Category Archives: Plea bargains

Abstracts and Minutes, Appellate Principles, Fines and fees, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 000997

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The approved plea agreement provided for dismissal of count II, but that count was not dismissed at sentencing. Further, the court failed to impose a suspended parole revocation fine matching the amount imposed as the restitution fine.

The judgment is modified to dismiss count II and impose a $300 parole revocation fine, which shall be suspended unless parole is revoked. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to amend the sentencing minute order to reflect this modification. However, because the abstract of judgment already reflects the $300 suspended parole revocation fine, no amendment of that document is necessary.

First Holding:

When a guilty or no contest plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.

Authority:

People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80

Second Holding:

When the trial court imposes a sentence that includes a period of parole, and it also imposes a restitution fine, a matching suspended parole revocation fine must be imposed. Omission of a mandatory parole revocation fine is an unauthorized sentence that we can correct on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 1202.45

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 853

Duty of counsel, Duty of the court, Immigration, Plea bargains, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000994

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea conviction under section 1473.7, because the defendant demonstrated entitlement to relief.

First Holding:

In response to the absence of a legal remedy for individuals who are no longer in custody but find themselves facing unanticipated immigration consequences resulting from a guilty or no contest plea entered years earlier, the Legislature added section 1473.7 to the Penal Code, effective January 1, 2017. The statute was subsequently amended to broaden eligibility for relief beyond the entry of a plea.

In relevant part, the statute now provides that individuals may file a motion for relief from a conviction or sentence on the basis that the conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. Relief is not contingent upon establishing ineffective assistance of counsel.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 522-523

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 12-13

Second Holding:

A defendant must satisfy three statutory requirements to be eligible to seek relief from a legally invalid conviction or sentence under section 1473.7(a)(1). The movant must show he is no longer in criminal custody, and the conviction or sentence being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization. The motion must also be timely.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 13

Third Holding:

To prevail under section 1473.7, a defendant must demonstrate that his conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging his or her ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.

The defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.

Next, the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.

Prejudical error means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529

Fourth Holding:

We evaluate prejudicial error under the totality of the circumstances.

Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.

The defendant’s probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had rejected the plea and the difference between the bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at trial are also relevant.

These factors are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.

A defendant must provide objective evidence to corroborate factual assertions. Objective evidence includes facts provided by declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence of the charges the defendant faced.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320-321

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529-530

People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 564

Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 358

Fifth Holding:

On appeal, we apply independent review to evaluate whether a defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea offer had he understood its immigration consequences.

We exercise independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law, and defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on the credibility of witnesses the superior court heard and observed.

However, when, as in this case, the trial court’s findings derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, the trial court and the reviewing court are in the same position, and no deference is owed.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319-320

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527-528

Sixth Holding:

The focus of this inquiry is the defendant’s own error. Thus, the key is the mindset of the defendant and not what an objectively reasonable person would have understood under the circumstances.

The defendant is the only one with direct access to his state of mind, but a defendant’s assertion as to his or her state of mind is not accepted at face value by courts evaluating a section 1473.7 motion. Such assertions must be corroborated with objective evidence.

A party seeking relief under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel.

Authority:

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871

People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 769

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 325

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962

Seventh Holding:

The standard section 1016.5 advisement—given to all criminal defendants in California who plead guilty to any offense other than an infraction—that his or her criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences does not bar a defendant from seeking relief from his plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance based on immigration consequences. Thus, the fact the superior court advised defendant pursuant to section 1016.5 does not resolve the matter against defendant.

Authority:

People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 889, 895

People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577-578

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 320

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 962

Eighth Holding:

Prior to Padilla, there was no Sixth Amendment obligation on the part of defense counsel to affirmatively advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a conviction. Rather, most courts had determined that no such duty existed.

As a general rule, a failure to anticipate changes in the law is not considered ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Gary note:  I think we all know what the court means by “Prior to Padilla, there was no Sixth Amendment obligation ….”  But I think a more accurate statement would be something like, “Padilla was the first pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court recognizing that the Sixth Amendment places an obligation on the part of defense counsel to ….”  The Sixth Amendment was certainly not amended to add any provision generating a new obligation.  The Sixth Amendment has been around for centuries, unchanged.  It was only its import that hadn’t been seen in the past, at least by the High Court.

(The court’s phrasing as I’ve set out in the Ninth Holding tracks what I’m saying.

(I mention this because I think sometimes it is important to argue that something is NOT new law, and that it has BEEN the law all along, notwithstanding that it had not previously been understood to be the law.  Why is that important?  It can make the difference in whether a court recognizes that your client’s rights were violated, even though it was only through a later appellate analysis that the nature of the violation was discovered.  We don’t want the court to assume that, because no court had seen it before, your client is not entitled to its benefit.

(There have been decisions, of course, that decline to revisit cases where, had the law been understood at the time, there would have been a different result.  But that is generally related to the principle of finality of judgment and the jurisdiction of the court to act on the case.  While not directly the same, think of the Estrada presumption of retroactivity of ameliorative changes in the law to those whose judgments are not final, in the absence of clear intent that the change was to be applied prospectively only.  

(Just sayin’.

(Of course, with respect to Padilla, the practical effect is that yes, the Sixth Amendment imposes the obligation on the attorney to provide the advice, but the failure to do so prior to Padilla is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel as that principle has been described in the past.  As the court in this case said, relying on In re Grinder, “As a general rule, a failure to anticipate changes in the law is not considered ineffective assistance of counsel.”

(Was there a change in the law?  Or simply a change in the understanding of the Sixth Amendment?  Of course, the opposition might argue that court pronouncements dictate what is the law, and therefore they represent the law, and thererfore it wasn’t until Padilla that the Sixth Amendment created the obligation.  An interesting debate, or not, but for another time.)  

Authority:

Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356

Chaidez v. United States (2013) 568 U.S. 342, 353

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 17

In re Grinder (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 845, 872

Ninth Holding:

Here, defendant entered his plea 15 years before the United States Supreme Court held in Padilla that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to provide affirmative and competent advice to noncitizen defendants regarding the potential immigration consequences of their criminal cases. As such, defendant’s attestation that his attorney did not advise him about the immigration consequences of his plea is consistent with the state of the law at that time.

(Gary note: The appellate court examined and analyzed extensively many facts in the record from which it concluded that, based primarily on the principles I have extracted in this summary, the defendant was entitled to relief because his plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently within the contemplation of section 1473.7. I have omitted those details, some of which included citations to other cases apparently relevant to those details. Since this was an unpublished decision and cannot be cited for comparison, and since this is supposed to be a summary and not a copy of the entire decision, I have to stop about here.)

Authority:

PEN 1016.2

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 18

People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 307–312

 

Amelioration, Plea bargains, Sentencing, Sixth Amendment

Case 000963

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Having been found in violation of probation and the previously imposed but suspended prison term having been ordered executed, the defendant is entitled to challenge the upper term that he agreed to in 2021 before section 1170 was amended to provide that the upper term may be imposed only on aggravating factor stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.

If the prosecution or court are not satisfied with the resulting modification, the plea shall be set aside and the parties shall be restored to their status prior to the plea agreement.

First Holding:

Effective 1/1/2022, SB 567 amended section 1170 to make the middle term the presumptive sentence and permit a trial court to impose the upper term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Second Holding:

In Mitchell, the California Supreme Court resolved the effect of section 1170(b) on negotiated dispositions, holding that SB 567’s amendments to the statute apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases that were not final on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735, 737–738

Third Holding:

We therefore reverse the judgment because the facts relied on to justify the upper term were not stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. The defendantl may reaffirm the bargain and waive the requirements now applicable under section 1170(b), or he may withdraw his plea and return the parties to a pre-plea posture, with the prosecutor bearing its burden of proof. What he may not do, however, is unilaterally obtain a reduction of his agreed-upon upper term sentence to the middle term.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729, 735, 749

Gary note:

(The opinion made no mention of Penal Code section 1171, effective 1/1/2025, even though the Mitchell opinion made an observation in a footnote. There are several unpublished cases that have held that section 1171 will NOT result in a rescission of the plea agreement, in light of the language in 1171(c)(3) that says, “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (You can search for the unpublished opinions I have posted, where I may have added additional commentary.  Maybe try the search term “1171” or “PEN 1171” with or without quotation marks.)

(On May 18, 2026, the Supreme Court decided People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729. It was an appeal directly from the original sentencing under section 1170, and did not arise out of a ruling on the application of any other ameliorative statutes. The question was “Does Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which limits a trial court’s discretion to impose upper term sentences, apply retroactively to defendants sentenced pursuant to stipulated plea agreements?”

(The court concluded that it does apply (section 1170 as amended by SB 567), but it remanded with the Stamps remedy–that if the defendant opts to claim the benefits of section 1170 and the resulting sentence is something the DA or the court are not happy with, the plea will be set aside and the parties restored to their pre-plea bargain status.

(But it contained a very important footnote:

(“Shortly before oral argument, counsel for Mitchell filed a letter with this court identifying section 1171 as a new authority. Section 1171, effective January 1, 2025 (Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2) sets forth procedures governing a “ ‘postconviction proceeding,’ ” which the statute defines as “a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.” (§ 1171, subd. (a).) At oral argument, counsel for Mitchell urged that this statutory definition broadly encompasses a remand to the trial court in the context of a direct appeal under the authority of section 1170(b) and Estrada. We decline to consider this argument because we have concluded that Mitchell is entitled to a remand under our established precedent in Stamps. We express no view on the applicability of section 1171 to this case or how it might affect the options described above. Mitchell may raise this issue in the Court of Appeal or the trial court in the first instance.”

(On remand, the Court of Appeal issued its new opinion–this time unpublished–in which it further remanded the case to the trial court for resolution in light of the Supreme Court decision. And in that unpublished opinion, it stated, “We now find that Mitchell’s section 1171 arguments should be resolved first by the trial court. Accordingly, we remand this action to that court for further proceedings consistent with Mitchell II [the Supreme Court decision]. On remand, Mitchell may raise her contentions regarding section 1171.”)

Amelioration, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 000919

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to consideration for resentencing under section 1172.75 even though she stipulated to the upper term in her original plea agreement. The matter is remanded.

Under Mitchell, the defendant is free to raise the issue of whether section 1171 precludes the setting aside of her plea if the court modifies the sentence to something less than the stipulated sentence.

First Holding:

The defendant is entitled to the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s provisions notwithstanding her agreement to a specified term as part of a plea bargain.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729

Second Holding:

The proper remedy is to remand this case and permit the defendant to pursue relief under the new benefit that SB 567 confers. On remand, the defendant may either waive or invoke the requirements of section 1170(b). If she reaffirms her acceptance of the plea bargain and enters a new waiver of section 1170(b)’s requirements, the court shall reinstate the original sentence as negotiated by the parties.

If she declines to enter that waiver, in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify the existing plea agreement to specify a midterm sentence. If the court also accepts the modification it shall sentence the defendant accordingly. If no such agreement is reached and approved, the defendant’s remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain. In that case the court shall set aside the plea, the matter shall proceed as to the defendant as if no plea had been entered, and the case shall be set for trial.

In keeping with footnote 9 of Mitchell, however, on our remand to the trial court, the defendant may present her argument that section 1171, enacted effective 1/1/25, provides that any modification of her sentence under ameliorative provisions shall not result in setting aside her plea.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Duty of the court, Plea bargains, Sentencing

Case 000863

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We modify the sentence by vacating the trial court’s stay of punishment for the firearm enhancement and instead strike the punishment.

First Holding:

After taking the defendant’s admission to the firearm enhancement, the trial court did not impose additional punishment for it. Instead, the trial court incorrectly imposed and stayed the low term of three years for the firearm enhancement. Generally, a court has no discretion to stay an enhancement.

The court must either impose or strike the enhancement. Under section 1385(b)(1), the court may also strike the punishment, instead of the enhancement itself. The trial court’s stay of the enhancement resulted in an unauthorized sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1385(b)(1)

People v. Haykel (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 146, 151

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364-365

People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1122–1123

People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 391

Second Holding:

A resentencing hearing is unnecessary because the correction does not require resolving a factual dispute or exercising discretion. The trial court did not intend to dismiss the firearm enhancement because an admission to it was required by the plea agreement. Nor did the trial court intend to impose additional punishment for the firearm enhancement.

The record clearly supports the court’s intention to strike the punishment for the enhancement had it known a stay was not possible. We accordingly modify the sentence by vacating the trial court’s order that imposed and stayed the three-year term for the firearm enhancement as to count 1. We further modify the sentence to comply with the terms of the plea agreement by striking the punishment for the firearm enhancement pursuant to section 1385(b)(1).

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 294

People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1473