The amount of credit for time served was short by three days. The judgment is modified to include those three days.
The appellate court has authority to modify the judgment to correct the credit for time served.
People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493–494 [modifying judgment to correct custody credits]
Upon determining that the minor violated probation by using marijuana, the juvenile court committed the minor to juvenile hall for 18 months, a sentence that the court had initially stayed in favor of home detention on probation with GPS monitoring. On appeal, the minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in automatically lifting the stay and imposing the commitment without a reassessment of the minor’s circumstances. The juvenile court erred in imposing the 18-month commitment without considering relevant factors and will vacate the disposition order and remand for the court to conduct a new disposition hearing.
The juvenile court’s decision may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing the minor to juvenile hall.
In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147
A juvenile court cannot lift an imposed, stayed or suspended term of confinement without meeting the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. Section 777 requires that an order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent and directing commitment to a county institution shall be made only after a noticed hearing.
In re Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 960
In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147
In order to commit the minor to juvenile hall, the court must be fully satisfied that the minor’s mental and physical condition and qualifications render it probable the minor will benefit from the commitment. To determine what is appropriate under a given set of circumstances, a court must review those circumstances every time the minor appears for a dispositional hearing. Juvenile courts must consider safety and protection of the public and the best interests of the minor in all deliberations. Violation of a juvenile court’s order cannot lead automatically to imposition of some reserved measure, but requires a complete review of the order and such amendments as the court finds meet and proper under the governing statutory criteria.
WIC 734
WIC 202
In re Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 960
In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147-1148 [The juvenile court must determine the best manner in which to facilitate the rehabilitation of the minor]
In re Chad S. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 607, 614
In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088-1089
(GARY note: This case actually provided no relief at all to the defendant. It is included because it teaches a valuable lesson on the burden an appellant bears to prevail on appeal. The defendant argued that the protective order was unlawful because he was not convicted of a crime eligible for protective orders.
(But the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant did not show that he did not commit the crime in the course of a domestic violence course of conduct, and the Court of Appeal must assume that the trial court made such a finding or it would not have imposed the order.
(The defendant was required to prove a negative. It is entirely possible that there was nothing in the record that would disprove there was or was not a domestic relationship. The conviction resulted from a plea bargain with a stipulated sentence. No objection was interposed at the time the protective order was issued.
But the case highlights the importance of understanding that an appellate court is not bound to help the defense. The conviction shifted the presumption from innocence to guilt, and the burden shifted likewise. The California Constitution requires upholding a conviction in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the appellate courts start with a mandate that the conviction be affirmed. It is appellate counsel’s role to chip away at the presumption that orders of the superior court were properly issued. Don’t make any assumptions that cannot be backed up by the record.)
The defendant contends the trial court erred in issuing a criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2(i) because his conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm (section 245(b)) is not an offense enumerated under the statute.
Assault with a semiautomatic firearm is not an explicitly enumerated offense under section 136.2(i). However, assault with a semiautomatic firearm can qualify under the statute as a crime involving domestic violence if the defendant’s abusive conduct is directed at someone with a qualifying relationship to him.
The record on appeal is silent as to the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim. The defendant has not remedied this silence with an adequate record from which we can discern whether his conviction constituted a crime involving domestic violence. On this silent record, we indulge all intendments and presumptions to support the criminal protective order, including the existence of a qualifying relationship between Hooks and the victim. Because the record does not support the defendant’s claim, he fails to meet his burden on appeal.
PEN 13700
FAM 6203(a), 6211(c)
The People assert the defendant forfeited his contention by failing to object in the trial court. As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order during sentencing, we will consider the defendant’s claim on the merits.
People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382
Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. This presumption also applies to a lower court’s orders. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the order on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. On appeal, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate error below and provide an adequate record to support his arguments. Any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant. We will not presume error.
People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573
People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549
On resentencing the defendant under section 1172.75, the balance of the restitution fine must be struck, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago.
Effective January 1, 2025, AB 1186 (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, sec. 1) amended section 1465.9 to add subdivision (d), providing that any portion of a restitution fine under section 1465.9 that is not paid within 10 years cannot be collected upon. The restitution fine here more than 10 years ago. We therefore vacate the fine.
PEN 1465.9(d)
In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066
In this trial that resulted in a conviction of two counts of felony vandalism, the trial court erred under state law by admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony about the costs to repair her vehicle. The admission of the hearsay testimony was prejudicial under state law. We reverse the vandalism convictions and remand for the People to elect whether to retry them as felonies or accept their reduction to misdemeanors.
Other than the deductible, an insurance company paid for the repair of the damages. The victims testified to what she was told was the cost of the repairs. No repair bill was introduced into evidence. The trial court erroneously overruled defendant’s objections to the victim’s hearsay statements regarding the cost of repairs. State-law errors are reviewed for harmlessness under Watson. Under Watson, reversal is required if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have achieved a more favorable result absent the out-of-court statements.
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836
People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1308
People v. Lozano (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 366, 381–382
The vandalism convictions must be reduced to misdemeanors because of the error in admitting the victim’s hearsay testimony. The only further relief the defendant could obtain from prevailing on his substantial-evidence claim is a bar to retrying him on the damage-value element. To resolve this claim, we consider whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. Conflicts and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.
People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60 Cal.4th 583, 591
People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87
Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission. The reason for this is that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary trial errors as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence. While the former is in effect a finding that the government has failed to prove its case against the defendant, the latter implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but is simply a determination that the defendant has been convicted through a judicial process that is defective in some fundamental respect.
People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 684