Error and/or relief
The trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s motion filed under Franklin and Penal Code section 1203.01 for a hearing to set forth youth-related evidence for consideration at future parole hearings.
We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion absent evidence that the defendant had past opportunities to present youth-related evidence and absent information regarding the substance of the evidence that the defendant intended to present.
We decline to issue an order that the trial court grant the request for a Franklin hearing. We simply direct the court to hold a proper hearing on the motion to determine whether a Franklin hearing is warranted.
First Holding:
Section 3051(a)(1) provides for a youth offender parole hearing by the Board of Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger at the time of his or her controlling offense.
Section 4801(c) provides that, when a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense, as defined in section 3051(a), when he or she was 25 years of age or younger, the board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant to section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.
Authority:
PEN 3051
PEN 4801(c)
Second Holding:
In Franklin, the Supreme Court held a defendant who did not have an opportunity to make a record of mitigating youth-related factors relevant to a later youth offender parole hearing should have an opportunity to make a record on remand.
The court explained that sections 3051 and 4801 contemplate that information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s consideration. Assembling such statements about the individual before the crime is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded, records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members may have relocated or passed away.
The Supreme Court remanded the matter to determine whether the defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and if not, to allow the defendant to place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.
Authority:
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284
Third Holding:
In Cook, the Supreme Court held that a juvenile offender with a final judgment could move for a postjudgment proceeding under section 1203.01, to present evidence of youth-related factors. The Cook court reasoned that recognizing the court’s authority under section 1203.01 to gather youth offender evidence effectuates sections 3051 and 4801.
For inmates who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and the Cook decision that establishes the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicates when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred.
Consistent with Franklin and the court’s inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.
Neither the passage of significant time, nor the fact that the defendant has had prior parole hearings is a bar to the court granting a Franklin hearing. The Legislature intended that the benefits of youth offender parole hearings be available even to those prisoners with decades-old convictions.
Authority:
PEN 1203.1
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 453, 458-459
People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 751
Fourth Holding:
We review the trial court’s denial of a Franklin proceeding for abuse of discretion. In deciding whether the trial court has abused its discretion we are required to ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Critical to the resolution of this case, we note that when a trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.
Authority:
People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749
Fifth Holding:
The defendant’s motion contained sufficient information. Nothing in Cook indicates the motion bust describe with precision the vidence the offender seeks to introduce. The court’s commentary in Cook about what a motion should include is not the same as creating mandatory pleading requirements.
Courts have found there are no mandatory pleading requirements for a Franklin motion, and the required showing to initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding is minimal: due to the limited resources generally available to inmates, the Cook court reasonably envisioned a simple pleading mechanism to get the process started.
Authority:
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150
People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 896