:

After the date of offense in this matter, section 12022(c)(2) was amended and now provides for imprisonment in state prison as punishment for a violation with a firearm enhancement under that section, not under section 1170(h). Applying this statute retroactively would likely violate the ex post facto clause.

Authority:

PEN 12022(c)

U.S. Const., art. I, secs. 9, 10

People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 360 [A statute violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws if it increases the punishment for a crime after it is committed]

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000479

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this People’s appeal from the order of the juvenile court denying its motion to transfer the juvenile matter to adult court, the order retaining jurisdiction in juvenile court is affirmed, even though the respondent is well over 25 years of age.

First Holding:

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. The court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court’s erroneous understanding of applicable law is subject to reversal. But we do not reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial court. We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings, not against them. We are concerned only with whether the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings. When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165, 169

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211

Second Holding:

The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer petition is whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. To order a minor’s transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which for persons 25 years or older extends for up to two years from the date of disposition. the prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 607(d) [The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of disposition if the person is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707. The court shall exercise jurisdiction in conformance with the objectives of the juvenile court.]

WIC 707(a)(3)

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167

Third Holding:

In making that determination, the juvenile court must consider five specific factors. The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. If the juvenile court orders a transfer to criminal court, it must recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 707(a)(3)

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212

Fourth Holding:

The language used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given its ordinary meaning, and if the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters). Courts generally must accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose, and a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.

The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. We examine statutory language, not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357

Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735

Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975

Fifth Holding:

Language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered. Thus, a decision is authority only for the points actually involved and actually decided.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154–155

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 110

Sixth Holding:

Failure to offer reasoned analysis of an issue constitutes a waiver. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. The People’s failure to develop a legal analysis that is tethered to the issue they raised and is supported by relevant authority compels rejection of their claim of error. We will not develop that analysis for them.

Authority:

Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [Each brief must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority]

Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008

Perry v. City of San Diego (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 172, 188, fn. 8 [It is not this court’s role to connect the dots]

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000478

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Before jury selection, the defendant requested mental health diversion. The trial court denied the request as untimely. This was error. The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to consider defendant’s application for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. If the trial court grants diversion and defendant successfully completes mental health diversion, the court shall dismiss the charges. If the court denies defendant’s application for mental health diversion, or if defendant does not successfully complete diversion, then the court shall reinstate the judgment and sentence.

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders. The trial court must find a defendant is both eligible and suitable for diversion.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Third Holding:

In a jury trial, to be timely, a request for diversion must be made before attachment of jeopardy. The defendant is deemed to have been placed in jeopardy when the jurors have been impaneled and sworn. Here, the jury had not been impaneled or sworn when defendant requested mental health diversion. The trial court abused its discretion in denying his unopposed request for mental health diversion solely on the ground that it was untimely.

Authority:

People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819

People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case 000477

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing under section 1172.75 for recall of sentence and resentencing, the trial court failed to conduct a full resentencing because it limited resentencing to only one of the several cases consolidated into an aggregate sentence. The defendant had been sentenced in the 1990s in two separate sentencing hearings involving multiple cases. Only one of the cases was enhanced by a now invalid prior prison term enhancement. That case made him eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. The trial court conducted a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 on only that single case, and declined to resentence on the others. The trial court should have conducted a full resentencing that reconsidered sentencing choices in all five cases in the late 1995 aggregate sentence.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides thatany sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense is legally invalid. Once the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identifies those persons currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a) to the sentencing court, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Here, defendant’s sentence was subject to recall and resentencing because the CDCR identified his now invalid prison prior.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(b), (c)

Second Holding:

On recall of his sentence, defendant was entitled to a full resentencing that included all aspects of his aggregate sentence. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements. Section 1172.75(d)(2) specifies that the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

When a sentence is subject to recall, the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall. Where there are multiple counts and discretionary decisions at play, the trial court may consider the entire sentencing scheme and reconsider all sentencing choices. This includes an aggregate prison term, which is not a series of separate, independent terms, but one term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one component infects the entire scheme.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834

People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 206

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

People v. Marcus (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 201, 214

Third Holding:

Defendant’s sentence is an aggregate prison term comprised of five separate cases. Even though defendant only referenced the one of the 1995 sentences instead of both of the 1995 sentences, the trial court mistakenly believed it was limited to resentencing defendant on the narrow portion of his sentence that included the prison prior. Defendant’s sentence contains interdependent component parts from multiple cases. Therefore, the court erred by treating the portion of the sentence with the invalid prison prior as an independent, separate term, rather than an integral part of the whole and reconsidering every aspect of the sentencing scheme as required. The trial court should have conducted a full resentencing that reconsidered sentencing choices in all five cases in the later 1995 aggregate sentence.

Authority:

People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568

People v. Marcus (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 201, 214